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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of three non-state actors -- Freedom House, the 
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) -- in the creation and implementation of US policy towards Latin 
America from 1980 to 1993. The Reagan administration oversaw a key change in US 
Latin American policy to a focus on democracy promotion, which took over from 
Carter’s human rights policy as the moral justification for US policy towards the region. 
This created a tension in the US between the liberal human rights movement of the 
1970s and a new neo-conservative human rights movement which supported Reagan’s 
democracy promotion policies. The years that frame this study cover the establishment 
of democracy promotion as the primary inter-American policy. Moreover, the inclusion 
of the early 1990s allows for an assessment of the extent to which this policy changed 
after the end of the Cold War.  
 This thesis will take a comparative approach allowing me to examine the role 
played by different types of non-state actors as well as the relationships between the 
Reagan administration and both the liberal and neo-conservative human rights 
movements. Furthermore, this thesis will provide two case studies (Chile and 
Nicaragua) to examine how these organisations interacted with US foreign policy in the 
context of specific Latin American countries. The first four chapters of this thesis 
examine the three organisation’s various backgrounds, their sources of funding and their 
networks in the US and Latin America, while the final two chapters examine the 
consequences of these findings for their policies towards Chile and Nicaragua. This 
research hopes to contribute to the historiography of human rights, of inter-American 
relations and of the interactions between non-state actors and the US government.  
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Introduction 
 
For US-Latin American relations, the 1970s represented a decade of change; the 
aggressive policy of Chilean regime change and regional control put forward by Nixon 
in the early 1970s was followed by the human rights-led policies of the Carter 
administration. As the Cold War thawed, Latin America moved from being a “Cold War 
battleground” to a test centre for US moral credibility. Carter’s human rights policy 
grew out of a national feeling, which followed Vietnam and the corruption of the 
Watergate scandal, that a more moral politics was needed.1 The election of Reagan in 
1980 saw the human rights policy of the Carter administration replaced by one of 
“democracy promotion”, under the auspices of which the United States intervened 
repeatedly (financially, politically and militarily) in Latin American domestic politics 
during the 1980s. This thesis hopes to answer three main questions: first, how did the 
conception and implementation of US human rights policy in the Americas change with 
the election of Reagan? If so what consequences did this change have for inter-
American policy? Finally, what role was played by non-state actors in the creation and 
implementation of US human rights and foreign policy in the 1980s and early 1990s?  
 In order to answer these questions this thesis will examine the work undertaken 
by three US-based non-state actors in Latin America: Freedom House, the Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). 
All three of these organisations state their main interests to be human rights and 
                                                 
1 Stuckey, Mary E, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and the National Agenda (USA: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2008) pp. 8-9. See also Whitehead, Laurence, “Explaining Washington’s Central American 
Policies” in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1983) pp. 321-363. For a full analysis of 
the Carter administration’s human rights policy see Mower, A. Glenn, Human Rights and American 
Foreign Policy: The Carter and Reagan Experiences (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Muravchik, 
Joshua, Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (Lanham, MD: 
Hamilton Press, 1986); Schmitz, David F. and Walker, Vanessa, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of 
Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy” in Diplomatic History, No. 28, 
(2004) pp. 113-143; Schoultz, Lars, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) and Strong, Robert, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter 
and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000)  
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democracy. While there were many human rights groups in operation by the 1980s, 
these three were the key US-based organisations engaged with Reagan’s democracy-
promoting crusade. They represent a cross-section of historical periods, political 
leanings and “types” of non-state actor. Freedom House was founded in the 1940s and 
for much of the post-war period represented the liberal centre of US politics. 
Established before the institutionalisation of human rights in the United States, Freedom 
House initially stated that it stood for “freedom and democracy” and sought to act as a 
clearing house for information concerning these issues.2 WOLA had been founded in 
the early 1970s in response to Chile’s military coup of 1973; ideologically to the left of 
US politics, it, too, acted primarily as a disseminator of information but was also a 
lobbying organisation. The NED was the hardest to classify of the three organisations. 
A creation of the 1980s with strong right-wing leanings, the NED was a grant-making 
organisation which provided money to groups and organisations abroad for the purpose 
of promoting and consolidating democracy. While legally not a branch of the US 
government, the NED was established by and received its budget from Congress. The 
framework for comparison of the three case studies is discussed further below (pp. 27-
28). 
 
Historiography 
In recent years, there has been a trend towards the re-examining and rewriting of both 
the history of US-Latin American relations during the Cold War and the history of 
human rights and the human rights movement. Samuel Moyn and Barbara Keys have 
shown that the history of human rights is far shorter than described by scholars such as 
Micheline Ishay and Paul Gordon Lauren, emerging apparently from nowhere in the 
1970s and rapidly becoming a powerful international norm publicly championed by the 
                                                 
2 Princeton University, Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 1, Certificate of Incorporation, (1941). 
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Carter administration in its dealings with Latin America.3 Although this human rights 
literature discusses the role played by Congress and certain non-state actors in the 
institutionalisation of human rights and human rights policy in the United States, for the 
most part, questions of inter-American relations are examined through investigations of 
the actions of the US executive branch. While the relationship between the Carter 
administration and human rights, particularly in Latin America, has been thoroughly 
studied, there is little scholarship concerning the question of human rights under the 
Reagan administration and still less on the position held by US-based non-state actors in 
relation to US inter-American policy in the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis will be 
engaging primarily with four schools of historiography, addressing the history of human 
rights, non-state actors, inter-American relations and democracy promotion.  
i) Defining Human Rights 
Although the concept of human rights has become a powerful norm, enshrined in 
international law and considered an essential aspect of “good” governance, there is little 
consensus concerning what the term actually means. Human rights is a complex, 
shifting concept and, for much of the 20th century, definitions of human rights have 
varied with geography and political ideals. According to Moyn, around the 1970s these 
conceptions converged (albeit briefly as this thesis will show) into a transnational 
human rights movement which brought the issue to the forefront of international 
consciousness. While the concept of “rights” does, in various forms, pre-date the 20th 
century, the first concrete definition of human rights came with the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The Declaration laid out a selection of 
                                                 
3 Moyn, Samuel, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: First Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010) pp. 3-5; Keys, Barbara, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights 
Revolution of the 1970s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) p. 19.  For more on the 
history of human rights see Ishay, Micheline, The history of Human Rights from Ancient Times to the 
Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Hunt, Lynn, Inventing Human 
Rights: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007) and Lauren, Paul Gordon, The 
Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011).  
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rights which, to this day, form the basis of the international legal definition of human 
rights and include socio-economic rights and civil and political liberties.4 Indeed, for the 
most part, when people talk of human rights they are referring to those rights set out by 
the Declaration, ranging from basic rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture and 
arbitrary imprisonment to promises of work, social security, education and a basic 
quality of life.5 While the Declaration provided a definition of what constituted basic 
human rights in international law, different regions and countries understood and used 
the concept in different ways between 1948 and the mid-1970s. Patrick William Kelly 
argues that the language of human rights was not widely used in the Americas prior to 
the 1970s. Utilised by many Latin American Marxists as a tactical weapon to deploy 
against the capitalist world order and by others as a new paradigm through which to see 
the world, the concept of human rights in the region was far from homogenous.6 
Similarly, in the United States the Democratic and Republican parties both picked up 
the concept of human rights, although the US interpretation generally tended to 
emphasise individualism in contrast to the collectivism of the Latin American left. 
While the liberal vision of human rights, which triumphed in the mid-1970s, sought to 
transcend the nation state and hold all governments accountable to a universal norm, the 
alternative view focused on a more politicised conception of human rights.7 This 
                                                 
4 The full text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be found here <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 
23/10/2015). 
5 Moyn, The Last Utopia (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2012) pp. 62-63.  
6 Kelly, William Patrick, “’Magic Words’: The Advent of Transnational Human Rights Activism in Latin 
America’s Southern Cone in the Long 1970s” in Eckel, Jan and Moyn, Samuel, The Breakthrough: 
Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) pp. 89-90.  
7 Bon Tempo, Carl J., “Human rights and the US Republican Party in the Late 1970s” in Eckel and Moyn, 
The Breatkthrough, p. 158. For more on the institutionalisation of human rights in US policy in the 1970s 
see Cmiel, Kenneth, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States” in The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 86, No. 3 (1999) pp. 1231-1250; Iriye, Petra Goedde and Hitchcock, William I., 
The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Schmidli, William Michael, The Fate of Freedom Everywhere: Human Rights and US Cold War Policy 
Towards Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013); Sikkink, Kathryn, Mixed Signals: US 
Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) and Snyder, Sarah, 
Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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combined the issues of democracy and human rights; it was this that won out in the 
1980s with the election of Reagan and not only served as the basis for US human rights 
policy for the following thirteen years, but also gave rise to a neo-conservative human 
rights movement to counter the liberal human rights groups of the 1970s.8  
 According to Barbara Keys, the rise of human rights as an issue in the United 
States in the 1970s came about in an attempt to assuage the national guilt and shame 
that marred the post-Vietnam era.9 She claims that the US human rights movement of 
that decade emphasised civil and political rights over social and economic rights, 
although conservatives tended to prioritise freedoms of religion, movement and speech 
rather than the issues of torture and arbitrary imprisonment which primarily interested 
liberals.10 Keys argues that around the mid-1970s a group of conservative Democrats, 
led by Henry “Scoop” Jackson, began to redefine human rights in terms of anti-
communism and claim the concept for what eventually became the neo-conservative 
movement.11 Initially interested in and linked to the Soviet dissident movement and 
weary of the national discourse of post-Vietnam guilt, this group sought to regain the 
global moral high ground and re-frame anti-communist rhetoric with a strong focus on 
democracy. As the 1970s progressed and the US government embraced liberal human 
rights as a key part of foreign policy, this conservative reaction grew in prominence and 
was adopted by members of the Republican Party as well. Indeed, this conservative 
Democratic human rights movement had a strong influence on Reagan’s anti-
communist democracy promotion programme and it is the progression and spread of 
this movement that this thesis hopes to examine.  
                                                 
8 For more on the tension between democracy and human rights see Hartmann, Hauke, “US Human 
Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981” in Human Rights Quarterly, No. 23 (2001) pp. 402-
430. 
9 Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) pp. 3-4.  
10 Ibid, p. 13 
11 Ibid, pp. 103-104.  
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ii) Non-State Actors 
Although there is some discussion of the place of non-state actors in the history of 
human rights, neither Keys nor Moyn really go into the position such organisations and 
groups held in the process of institutionalisation. Both do make some mention of 
Amnesty International and the work it did for human rights advocacy, but aside from 
brief engagement with this case, the only detailed discussion of non-state actors in the 
institutionalisation of human rights comes from Sarah Snyder in her work on the 
Helsinki Accords and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their work Activists 
Beyond Borders (2014).12 Keck and Sikkink highlight the role played by non-state 
actors in the inclusion of human rights language in the UN charter of the 1940s but 
suggest that it was not until the early 1970s that organisations specialising in human 
rights began to proliferate.13 While Keck and Sikkink provide an excellent, detailed 
description of the role played by non-state organisations in wider transnational 
advocacy networks, this description contains only a nod to the role of such 
organisations in championing human rights in US foreign policy-making. They make 
reference to the fact that during the Carter administration, the Bureau of Human Rights 
sought out contact with and information from non-state actors and that these actors 
continued to influence policy under both Reagan and Bush. This account of non-state 
involvement in foreign and human rights policy is far from the whole story, particularly 
during the Reagan and Bush administrations. By the 1980s, the non-state human rights 
movement was far from homogenous and, for the most part, liberal human rights 
                                                 
12 The main debate concerning Amnesty International mostly concerns the impact it had in the United 
States. While Moyn hails Amnesty International as the inventor of grassroots human rights advocacy and 
the driver of the public awareness of human rights, Keys claims that Amnesty International USA was, in 
fact, almost ignored in the United States until the mid-1970s by which time human rights issues had 
already captured the imagination of the American public. 
13 Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) pp. 85 and 89; Snyder, Human Rights Activism and 
the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). See also Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S Cold 
War Policy Towards Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
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organisations were actively distrusted by the Reagan administration. Moreover, very 
rarely did the Reagan administration approach non-state actors for anything; more often, 
it was the organisations which approached the administration to put forward their ideas 
and to lobby for policy changes. 
In most of the scholarship concerning both inter-American relations and the 
history of human rights, the main focus is on the agency and actions of governments 
and inter-governmental organisations. While studies have been undertaken into the 
work of individual non-state organisations and mentions made of the Bureau of Human 
Rights’ relationships with non-state groups, these have tended to place non-state actors 
in the periphery, viewing their role as little more than the provision of occasional 
information. Some of the scholarship, particularly that which concerns the history of 
human rights, does engage with the role of Congress in foreign policy-making, but even 
this is usually viewed through the lens of its relationship with the executive branch. This 
focus on governments and inter-governmental organisations does not do the process of 
foreign policy-making full justice. This thesis hopes to show that the development of 
foreign policy, particularly in the late 20th century, was considerably more complex and 
involved both governmental and non-state actors. While, as discussed previously, 
mentions have been made of non-state actors in the institutionalisation of human rights 
policy in the 1970s there has been no real attempt to examine how the role of non-state 
actors changed with the inauguration of Reagan. The Reagan administration had a great 
distrust of the liberal human rights groups which had come to prominence in the 1970s 
and this led to such groups being largely cut out of executive policy-making, making 
way for the new neo-conservative groups to gain influence.14 
                                                 
14 Sikkink, Kathryn, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004) pp. 178-179. 
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 While little scholarly attention has been paid to the role of non-state actors in 
foreign policy-making, work has been done on the involvement on non-state actors in 
wider transnational networks and there is some discussion concerning best practice and 
governance for non-state organisations. Evidence from this thesis suggests that much of 
this scholarship does not apply to organisations engaged with democracy promotion and 
human rights work. According to Keck and Sikkink there are a number of things that 
are essential for the functioning of non-state actors seeking to engage transnationally; 
these include reciprocal information exchange and relations with activists from target 
countries.15 While this was, indeed, the approach adopted by many liberal human rights 
organisations in the 1970s, the neo-conservative human rights movement did not appear 
to follow this method and, although questions could be asked about how well informed 
these organisations really were, this lack of contact did not impact negatively on their 
ability to achieve their aims. The consensus in the scholarship is generally that 
legitimacy and independence are the two most important traits non-state actors require. 
The most significant factors affecting these traits are funding sources and internal 
bureaucracy. According to Carrie Meyer and Glenn Wright the primary cause of a loss 
of independence and legitimacy in non-state actors is an over-reliance on “official 
donors”, defined as bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations and governments.16 Meyer 
actually takes this line further to suggest that any large single donor causes tensions 
between non-state actors’ need to be accountable to their donors and to be 
independent.17 While this definitely holds true for service providing non-state actors 
dealing primarily in humanitarian and development issues, for those organisations 
which deal in human rights and democracy promotion it is not necessarily the case. 
Theories concerning non-state actor legitimacy and independence also claim that 
                                                 
15 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) p. 28. 
16 Meyer, Carrie, The Economics and Politics of NGOs in Latin America (Westport: Praeger, 2000) p. 51. 
17 Ibid. 
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extensive funding by foundations causes a process of “bureaucratisation” within the 
organisations forcing them to divert essential resources away from projects to deal with 
the bureaucracy created by these grants.18 However, again while this increase in 
bureaucratisation is certainly problematic for organisations working directly on the 
ground and therefore requiring high levels of flexibility, for the groups in question here 
foundation funding often did not result in bureaucratic expansion. In the few situations 
in which extra bureaucracy did fall on these organisations as a result of foundation 
funding, they managed it with comparative ease and it does not appear to have impacted 
on their ability to carry out their stated aims. Overall, few of the previous theories 
concerning non-state actors apply to these organisations. Many of these groups were far 
from transnational, having minimal contact with local activists in Latin America and, 
when it came to governance and questions of legitimacy and independence, these 
organisations did not appear to face the set of struggles laid down in the literature.  
iii) Human Rights, Non-State Actors and Inter-American Relations 
With the exception of the human rights policy of the Carter administration, there is 
surprisingly little literature which examines Cold War-era US policy towards Latin 
America through the lens of human rights and still less which examines the role of non-
state actors in foreign policy-making generally. Moreover, scholarship concerning the 
inter-American policy of the Reagan administration is still in its early stages and, as a 
result, is also minimal. Much of the scholarship regarding US-Latin American relations 
in the Cold War is concerned with how the region fits into the overarching narrative of 
the Cold War and anti-communism. The primary debate in this literature addresses the 
level of agency Latin American actors had during this time. Scholars such as Peter 
Smith believe that US policy towards the region shaped Latin America’s experience of 
                                                 
18 Edwards, Michael and Hulme, David, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on 
Nongovernmental Organisations” in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 (1996) p. 964. 
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the Cold War.19 By contrast, the work of individuals such as Hal Brands and Gilbert 
Joseph and Daniela Spenser argue that Latin American actors were largely responsible 
for the region’s Cold War experience and that this was only exacerbated by 
Washington.20 While the question of Cold War agency is important, it will not be 
central to this thesis, which is primarily concerned with US policy towards Latin 
America. That said, this debate warrants mention since at least one of the non-state 
actors under examination here did attempt to provide a platform for local actors to 
influence US inter-American policy, thus seeking to give agency to the countries of the 
region.  
What is important for an understanding of inter-American policy is how the Reagan 
administration perceived the region. Scholars such as Greg Grandin view Latin America 
as merely another battlefield in the ideological battle of the Cold War, but one in which 
the United States ruled almost absolutely.21 He suggests that Reagan’s policy towards 
the region, particularly in Central America, was possible precisely because the region 
was of very little international significance and, as a result, any fallout would be easily 
managed. This appears to be an over-simplification of the Reagan administration’s 
interest of the region since it largely ignores the policy of democracy promotion, 
focusing instead on the overtly aggressive actions taken by the United States. Sikkink, 
in her work Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America (2004), 
provides a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the Reagan administration’s 
regional policy. She argues that democracy promotion became the Reagan 
                                                 
19 Smith, Peter, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States and the World (New York: Oxford 
University press, 2008) p. 113. See also Rabe, Stephen, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold 
War in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
20 Brands, Hal, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) pp. 255-
258; Harmer, Tanya, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011) and Joseph, Gilbert and Spenser Daniela, In from the Cold: Latin America’s New 
Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 
21 Grandin, Greg, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States and the Rise of the New 
Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006) p. 12.  
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administration’s major inter-American policy legacy and that democracy promotion and 
human rights were closely linked. In fact, Keys takes this one step further by stating that 
human rights policy was actually recast in the form of democracy promotion by Elliott 
Abrams when he became Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.22 This 
thesis will draw upon the work of Keys, Sikkink and Grandin to suggest that, in the 
1980s, human rights policy was redefined and subsumed into the democracy promotion 
mission and that Latin America proved to be an excellent testing ground for the new 
human rights policy. As Sikkink suggests, while the policies of human rights and 
democracy promotion combined in the 1980s, those who had campaigned for human 
rights, particularly in the 1970s, often maintained that the two were separate phenomena 
and did not take part in democracy promotion.23 Indeed, this tension between 
conflicting conceptions of human rights will form one of the main themes of this thesis.  
iv) Promoting Democracy 
As Keys and other scholars of US foreign policy suggest, the United States has a long 
history of espousing the values of freedom and democracy abroad.24 Peter Smith argues 
that the political mission to spread democracy was a central tenet in the national creed 
of the United States and formed a key part of American exceptionalism.25 He sees this 
interest in democracy promotion as an explanation and a justification for US 
imperialism abroad, claiming that it helps mobilise support domestically and engender a 
rationale in subjugated nations for the new arrangements of power.26 Smith’s claim that 
democracy promotion was part of the national creed of the United States maybe over-
stating its significance in the early life of the country, but by the 1900s it was certainly a 
                                                 
22 Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) p. 273. 
23 Sikkink, K., Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004) p. 158. 
24 Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) p. 5. 
25 Smith, Peter, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States and the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) p. 43. 
26 Ibid, pp. 43-44.  
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driving force in US foreign policy. It would be more accurate to suggest that democracy 
promotion had been brought to the fore of US foreign policy by Woodrow Wilson. 
Wilson believed firmly that the United States could, given time, promote the spread of 
constitutional democracy abroad and this belief was formative in Wilsonian foreign 
policy.27 Although the democracy promotion mission fell in and out of favour at 
different times since its institutionalisation by Wilson in the 1900s, the redefinition of 
human rights policy in the 1980s represents a key part of its history.  
A great deal of the scholarship concerning the Reagan administration’s policy 
towards Latin America has focused on the flashpoints of US aggression (such as the 
Contra War) and the abandonment of containment.28 Indeed, even when scholars do 
make mention of Reagan’s democracy promotion project, it is usually dismissed as 
being a convenient justification for US aggression in the region.29 According to 
Abraham Lowenthal, the Reagan administration’s commitment to democracy promotion 
was little more than a rhetorical excuse for neo-imperialism.30 However, when placed 
within the broader context of Reagan’s re-heated Cold War, democracy promotion was 
a concrete policy driven by the desire to ensure that Latin America remained on the 
ideological side of the United States. Moreover, as this thesis will show, democracy 
promotion was a vital part of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy legacy. While 
there were elements of the policy that certainly resembled neo-imperialism, the claim 
                                                 
27 Smith, Tony, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012) pp. 61-64. 
28 See Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Grandin, 
Empire’s Workshop (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Joseph and Spenser, In from the Cold 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Livingstone, Grace, America’s Backyard: United States and 
Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror (London: Zed Books, 2009); Rabe, The 
Killing Zone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Scott, James M., Deciding to Intervene: The 
Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NY: Duke University Press, 1996) and Smith, 
P., Talons of the Eagle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
29 Lowenthal, Abraham, Exporting Democracy: the United States and Latin America (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press. 1991); Robinson, William, “Globalization, the World System and “Democracy 
Promotion” in Theory and Society, Vol. 25, No. 5 (1996) pp. 615-665 and Sikkink, Mixed Signals (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press 2004). 
30 Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991). See also Sikkink, 
Mixed Signals (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) pp. 149-150, 155-158.  
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put forward by Keys that, for the Reagan administration, human rights promotion 
became indistinguishable from anti-communism seems to be a more accurate 
explanation for democracy promotion policies.31 
   
Periodisation and Definitions 
This thesis seeks to highlight the significance of the role of non-state actors in foreign 
policy debates, but what exactly is meant by non-state actors? There have been many 
attempts over the years to create a concrete definition of the term “non-governmental 
organisations” (NGOs); not only has a consensus never been reached, but none of the 
definitions really encompass the full range of organisations and groups involved in 
political activity while not being part of or affiliated to the state. Democracy promoting 
organisations are not well represented by the terms most commonly used when 
discussing organisations outside the state so, as a result, this thesis will use the term 
“non-state actors” to refer to the type of organisation in question here. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the term non-state actor will be defined using an amalgamation of David 
Lewis and Nazneen Kanji’s basic definition of NGOs and Alison Van Rooy’s definition 
of civil society organisations (CSOs). According to Lewis and Kanji, NGOs are 
“independent organisation[s] that [are] neither run by government nor driven by the 
profit motive”.32 Van Rooy states that CSOs are organisations that are political agents 
as opposed to NGOs which usually occupy a service delivery role. She quotes from a 
research report stating that “a concern with democratization [sic] highlights the more 
political role played by civic organisations”.33 Essentially this implies that CSOs 
typically work on political issues such as democratisation, human rights and socio-
                                                 
31 Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) p. 273. 
32 Lewis, David and Kanji, Nazneen, Non-Governmental Organisations and Development (London: 
Routledge, 2009) pp. 2-3.  
33 van Rooy, Alison, Civil Society and the Aid Industry (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1998) p. 35. 
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economic questions, unlike traditional NGOs which typically do not concern themselves 
with political matters. So, for the purposes of this thesis the term non-state actor denotes 
a political agent which is run neither by a government nor for profit.34  
 Since, as has been established by Keys and Moyn, the 1970s was the decade in 
which human rights was institutionalised and became an international norm, why 
examine the 1980s and early 1990s? The inauguration of Reagan in 1980 represented a 
significant shift in US foreign policy in several key ways. First, the Reagan 
administration instigated a reheating of the Cold War and, alongside this came a return 
to the strongly ideological rhetoric of democracy versus communism which had faded 
during the détente era of the 1970s. Second, given the Reagan administration’s seeming 
lack of interest in human rights abuses, it is important to examine how this attitude fit in 
to a world in which human rights had become a key international issue. During the 
1980s, in part thanks to the return to prominence of the Cold War as a war of ideologies, 
human rights became irreversibly redefined, not just in the United States but globally. 
The addition of procedural democratic rights, specifically US-style democratic rights, to 
the common definition of human rights began in the 1980s and has persisted to this day. 
Moreover, alongside this redefinition arose a neo-conservative human rights movement 
to counter the liberal movement of the 1970s and this, too, changed the way in which 
human rights were advocated for and viewed. This neo-conservative definition of 
human rights rose to prominence throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations and, 
as a result, the period 1980 – 1993 is key to an understanding of the history and current 
conception of human rights.  
                                                 
34 The debate concerning the definition of NGOs is extensive and includes scholars such as Ahmed, 
Shamima and Potter, David, NGOs in International Politics (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press Inc, 2006); 
Grugel, Jean, “Romancing Civil Society: European NGOs in Latin America” in Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2000) pp. 87-107 and Mendelson, Sarah and Glenn, John, The 
Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002).  
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 For the purposes of this thesis, the two human rights movements will be referred 
to as the liberal movement and the neo-conservative movement. The use of the term 
“liberal” to denote the universalist movement of the 1970s is a continuation of 
terminology commonly used by previous scholars to refer to the beliefs and attitudes 
which formed this movement. The use of “neo-conservative” to describe the movement 
of the Reagan era may, at first, seem surprising given the term’s current association 
with leading members of George W. Bush’s administration, but early neo-conservatism 
was a far cry from that which pushed the United States into war in 2003. Neo-
conservatism was a diverse movement which, according to Justin Vaïsse, went through 
three incarnations.35 The first, the neo-conservatism of the 1960s and (in the case of 
foreign policy issues) the 1970s grew out of a negative reaction to a perceived leftward 
trend in US liberalism.36 The second, was mostly made up of Democratic Party activists 
who saw themselves as guarding the centre of US politics. They favoured domestic 
policies focusing on social progress and civil liberties while being staunchly anti-
Communist in their foreign policy. It was from this group that many members of NED 
and Freedom House staff came. Towards the end of the 1970s, this movement grew 
within the Republican party as well and, as a result of a shared common enemy in the 
form of Communism, the neo-conservative movement enjoyed a great deal of influence 
under Reagan.37 The neo-conservative movement of the 1970s and 1980s opposed the 
New Left’s human rights-focused foreign policy but also the centre-right and center-
left’s consensus on détente.38 These neo-conservatives believed that democracy was 
                                                 
35 Vaïsse, Justin, Neoconservatism: the Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011) p. 6. For more on the history of neo-conservatism see Dorrien, Gary J., The Neoconservative 
Mind: Politics, Culture and Ideology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Ehrman, John, The 
Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995); Gerson, Mark, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars 
(Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996) and Heilbrunn, Jacob, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of 
the Neocons (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 
36 Vaïsse, Neoconservatism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 7. 
37 Ibid, pp. 9-11.  
38 Ibid, p. 100.  
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important and that American might was the only thing that could protect democracy 
against the destabilising force of the Soviet Union.39 This belief carried over into the 
work and principles of both the NED and Freedom House and it is for this reason that 
these organisations will be referred to as the “neo-conservative” human rights 
movement.  
 
Case Studies 
The three case studies – Freedom House, WOLA and the NED – were chosen for the 
following reasons. These three organisations represent both sides of the debate 
concerning human rights within the United States; the NED and Freedom House were 
leading players in the neo-conservative human rights movement while WOLA 
represents the more traditional liberal human rights movement of the 1970s. By 
examining and comparing the three organisations it is possible to gain an insight into 
how these movements differed from each other and how the two human rights 
movements fared in the 1980s, but why these specific organisations? There is a case to 
be made for studying more publicly visible actors such as Amnesty International and 
Americas Watch, but not only were neither of these were born-and-bred US 
organisations, they also did not seek to engage with the policy of democracy promotion. 
Freedom House, WOLA and the NED were all home-grown US institutions seeking 
primarily to influence US foreign policy-making. This meant that during the 1980s, all 
three took a keen interest in Reagan’s democracy promotion policies. In addition to 
their differing priorities, they represent a political cross-section and two different types 
of non-state actors. Although by the 1980s Freedom House had been taken over by a 
neo-conservative group, its founding ideals were largely centrist and it did remain, for 
the most part, an organisation of the centre-right. Having been founded in the 1940s as a 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
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response to totalitarianism in Europe, Freedom House had a long standing interest in 
issues of democracy and, while it picked up human rights rhetoric as human rights 
became institutionalised in the 1970s, the return to democracy promotion came easily to 
it. By contrast, as a creation of the 1970s, WOLA’s primary interest was human rights 
and it was a key part of the liberal human rights movement in Washington in the 1970s. 
It was an outgrowth of the left-wing Christian social justice movement and was a strong 
proponent of liberal, universalist human rights. While the inclusion of the NED as a 
non-state actor may seem controversial, by its own description it does fit the definition 
in use in this thesis. Despite being created by Congress, the act which founded the 
organisation insisted that it would “not be considered an agency or establishment of the 
US Government”.40 Given the NED’s insistence that its board and decision making 
processes were completely independent of the US government this thesis will examine 
the NED by the parameters it set for itself. Measuring it by its own definition allows us 
to analyse whether or not it was a completely independent entity or whether the 
financial and historical connections it had to the government compromised its non-state 
status. In addition, the NED and many of its staff were key players in the neo-
conservative wing of the US’ New Right and indeed the burgeoning neo-conservative 
movement.  
 As well as representing a cross-section of the US political spectrum, these 
organisations also allow us to examine non-state actors engaging in two different types 
of work. Freedom House and WOLA operated almost like think tanks. Both of these 
organisations sought primarily to gather and disseminate information concerning the 
state of democracy and human rights in the region. As an extension of this, both also 
                                                 
40 Library of Congress, US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorizing appropriations 
for fiscal years 1984 and 1985 for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the 
Board for International Broadcasting , the Inter-American Foundation and the Asia Foundation, to 
establish the National Endowment for Democracy and for other purposes (16th May 1983) Bill (98) H.R. 
2915, p. 87. 
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acted as lobbyists, seeking to influence US policy using the information they delivered 
to the foreign policy community. Both also engaged in a small amount of advocacy 
work, although this was not the main priority of either organisation. By contrast, the 
NED did not participate in information gathering or lobbying; instead it was a grant-
making organisation which provided funds for organisations and projects which it saw 
important for the promotion and consolidation of democracy abroad. It is worth noting 
at this point that Freedom House and the NED did not only work in Latin America. 
While WOLA’s sole area of operation was the Americas, both the NED and Freedom 
House worked globally and, as a result, although both had permanent Latin American 
programmes, at times these took a back seat to priorities in other parts of the world (for 
example, the Middle East took priority with the Gulf War in the early 1990s).  
 In order to understand the work and role of these organisations more clearly, the 
last two chapters of this thesis will compare their work in Chile and in Nicaragua. At 
this point in the 20th century, both Chile and Nicaragua were undergoing a form of 
democratic transition, but the experiences of authoritarian and transitional governance 
in these countries was quite different. Moreover, both countries experienced radically 
different relations with the US government throughout this period. By 1980, Chile had 
endured seven years of General Augusto Pinochet’s military junta, a regime 
characterised by widespread violence against the left and the centre, human rights 
abuses and disappearances. In 1980 Chileans had voted in a new constitution which laid 
out a timetable for democratic transition. This constitution stated that Pinochet would 
remain President (with greatly increased powers) for eight more years, until 1988, at 
which point a plebiscite would be held concerning the continuation of his presidency. 
This plebiscite was held and Pinochet lost, which resulted fully contested elections the 
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following year and Chile’s return to democracy with the inauguration of the Christian 
Democrat Patricio Aylwin in 1990.41  
Nicaragua, on the other hand, had experienced a revolution in 1979 which 
overthrew the US-backed dictatorial Somoza dynasty.42 In the aftermath of this 
revolution, the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua and began a programme of social 
mobilisation and redistribution. Despite the declaration of a State of Emergency in 1982 
which curtailed some civil liberties, particularly freedoms of the press and of protest, 
the country held elections in 1984 which were declared free and fair by a majority of 
international observers, although the main opposition parties had not participated.43 
However, as the economic situation in Nicaragua deteriorated due to US sanctions and a 
US-funded civil war, the Sandinistas became increasingly unpopular and when elections 
were held again in 1989, they lost to a coalition of Nicaragua’s opposition parties 
funded by the United States.44 Despite the declared fairness of the 1984 elections, it was 
only after the Sandinistas’ defeat that the United States recognised Nicaragua’s “return 
to democracy”.45  
 Chile and Nicaragua also represent two very different US policy approaches 
towards the region. While Chile, until the election of Socialist Salvador Allende in 
1970, had not been at the forefront of US foreign policy, the US had taken a continuous 
interest Nicaragua in the 20th century, particularly following its occupation by the 
United States in 1912 (an occupation which effectively lasted for twenty-one years). 
                                                 
41 On the history of 20th century US-Chilean relations see Mares, David R. and Aravena, Francisco Rojas, 
The United States and Chile: Coming in from the Cold (New York: Routledge, 2001) and Sater, William, 
Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (London: University of Georgia Press, 1990). 
42 Soler Torrijos, Giancarlo, In the Shadow of the United States: Democracy and Regional Order in the 
Latin Caribbean (Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2008) p. 81. 
43 Vanden, Harry E. and Prevost, Gary, Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1993) p. 131. 
44 Scott, Deciding to Intervene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) pp. 157-180. 
45 On the history of US-Nicaraguan relations in the 20th century see Morley, Morris, Washington, Somoza 
and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, 1969-1981 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Pastor, Robert, Not Condemned to Repetition: the United States 
and Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002).  
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The United States had had a hand, at least in the timing, of the military coup which 
brought Pinochet to power in Chile and had been, until the Carter administration, a tacit 
supporter (and sometimes an active enabler) of the Pinochet regime.46 Although 
relations between the United States and the Pinochet regime soured due to the 
assassination of Orlando Letelier (a minister of Allende’s government living in exile) on 
US soil in 1976 and Carter’s human rights policy, in the early 1980s, the Reagan 
administration actively sought to normalise relations with Chile, returning to the policy 
of overlooking the Pinochet regime’s war on the Chilean left.47 As the 1980s 
progressed, anti-Pinochet protests grew in strength and, with the rise of Reagan’s 
democracy promotion policy and the appointment of Harry Barnes as Ambassador to 
Chile in 1985, US policy began to shift towards support for the Christian Democratic 
Party and democratic transition.48 By contrast, in Nicaragua the United States engaged 
in a highly aggressive policy of regime change in the 1980s. The Reagan administration 
had taken a keen interest in events in Central America, maintaining a militant anti-
communist policy in the area under which the left-wing Sandinista government could 
not be allowed to survive. As a result, the Reagan administration engaged in all out 
economic and covert warfare against the Sandinistas, blocking multinational bank loans, 
imposing sanctions and funding guerrilla movements based in Honduras to wage a civil 
war on the Sandinista government.49 Examining the work of Freedom House, WOLA 
                                                 
46 On US policy towards the Allende government see Harmer, Tanya, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-
American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Haslam, Jonathon, The 
Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (London: Verso, 
2005); Kornbluh, Peter, The Pinochet File (New York: New Press, 2013) pp. 79-115; Petras, James and 
Morely, Morris, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), and Qureshi, Lubna Z., Nixon, Kissinger and Allende: US 
Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009). For more information on 
Carter’s human rights policy towards Chile see Carleton, David and Stohl, Michael, “The Foreign Policy 
of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan” in Human Rights 
Quarterly, 7, No. 2, (1985) pp. 205-229.  
47 Morley, Morris and McGillion, Chris, Reagan and Pinochet: the Struggle of U.S. Policy towards Chile 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2015) pp. 11-13.  
48 Sikkink, Mixed Signals, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) p. 175. 
49 Smith, Christian, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central American Peace Movement (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996) p. 38. For more on the funding of the Contras and economic policy towards 
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and the NED in these contexts allows us to see how they interact, not only with different 
types of US policy and attitudes, but also whether the behave differently under different 
local circumstances.  
 
Methodology 
In addition to showing the role of non-state actors in democracy promotion in the 1980s 
and 1990s, part of the purpose of this thesis is to highlight the differences and 
similarities between, not only the two definitions of human rights which were 
competing at this time, but also between the Chilean and Nicaraguan experiences of US 
foreign policy. In order to do so, this thesis will take a comparative approach on two 
different levels; first, comparing the work and positions of the three organisations 
within US foreign policy and the international community and second comparing how 
these organisations interacted within specific national contexts and the relationships 
these nations had with the United States. As John Breuilly suggests, comparison should 
allow us to examine the significance of differences between subjects. 50 Through 
comparing the work of these organisations and highlighting the differences between 
them, this thesis will show how these differences affected the success these 
organisations had and the role they played in foreign policy-making as well as in the 
lived experiences of Chile and Nicaragua’s relations with the United States. In addition 
to organisational comparisons, this thesis seeks to compare the national experiences of 
Chile and Nicaragua. By encompassing two very different US foreign policy 
                                                 
Nicaragua see Pach, Chester, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism and Policy” in Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2006) pp. 83-84 and Roberts, Kenneth, “Bullying and Bargaining: The 
United States, Nicaragua and Conflict Resolution in Central America” in International Security, Vol. 15, 
No. 2 (1990) pp. 67-102. For a more general overview of the Reagan administration’s policies in 
Nicaragua see Kagan, Robert, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua 1977-1990 (New 
York: The Free Press, 1996); Robinson, William, and Norsworthy, Kent, David and Goliath: the U.S. 
War against Nicaragua (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987) and Vanderlaan, Mary, Revolution and 
Foreign Policy in Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). 
50 Breuilly, John, Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) p. 3. 
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approaches and two distinct transitional and political experiences, this comparison will 
not only show how these differences impacted on the work of the three organisations 
concerned, but will also allow us to draw some broader conclusions about how the two 
competing definitions of human rights were adapted and implemented across the region 
by both the US government and the three organisations in question here. Although these 
two countries were not necessarily “typical” of inter-American relations throughout the 
20th century, they are representative of two different types of US policy towards 
countries in the region and this makes them excellent candidates for comparison.  
 
Sources 
This thesis is based primarily on documents from the archives of the three organisations 
themselves and papers from the State Department’s Freedom of Information archive. 
These will be supplemented by articles from US and Latin American newspapers, some 
pamphlets published by the organisations themselves, some of Reagan’s speeches and 
personal papers and the Congressional Record. The archives of these organisations 
contain a selection of sources concerning their running, funding and projects; these 
include board meeting minutes, grant proposals and reports, correspondence, press 
releases and policy documents. However, although these archives provide a wealth of 
information they also present a number of difficulties. First, these archives are not 
comprehensive and they contain an uneven spread of information. For example, while 
the Freedom House archive contains a decent amount of information concerning the 
grants it received, detailing where they came from and, sometimes, how much they were 
for, WOLA’s archive contains considerably less material on this subject and to find this 
information for the NED one has to look through congressional appropriations bills 
instead. Moreover, while the Freedom House and WOLA archives (housed in Princeton 
and Duke Universities respectively) are well catalogued and, for the period in question, 
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quite extensive, the NED’s archive in the Library of Congress was, at the time of 
visiting, a restricted archive and neither fully catalogued nor complete. Despite this, the 
archive did contain enough information concerning the running of the NED and its 
projects relating to Latin America to make it a useful collection, especially since gaps 
concerning funds could be filled in using congressional bills.  
 One of the most challenging factors of working with non-state actor archives is 
that they do not require the same level of documenting and transparency as public sector 
organisations. As a result of the often more informal structures of non-state actors, there 
is not always extensive documentation to show exactly what occurred in internal and 
external meetings. Although Freedom House and the NED did minute some board 
meetings, this does not appear to have been standard practice or, if it was, only a 
selection of the minutes made it into the archive. By contrast WOLA does not appear to 
have taken minutes of any of their board meetings and none of the three organisations 
habitually documented what was said in meetings with external parties or other 
organisations. While this lack of consistent documentation is frustrating, it does not 
completely prevent researchers from knowing the content of meetings or understanding 
the processes used by these organisations internally. Through correspondence, 
memoranda and other such documents, it is possible to piece together a coherent picture 
of the internal workings of these organisations. Overall, the documentation in the 
archives of the three organisations allows us to develop a decent understanding of the 
internal processes, funding, relationships and projects of the groups in question. 
However, it is necessary to supplement these sources in order to develop a broader 
picture of the work and position of these groups.  
For the most part, documents from the State Department take the form of cables, 
reports and correspondence between Washington and various embassies in Latin 
America. These documents provide an insight into how these organisations engaged 
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with the State Department, whether relationships were developed and how these 
organisations fit into the world of executive branch foreign policy-making. State 
Department documents can also give some indication of what the State Department 
thought about these organisations and their work. Although the question of public 
perception is not one this thesis seeks to answer, newspaper articles, particularly those 
from Latin America, can serve as evidence for the problems or successes these 
organisations had in their work. Examining Reagan’s speeches and personal papers 
shows whether the President (publicly at least) took an interest in these organisations 
and their work. Similarly, searching the Congressional Record for mentions of the three 
institutions gives an indication of the level of engagement they had with Congress and 
whether or not their work was used, respected or seen as useful to Congress in foreign 
policy debates and policy-making.51 Through this mix of archival, state and press 
sources this thesis will provide a clear picture of how these organisations functioned 
internally, how they fit into the broader world of foreign policy-making and how they fit 
into a broader debate about the definition of human rights.  
 
Thesis Structure 
In order to provide a clear understanding of these organisations and their role in policy-
making this thesis will be structured around those issues deemed in the existing 
literature to be vital to the “proper” functioning of non-state actors. The first four 
chapters will examine the organisations themselves, their principles, funding and wider 
relationships, and the last two chapters will provide a detailed look at these 
organisations in action in Chile and Nicaragua.  
                                                 
51While some of the individuals who sat on the boards of these organisations are still alive, this thesis will 
not be using any oral history sources. This is partially due to the impossibility of achieving balance, very 
few of the Freedom House board are still alive while the majority of WOLA and the NED’s boards are, 
and partially because only one of the individuals I contacted was available for interview.  
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 The first chapter will set the scene for the rest of the thesis by investigating the 
histories and principles of these organisations. It will set out their founding stories and 
show what their founding principles were and how (or if) they had changed by the 
1980s. Through detailing these principles, this chapter will highlight the balance and 
tensions between democracy promotion and human rights within the organisations 
concerned as well as explaining what exactly these organisations meant when they 
talked about “democracy” and “human rights”. Furthermore, this chapter will begin to 
show the links within the foreign policy community by providing short biographies of 
key individuals within the three organisations, examining the connections between them 
and placing them in broader contexts.  
 Chapter two will show the effects (or lack thereof) of funding and internal 
structures and processes on the legitimacy, independence and functionality of the three 
organisations. This chapter will detail the sources of these organisations’ funding and 
analyse the impact these donors had on the running of the organisations and the 
perception and legitimacy of the organisations on the ground in Latin America. 
Moreover, it will examine the claim made by much of the theory that “official donor” 
and foundation funding inherently alters the internal processes of non-state actors, 
adding layers of bureaucracy which make actors less effective, in relation to these 
organisations. Through examining their decision-making processes and internal 
structures, this chapter will show whether donors did, in fact, have any influence over 
how these organisations were run and what the effect of this was on their work and 
legitimacy. Combined with the first chapter, this chapter hopes not only to provide a 
solid understanding of how these organisations functioned and what they believed, but 
also to show how they were distinct from other non-state actors and NGOs normally 
discussed in theoretical literature.  
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 Building on the analysis of connections in chapter one, chapters three and four 
will examine how these organisations fit into the Washington foreign policy community 
and how they fit into broader transnational networks. Chapter three will examine the 
relationships between these organisations and the three key branches of the US 
government involved with foreign policy: the White House, the State Department and 
Congress. By investigating how these organisations interacted with the US government 
we can examine the role they played or sought to play in the policy-making process and 
assess how successful they were in their attempts. Moreover, investigating these 
relationships will shed some light on how the attitude and, particularly in these period, 
political leaning of the US government affected how these organisations were able to 
work. This chapter will also show how the institutionalisation of the neo-conservative 
conception of human rights affected the groups concerned.  
 Chapter four will examine these organisations in a more transnational context. 
According to Keck and Sikkink, relations with local actors were essential for 
organisations such as these to be effective; this chapter will look at the relations 
between the organisations in question, Latin American actors and their peers in the 
United States. Relationships and collaboration with other international non-state actors 
and a network of contacts on the ground in Latin America both contributed to the 
legitimacy of these organisations. For the most part, the human rights organisations of 
the 1970s relied on extensive networks to help them work effectively. The creation of 
networks affords non-state actors greater access to resources and a better understanding 
of the situation within their target countries. This chapter will show that while the 
traditional networking method of operation was still very much being used, the neo-
conservative human rights movement adopted a different approach to its work, having 
very few local contacts and rarely collaborating with its international peers.  
Mara Sankey 
 
35 
 
 The final two chapters of this thesis will examine the two country case studies: 
Chile (Chapter 5) and Nicaragua (Chapter 6). They will examine in detail the networks 
these organisations had on the ground, tensions between the two competing definitions 
of human rights and two key events, the 1988 plebiscite in Chile and the 1989 election 
in Nicaragua. Combining the findings of the previous four chapters, these case studies 
will put these findings into specific contexts and show how the organisations worked in 
practice. These two chapters will show how the priorities of the US government often 
affected the work, interests and even the networks these organisations had on the 
ground. Moreover, these chapters will illustrate how the different definitions of human 
rights were applied within the contexts of the two countries and show the interaction 
between the work of the three organisations and US policy towards the countries.  
 Examining the issue of democracy promotion, so central to Reagan’s foreign 
policy, provides an opportunity for greater understanding of not only the period in 
question, but also the foreign policy decisions of subsequent US governments. The rise 
of this new conception of democracy promotion in the 1980s fundamentally changed 
the context in which human rights and foreign policy were discussed within the United 
States. This context brought with it a new divide in the non-state community and a 
change in how non-state actors interacted with the executive branch of the US 
government. Understanding these changes and the impact they had on US foreign policy 
(and by extension the international community) is vital to the history both of inter-
American relations under Reagan and to the broader international history of human 
rights.  
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Chapter 1 - Democracy or Human Rights? Founding Principles and 
Changing Priorities 
 
The three organisations that are the focus of this thesis have diverse backgrounds. The 
three periods in which they were founded had distinctive geopolitical conditions, 
domestic US attitudes towards foreign policy and conceptualisations of human rights. 
By the 1980s these organisations represented two distinct movements within the world 
of human rights advocacy, one a product of the traditional left, the other a new neo-
conservative movement. The 1980s saw the liberal human rights language of the 1970s 
(as described by Moyn, Keys and Snyder), based on a utopian programme seeking 
protection for individuals against the state through international law, applicable to any 
nation regardless of its political system or affiliations,52 lose ground to a new dialogue.53 
While WOLA represented a variation of this traditional, liberal approach to human 
rights, institutionalised during the Carter administration, the NED and Freedom House 
formed part of a new neo-conservative human rights movement which emerged during 
this time and redefined the concept. Epitomised by the thinking of Jeane Kirkpatrick 
and her mission to the United Nations, this movement sought to use human rights as a 
key aspect of the Cold War ideological conflict and saw the exportation of democracy 
as central to this greater human rights project.54 As Barbara Keys suggested, anti-
Communists fashioned an anti-Communist policy around the utopian human rights 
language and, while this was primarily directed against the Soviet Union, extensive use 
of this language was made in Central and South America as well.55 By examining the 
stated principles and founding contexts of these three organisations, this chapter hopes 
                                                 
52 Ibid, pp. 4-7.  
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to show how the neo-conservative movement assimilated human rights and democracy 
promotion, how the traditional human rights movement understood its own principles 
and whether these changed between 1980 and 1993 in response to the new dialogue.  
 
Founding and Personnel 
Freedom House, the oldest of the three organisations, did not start out as the neo-
conservative organisation it became in the late 1970s. Founded in 1941 by journalists 
Herbert Agar, Dorothy Thompson, George Field and Ulric Bell, it was a coupling of the 
liberal interventionism of the Roosevelt presidency and the anti-fascist movement of the 
wartime era. Its creation was supported by President Roosevelt as a means of 
encouraging popular support for US involvement in the Second World War. 56 In 
Freedom House’s early years, the concept of human rights was still in its infancy, so its 
founding documents state the promotion of “freedom and democracy” as its key aims in 
the fight against totalitarianism.57 Freedom House retained this ill-defined concept of 
“freedom” in its vocabulary, although as the 20th century progressed it was mostly 
replaced by more specific references to human and civil rights, particularly during the 
Carter era.58 At its founding, Freedom House received support from many sectors of US 
society including business and labour leaders, former government officials such as 
Wendell Willkie (the 1940 Republican presidential candidate) and, perhaps most 
famously, Eleanor Roosevelt. However, between its founding in 1941 and 1980, the 
ideology of Freedom House shifted. The liberal interventionism of the 1940s fell out of 
favour in the US domestic debate as the shame of Vietnam dissipated the optimism of 
                                                 
56 Freedom House, “Our History” <http://www.freedomhouse.org/content/our-history> (Accessed 
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the post-war era, and changes to Freedom House’s board and staff distanced it from its 
liberal roots until it became a strong voice in the budding neo-conservative movement.  
Unlike Freedom House, WOLA began its life very much on the fringes of US 
politics and was religious rather than secular in origin.59 It was founded in 1973 by Joe 
Eldridge, a Methodist missionary to Chile, in the wake of the coup which brought 
General Pinochet to power. WOLA hailed from a background of liberal Christianity, 
which was similar to that of the early religious peace movements and the US-based 
supporters of liberation theology.60 It took some of the form of a US-based version of 
the Christian opposition to the military governments in Latin America, often bringing 
into the open cases of human rights violations and presenting them to the Washington 
audience. Its founding story, one of a grassroots organisation, echoed that of other 
traditional human rights groups such as Amnesty, albeit WOLA had the benefit of pre-
existing religious organisations and structures behind it. Initially, WOLA worked 
almost entirely with religious groups and missionaries to develop a large network on the 
ground in Latin America from which it could draw testimony and information. WOLA 
was very much a product and a part of the growth of the transnational human rights 
advocacy movement described by Keck and Sikkink, making use of extensive networks 
of local contacts to acquire testimonial accounts for use alongside statistical information 
to seek policy change and develop awareness of human rights issues.61 It was one of the 
key organisations involved in lobbying the Carter administration to take a stand against 
Pinochet and was well respected within Carter-era foreign policy circles. WOLA was 
founded as the utopian human rights vision was gaining traction internationally and the 
commitment to the upholding of international law across state borders (and regardless 
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of a state’s political affiliation) is clear in its principles and its work throughout the 
1970s and the first half of the 1980s.  
The NED grew out of a project undertaken by the American Political 
Foundation (APF) in 1982 and was a product of the revived Cold War of the Reagan 
era. The APF, the brain-child of George E. Agree, a seasoned Washington operator, was 
(primarily) a research centre designed to be a means of promoting understanding 
between the two main US political parties and democratic parties abroad.62 The NED 
was the poster child for Reagan’s democracy promotion policy, constituting another 
side of the USAID “Democracy Program” which was an outgrowth of the original 
Carter human rights programme.63 The APF project was a study to “determine the 
feasibility of various programs and institutional arrangements to promote the 
development and strengthening of democratic forces overseas”.64 It was proposed in a 
personal letter to Reagan from Charles Manatt and Richard Richards (the national 
chairmen of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively) and enjoyed the full 
support of many senior members of the Reagan administration as well as Reagan 
himself. In 1982, in a speech to the UK Parliament in Westminster, Reagan announced 
the project publicly, claiming that it would determine how the United States could “best 
contribute – as a nation – to the global campaign for democracy”.65 The APF called for 
the creation of an umbrella organisation through which four core organisations would 
receive their funding and which would approve grants to other private sector 
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organisations whose proposals matched its purposes.66 After these suggestions were put 
to the Reagan Administration in May 1983, the NED was founded by an act of 
Congress to serve as this umbrella organisation. The act stipulated an organisation 
which would serve as an “intermediary between private sector groups and as a clearing 
house for inquires and proposals to bring groups together and create new opportunities 
for democratic assistance”.67 Four core grantees were also established by Congress: the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a non-profit organisation 
affiliated to the Democratic Party; the National Republican Institute for International 
Affairs (NRI), the Republican Party’s equivalent of the NDI; the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), a branch of the Chamber of Commerce; and the 
Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), a branch of the American Federation of Labour and 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO).  Despite being established by 
Congress and being subject to Congressional oversight, the act also stated that the NED 
would “not be considered an agency or establishment of the US Government”.68 This 
meant that although the NED had to provide annual and financial reports to Congress 
and the Government Accountability Office, legally no branch of the US government 
would be involved in internal programming or funding decisions which would be taken 
by an independent board.  
 The NED and Freedom House had a number of senior personnel in common: 
Carl Gershman had been a resident scholar at Freedom House before moving into the 
presidency of the NED in 1983 and John Richardson had been the President of Freedom 
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House before taking a position on the NED board in 1984.69 Indeed, interchange of 
personnel between organisations in both the neo-conservative and liberal human rights 
movements were not uncommon as demonstrated by the move of Penn Kemble from 
Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America (PRODEMCA) to Freedom House 
in 1988 and, indeed, the eventual merger between Freedom House and PRODEMCA. 
There was no movement of personnel between either the NED or Freedom House and 
WOLA. The majority of the individuals discussed in this section were in their roles for 
the entirety of the 1980 – 1993 period. The stability of personnel in these organisations 
during this time ensured a continuity of principles and organisational ethos which was 
evident in the programming of the three organisations.  
 The top personnel of Freedom House and the NED during this period came from 
broadly similar political and educational backgrounds. Carl Gershman, John 
Richardson, Frank Fahrenkopf (NED Vice-Chairman and president of the NRI), Brian 
Atwood (NED board member and director of the NDI), Bruce McColm (Director of 
Freedom House’s Centre for Caribbean and Central American Studies and later 
Freedom House Executive Director), Penn Kemble (Freedom House resident scholar) 
and Leonard Sussman (Freedom House Executive Director) were all born on the East 
Coast and through the course of their educations and early careers all six men entered 
into US policymaking circles. Gershman and Kemble had a shared background in the 
Old Left and began their political careers in the Young People’s Socialist League 
(YPSL) which they and others revived in 1964 after it had been dissolved by the 
Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation on account of its Trotskyite affiliations.70 
Under their revival, the YPSL took on a much more mainstream appearance as, with the 
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assistance of Albert Shanker (who later also sat on the NED board), they sought to 
create and maintain unity between the YPSL, the AFL-CIO and the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party.71 All three men worked as organisers for Henry Jackson’s campaign 
for the presidential nomination in 1972. Jackson had a solid reputation as a “Democratic 
hawk” and, although he never used the term himself, was an early neo-conservative. 
This work placed the Gershman, Kemble and Shanker firmly in the burgeoning neo-
conservative movement alongside individuals such as Richard Perle and Paul 
Wolfowitz, both of whom also worked for Jackson.72 In 1974 Gershman became the 
executive director of the newly renamed Social Democrats USA (SDUSA). Like the 
YPSL, the SDUSA was a formative political experience for a number of the individuals 
who later sat on the NED and Freedom House boards. In addition to Gershman, both 
Kemble and later McColm were key members of the SDUSA. Gershman and Kemble’s 
years in the YPSL and working for Jackson had cemented in both men profoundly anti-
Communist feelings and this carried through into their leadership of the SDUSA. The 
organisation became something of a recruitment ground for the Reagan 
Administration’s State Department and the neo-conservative US human rights 
movement, with many members (including Gershman) going on to work, not only at the 
NED and Freedom House, but also on Jeane Kirkpatrick’s staff at the US mission to the 
UN.73  
  Due to the requirements of its founding act, the NED’s board was populated 
with individuals from the business world as well as the AFL-CIO and Congress. In 
accordance with its founding document’s claims to bipartisanship, the NED’s initial 
board contained a cross section of members of Congress from both the Democratic and 
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Republican parties. The initial board of the NED was somewhat bipartisan, including 
not only clear Reagan supporters or those who believed in interventionist foreign policy 
(such as Gershman, Richardson and Henry Kissinger) but also two more moderate 
critics of Reaganite foreign policy in Rep. Dante Fascell (D, FL), who was highly 
critical of Reagan’s handling of El Salvador, and Carter’s Vice-President Walter 
Mondale.74 Of a board of approximately sixteen, around eight could definitely be said to 
hold interventionist foreign policy beliefs while only two were primarily opposed to 
Reaganite foreign policy. It seems that few proposals were ever challenged by these 
more liberal voices and, by 1992, the nearly all of NED board members were either 
proponents of directly interventionist foreign policy or were believers in the more 
Wilsonian brand of US internationalism. This suggests that, in reality the claim of 
bipartisanship carried little serious weight since, when it came to foreign policy issues, 
all but a very few were pretty much of one mind. All of the NED’s board members were 
part of the US political establishment and at least three of them, Lane Kirkland of the 
AFL-CIO, Charles Manatt of the NDI and Frank Fahrenkopf of the NRI, were also 
members of the boards of its four core grantees. The majority of the initial board was 
not only close to Washington but many were part of the government, with eight 
members being either sitting or ex- members of Congress and executive staffers.  
 Although more diverse in background, the majority of the Freedom House board 
were no less embedded in the US political establishment of the 1980s than their NED 
counterparts. Freedom House had fewer personnel who worked for or were part of any 
branch of the US government. By 1985 around six of its Board of Trustees were 
representatives of the US business and legal establishment or career political activists. 
Leonard Sussman was a journalist and campaigner for press freedom who had sat on the 
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US National Commission for UNESCO and the Council for World Communications. 
Alongside him on the board sat Bayard Rustin, a Civil Rights leader who had, like 
Gershman, Kemble and McColm, an earlier history of involvement in the SDUSA, John 
Richardson, a lawyer, businessman and ex-Assistant Secretary of State for Education 
and Cultural Affairs (1969-1977), and Max Kampelman a career diplomat with a history 
of involvement in European policy, including negotiating weapons treaties with the 
Soviet Union, and a strong anti-communist streak.75 In 1983, McColm was elected by a 
majority of Latin American states to be the American representative on the Organisation 
of American States (OAS) Inter-American Human Rights Commission, indicating not 
only that he was strongly connected to formal foreign policy channels but also 
suggesting the reputation of Freedom House as an organisation in the international 
community.76 He continued to hold this position alongside his job at Freedom House’s 
Centre for Caribbean/Central American Studies until 1987 when direct criticism from 
the Sandinista government concerning his writings in Freedom at Issue meant he was 
not nominated for a second term.77 Throughout this period, the board of Freedom House 
was overwhelmingly anti-Communist in its attitude; the individuals who made up the 
Freedom House board were, by and large, favourable to the Reagan administration’s 
aggressive Cold War stance and were strong, vocal supporters of the ideological anti-
Communism of the Reagan era. It is likely that the prevalence of such voices is 
responsible for Freedom House’s move towards the neo-conservative movement at this 
time. 
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  In contrast to the NED and Freedom House, WOLA’s personnel existed very 
much on the fringes of Washington policy circles, particularly in the early 1980s. In this 
period, most of WOLA’s board members were priests and nuns from various Christian 
denominations, including two members of the National Council of Churches, along with 
a few career activists and academics. For example, Joseph Eldridge, WOLA’s president, 
was a Methodist reverend with strong missionary connections in Latin America but very 
little experience of the workings of Washington.78 For the most part, the individuals 
who made up the board had few connections to US policymaking networks and what 
contacts they maintained had mostly been made under the Carter administration which 
was more favourable to human rights groups. At the time of its founding, none of the 
individuals involved had much experience of lobbying or working within Washington; 
although WOLA could draw upon the expertise of the National Council of Churches 
which had been providing testimony to Congress regularly since its founding in the 
1950s. WOLA’s board and personnel, while often prominent figures in their own orders 
and denominations, lacked the personal connections to policymaking networks enjoyed 
by the NED and Freedom House. The congressional connections WOLA was able to 
retain through the change of administration, had been developed through its work 
providing information to members of Congress and lobbying for a human rights led 
policy towards Chile under Carter. The flexible management and style of work which 
initially characterised WOLA continued throughout the 1970s and into the mid-1980s 
when WOLA began to “professionalise” as an organisation.   
As WOLA professionalised and cemented itself as a more formally structured 
organisation after receiving a large grant from the Ford Foundation, the make-up of its 
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staff began to change accordingly.79 In 1987, Eldridge left WOLA and the directorship 
passed to Alexander Wilde. Unlike his predecessor, Wilde came from an academic 
background, having previously held senior research and management positions in the 
Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame University and the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre.80 Wilde’s previous engagement with academic and 
policymaking communities enabled him to expand WOLA’s board to include members 
of both these groups.81 As a result of both this increased professionalisation and the 
reputation WOLA had built since 1973, by the 1990s WOLA was able to attract staff 
such as Rachel Neild, previously a researcher for the Inter-American Institute of Human 
Rights and a consultant to several inter-governmental organisations, who were well 
informed about the internal workings of Washington and the international legal 
community. This brought with it a more professional institutionalised attitude to the 
advocacy and lobbying work WOLA was undertaking. Although WOLA’s early staffers 
were not strongly connected to the US policy-making establishment like those of the 
NED or Freedom House, the organisation always had strong relationships with other 
human rights organisations as well as an extensive network on the ground in Latin 
America. In many ways, these relationships and the reputation WOLA gained as a result 
of its extensive network of non-state contacts made up for WOLA’s early lack of 
personal and institutional connections to foreign policymaking circles.82  
 In 2001 Martina Vandenberg, a former researcher of Human Rights Watch, 
stated that previously “human rights NGOs were a conglomerate of the elite, but with 
grassroots and idealism as their guide… Now they are a community of elite voyeurs 
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with a few wild haired exceptions”. The biographies of the staff of these organisations 
support the theory that human rights and democracy promotion in the 1980s remained 
the reserve of the establishment.83 Until the late 1980s, WOLA very much represented 
the former description, while its staff were part of the establishment, they were driven 
by a grassroots idealistic idea of human rights. By contrast, the NED and Freedom 
House fit the description of “elite voyeur”; they operated at arms-length from the 
situation on the ground and were driven primarily by their own interests or those of the 
United States. In the cases of the NED and Freedom House, the majority of their high 
ranking staff came from the top of US policy-making circles. Both organisations were 
well connected within the US government and US foreign policy-makers and were run 
in a top-down manner, driven by the desire to promote US policy and national security 
interests abroad. Unlike the NED and Freedom House, due to its strong network of 
missionaries, local actors and peers, WOLA definitely retained this concept of 
“grassroots and idealism” with the majority of decisions being guided by the volunteers, 
missionaries and on-the-ground staff, although this became less true by the early 1990s. 
While neither the NED nor Freedom House were guided by a grassroots movement, 
both were certainly driven by idealism.  
 
Principles, Purposes and Ideologies  
As can be seen, these organisations came from very different ideological backgrounds. 
Freedom House began as a nationalistic, centrist extension of the anti-fascist movement 
and, by the 1980s, had adopted many aspects of the same neo-conservative ideology as 
the NED. WOLA came from the Christian social justice tradition driven by a strong 
commitment to utopian human rights and the upholding of international law, and the 
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NED arose from an early incarnation of the neo-conservative foreign policy ideal. 84 
Although all three organisations claimed to promote and support democracy and human 
rights abroad, their proposed methods, principles and priorities within this broader aim 
differed greatly. It should not be surprising that the concept of “democracy” is a 
strongly contested one. The modern idea of democracy lacks a single unifying theory, 
although certain types and elements of democracy have been theorised.85 Despite many 
attempts to devise a comprehensive list of rights and issues that constitute “human 
rights” this too remains contested. Throughout the 20th century US presidents and other 
world leaders have struggled with the question of what human rights actually means.86 
In order to fully investigate the position of these organisations within the history of 
human rights and inter-American relations we must first grasp how they understood 
their own activities and their guiding definitions and ideologies.  
How these organisations interpreted the concepts of “democracy” and “human 
rights” is vital to understanding and analysing their activities and engagement both in 
the United States and in Latin America and to illustrating the shift in human rights 
language that occurred in the 1980s. The NED’s Statement of Principles and Objectives 
set out six purposes and five programme areas for the organisation. These can be 
summarised as the encouragement of democratic institutions, the facilitation of 
exchange between US and foreign private sectors, the strengthening of democratic 
processes abroad and the encouragement of the growth of democratic development in a 
“manner consistent both with the broad concerns of US national interests and with the 
requirements of groups abroad funded by NED”.87 While the NED did see human rights 
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as relevant to its remit, it chose to allow its grantees to define the role human rights 
would take in their programming.88 In a document responding to questions raised in the 
House of Representatives about the NED it stated that “It will be the task of the core 
grantees to define the role that human rights will play in their programmes”.89 For the 
NED the language of human rights was something to be picked up when convenient but 
it never formed a key part of its principles. In the Statement of Principles the NED 
states that “democracy and human rights are not identical objectives but they reinforce 
each other”. While it does not explicitly state human rights to be part of the NED’s 
remit, it does allow scope for the raising of human rights issues. Freedom House saw 
itself as speaking for the American centre and believed the key to the promotion of 
democracy was a commitment to individual political rights and civil liberties and the 
supporting of dissidents.90 Although Freedom House had a similar commitment to 
democratic and legal structures as the NED, it spoke of these structures as being 
necessary to the securing of rights rather than as just an end in themselves.91 While in 
practice, Freedom House was often, especially by the end of the period, more concerned 
with issues of democracy than human rights, in its policy documents of the early 1980s 
at least it represented something of a middle ground between the traditional language of 
human rights and the democracy-led language of the 1980s.  By contrast, WOLA stated 
its mission to be promoting “human rights, democracy, and social justice” by working 
with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean to shape policies in the United States 
and abroad.92 WOLA put human rights at the centre of its work in the early years and, 
while it continued to focus on rights based issues, as the conversation in US policy-
                                                 
88 NED Records, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 26, Answers to Congressman Yatron’s Questions: Hearing on 
Project Democracy, (19th April 1983).  
89 Ibid. 
90 FH Records, Box 3, Folder 14, What is Freedom House? (13th August 1982). 
91 FH Records, Box 3, Folder 14, Freedom House: Who We are, What do we do (a “new image” 
statement), (1982). 
92 Washington Office on Latin America, About US < http://www.wola.org/about_wola> (accessed 2012). 
Mara Sankey 
 
50 
 
making circles became dominated by the new language of the neo-conservative and 
anti-Communist movements through the 1980s, WOLA too began to move away from 
the traditional language of human rights and towards that of economic and social 
justice. 
In these organisations’ definitions of democracy and human rights the divide is 
clear. The NED and Freedom House conceived of a democracy that included elections, 
party pluralism and capitalism, while WOLA was more flexible, allowing for 
democratic experiments such as that of Nicaragua. Similarly, WOLA worked with a 
very broad definition of human rights compared to that used by Freedom House or the 
NED. For the NED, democracy was inextricably bound up with economic liberalism 
and development. In its statement of principles, the NED placed a strong emphasis on 
the “interdependence of sound economic development and real democracy”.93 Indeed, 
the Democracy Program’s report stated that NED projects should “reinforce ongoing 
programmes of economic assistance”.94 When it came to Latin America, Freedom 
House held economic issues to be of great importance in the struggle for democracy. In 
1982, it expanded its Freedom Survey (a yearly study carried out by Freedom House 
which ranked nations on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free)) to include “democratic 
economy” which was defined as a “political-economic system with economic 
arrangements and relationships legitimised through popular participation 
in[…]economic decision making”.95 In the eyes of Freedom House the ability to vote 
and select from a variety of individuals or parties was integral to popular participation 
in economic decision making.96 In a document entitled Latin America: Crisis of 
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Democracy Douglas Payne wrote that democracy and development form a “seamless 
web” and that economic crises in the region threatened democratic centrist governments 
by generating “regressive, left-wing populism”.97 While WOLA did not place a great 
emphasis on economic systems, it did see a connection between civil and political rights 
and social and economic rights.98 It saw economic rights as an aspect of the human 
rights struggle and, like Freedom House, it recognised the influence US economic aid 
could have on the region as evidenced by its work on development bank loans to 
Chile.99 By 1990, WOLA had also become more interested in economic issues, 
particularly questions of social equality and justice.   
The NED primarily sought to promote a form of US-style democracy, termed 
“polyarchy” by William Robinson. According to Robinson, polyarchy is a system in 
which a small group rule the many and mass participation occurs only in carefully 
managed leadership contests. It focuses primarily on the processes of democracy 
irrespective of outcome, although it must be said that in many situations the NED was 
very interested in the outcome of the democratic process and was prompted by this 
interest to involve itself in foreign elections.100 In the case of Nicaragua (which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6) for example, the NED’s primary reason for 
involvement in the 1989 elections was to manipulate the outcome to suit US interests. 
That said, the form in which these interventions took place and much of the language 
used to justify them centred on the principle of ensuring or consolidating “proper” 
democratic procedures.  
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In its Statement of Principles, the NED stated that “a precondition for 
democracy [was] a multiparty system” of “strong, broadly-based and well-organized 
political parties” .101 It also specified that a “democracy requires a system of 
representative government in which leaders are chosen in freely contested, fair and 
periodic elections”.102 In addition to its strong emphasis on democratic processes, the 
NED cited the creation of “pluralism” as one of their key aims. Although the NED 
stressed that democratic systems “need not follow the U.S. or any other particular 
model” the descriptions it gave of the democracy it sought to promote closely resembled 
the democracy of the United States and this ensured that, particularly, left-wing 
experiments such as that of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua could never be considered 
democratic.103 Furthermore, there was no recognition from the NED that other traditions 
of democracy, even those which provided much the same rights and freedoms as 
polyarchic democracy, were valid. This shared characteristics with the tactic the Reagan 
administration applied to those left-wing governments it sought to discredit. This deeply 
prescriptive US-centric definition of what constitutes democracy sometimes led to 
accusations of cultural imperialism against the NED by its opponents in Congress and 
the non-governmental community, but if the NED responded to these criticisms at the 
time, the responses are lost.  
While neither Freedom House nor WOLA laid out set definitions of democracy 
in their founding literature, Freedom House did establish its parameters for “freedom” 
in its Freedom Survey. By 1980, “freedom” encompassed a blend of civil and 
democratic rights and some basic discussion of human rights. It placed a similarly 
strong emphasis on the structures and processes of democracy to that of the NED. In an 
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internal statement redefining its image, Freedom House stated that one of its key 
purposes was to “defend and promote democratic institutions”.104 Indeed, in the 
preamble to its Freedom Survey of 1986, it stated openly that it took democracy to 
mean “liberal democracy” (although this was changed in later editions outside the 
period in question).105  Freedom House listed a number of political rights it saw as key 
to “freedom”, one of the first of which is that the “chief authority” was “elected by a 
meaningful process”.106 Like the NED, it indicated a strong commitment to pluralism 
with multiple political parties taking part in regular elections with equal campaigning 
opportunities. Although choice is a key aspect of any democratic system, the emphasis 
Freedom House and the NED placed on the importance of political parties specifically 
had complicated ramifications in parts of Latin America where political parties were not 
always trusted or deemed to be representative. Corruption and cronyism had led to 
disillusionment among citizens in many areas in the region and, particularly in Central 
America, political parties were often viewed very much as part of the problem; 
moreover, in those countries that had existed under military dictatorships, many parties 
were illegal or severely weakened. Perhaps most interestingly Freedom House also 
required “free” countries to have “decentralised political power”.107 Again, this 
requirement presented challenges when applied to Latin America. Although several of 
the dictatorships of the 1980s had pushed decentralisation policies, the region had a 
strong tradition of centralised governments and political decentralisation was only just 
beginning to take hold in the 1980s and 1990s.108 Despite stating that the United States 
was “not committed to recreating any nation in [its] own image”, like the NED, 
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Freedom House upheld a very US-centric conception of democracy.109 These 
prescriptive definitions of democracy brought both organisations into conflict with 
many Latin American political systems which, while often democratic, failed to fit the 
mould.  
Although democracy did not lie at the heart of WOLA’s interests (and certainly 
not democratic procedures), it did have some conception of what form democracy 
should assume. It saw US policy as having a “narrow electoral and market-economy”-
based view of democracy.110 Like both the NED and Freedom House, WOLA was 
committed to democratic pluralism. In articles published in its bulletin Update Latin 
America, it criticised the Uruguayan military for limiting political parties and placing 
restrictions on the press and political discussion during elections.111 Yet, despite this, 
WOLA did not place the same emphasis on the importance of political processes as the 
other two organisations. This is not to say it took no interest in electoral procedures, 
indeed, it often acted as an international observer for Latin American elections, merely 
that it was more concerned with the upholding of civil and political rights. It sought to 
promote fair media coverage and elections that were free from fraud, but beyond basic 
assurances of fairness in electoral processes it was open to many types and traditions of 
democracy. This is evidenced in its willingness to declare the 1984 Nicaraguan election 
free and fair, something many US-based organisations were unwilling to do.112 Overall, 
although WOLA saw democracy and human rights in a symbiotic relationship, its 
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primary focus was on traditional liberal human rights issues and international law, not 
democracy.  
WOLA’s understanding of human rights was a combination of legislation-
focused principles and broader, more radical ideals. While it aimed to hold the US 
administration and Congress accountable to existing international human rights 
legislation, it also lobbied for issues not part of international law at this time such as the 
rights of refugees and indigenous rights.113 During the civil wars in Central America 
WOLA pushed for the upholding of the Geneva Conventions in the region, publishing 
reports on the human rights abuses of the various factions and governments and sending 
delegations to Guatemala and El Salvador to assess the human rights situation there.114 
According to one of WOLA’s programme evaluations from 1991, its operational 
framework emphasised, at the most basic level, the “right to life, liberty and security” 
and the right to be “free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”.115 In this document it also stated that WOLA worked to ensure respect for 
the right to equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary exile, the right to asylum 
and the right to be innocent until proven guilty.116 These rights, for the most part, follow 
those laid down in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and are not dissimilar to those 
advocated by other organisations such as Amnesty International or the International 
Human Rights Law Group.117 However, as it became clear that US and international 
interest was moving away from the traditional human rights dialogue, WOLA began to 
expand its remit to include other universal rights-based issues. In its 1991 programme 
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evaluation, it also stated that it wished to ensure the right to basic social security and to 
a “standard of living adequate for health and well-being”.118 In the 1990s WOLA began 
to engage with issues of social and economic rights which helped it to stay relevant in 
the new human rights culture, to fit into the interests of the Bush administration and to 
involve itself more fully in the internal dynamics of Latin American nations. According 
to the Ford Foundation’s evaluation of WOLA, this was one of the aspects Latin 
American organisations and citizens considered of value in it.119  
In addition to espousing a broad definition of human rights, WOLA saw human 
rights and democracy as mutually reinforcing. In a grant report for the Ford Foundation 
WOLA stated that “to the degree that democracy is actually achieved, it should serve 
human rights”, suggesting that WOLA believed democracy acted as a guarantor for 
human rights but was not a prerequisite for their upholding.120 Freedom House also 
stated the belief that human rights and democracy were connected, but it claimed that 
human rights required “democratic and stable legal structures”.121 Instead of seeing 
democracy as a method of upholding human rights, Freedom House believed it to be a 
prerequisite to the existence of human rights. In a speech in 1982 Leonard Sussman 
stated that the “root cause of human rights abuse is the style of governance in less-than-
free-countries”.122 This was a key part of the redefinition of human rights in the 1980s. 
While democratic rights and processes had always been a part of the human rights 
movement, this language reversed the importance of the two creating a cause-and-effect 
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relationship rather than a symbiotic one. For the most part, Freedom House’s definition 
of human rights, followed the pattern of the UN Declaration – freedom of speech, 
worship and assembly and freedom from terror and unjust imprisonment made up the 
majority of its definition.123 Like WOLA, Freedom House’s conceptualisation did 
include some economic rights, but these were primarily the rights afforded by liberal 
economic ideology. It spoke of economic rights as the “freedom from dependency on 
landlords, bosses, union leaders or bureaucrats”.124 While these economic freedoms 
were mentioned, for the most part they did not form a large part of Freedom House’s 
work outside of a keen interest in land reform policies in El Salvador (which was a 
decidedly political objective). Instead Freedom House emphasised political rights and 
civil liberties as “the keystone of all personal and group efforts to improve the human 
condition”; without which it would be impossible to decrease “gross socioeconomic 
inequality”.125 
Like Freedom House, the NED believed that democracy was the “guarantee for 
human rights” and that “democracy and human rights [were] not identical 
objectives”.126 However, it did see human rights and democracy as mutually reinforcing 
in practice: its Statement of Principles and Objectives makes the point that human rights 
groups protect democratic activists and expand the political space available to them.127 
This would suggest that, unlike Freedom House, while the NED put democracy at the 
heart of their work, it saw the infrastructure created by an international and local interest 
in human rights in the previous decade as useful for the establishment and consolidation 
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of democracy. The NED saw human rights in far narrower terms than either WOLA or 
Freedom House. In fact, its conceptualisation was limited to those basic civil liberties 
afforded by the founding documents of the United States. Its Statement of Principles 
indicated a commitment to “honouring [sic] the fundamental rights that are guaranteed 
to citizens of the United States” and expresses a willingness to uphold the rights of 
freedom of expression, association and belief as well as the “inalienable rights of 
individuals and minorities”.128 The inclusion of the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) 
as one of its core grantees would suggest that the NED also believed in the right to 
unionisation and free trade unions, at least within certain parameters. Unlike WOLA 
and Freedom House, the NED does not appear to have seen economic issues as a key 
part of its work, despite the inclusion of the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE) as one of its core grantees, although it did emphasise the importance and merits 
of liberal economics. There is no suggestion in its programmes or literature that it saw 
concepts of socioeconomic equality or basic quality of life as part of its remit.  
Freedom House tied the promotion of human rights and democracy directly to 
the strength and moral authority of the United States. In 1981, Freedom House drafted a 
statement entitled The Opportunities for Freedom House to Help Sustain the New 
National Spirit which claimed that “advocacy of human rights abroad ultimately 
[depended] on US power, prestige and human values”.129 It claimed that the United 
States should use its good reputation to reduce inhumane acts abroad because “to 
remain silent would diminish US values”.130 In an outline of a policy statement, 
Freedom House claimed that “military and ideological support for… authoritarians… 
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[emanated] from the Soviet Union” and the United States “cannot avoid being regarded 
as the primary generator of human freedom”.131 It is clear that Freedom House saw 
itself very much as a part of the ideological Cold War with authoritarianism on one side 
and the United States as a beacon of democracy on the other. Freedom House had 
retained this Manichean outlook from the era of its founding, merely replacing anti-
fascism with anti-Communism. This attitude does not appear to have changed as the 
1980s progressed or, indeed, after the Cold War ended. Freedom House viewed much of 
the instability and unrest in Central and South America and the Caribbean as directly 
connected to “Cuban and Soviet exploitation”, an outlook which coloured its ability to 
work impartially within the region.132 While Freedom House, like the NED, regularly 
emphasised that it was not seeking to make other countries in the image of the United 
States, it also seemed to believe that advocating for human rights and democracy was 
worthless without the reputation and influence of the United States to back it up. The 
fact that it lobbied at home for the United States to be a good international citizen and to 
serve as a “model” for states seeking to develop politically and socially suggests that, 
while it may not have sought to make other countries in the US image through its own 
work, it certainly hoped that nations would make themselves in the US image.133 
Throughout its founding literature, the NED placed a great deal of importance 
on the private sector; the organisations which comprised its core grantees saw as their 
respective foci political parties, labour union programmes and the business sector. The 
core principles of the four grantees were largely identical to those of the NED since all 
four had been established especially to receive NED funding.134 Although this 
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prioritisation of the private sector may have been expedient in some beneficiary nations, 
(particularly in the Soviet Bloc), it demonstrated a questionable understanding of the 
situation in Latin America. For the most part, with the exception of certain elements of 
the business sector, 1980s Latin America lacked a strong, private sector. In the Southern 
Cone, previous and on-going military dictatorships had left labour unions, political 
parties and free press organisations weak, clandestine or non-existent. Similarly, in 
Central America, years of authoritarian dictatorships and the start of violent civil war 
had left the region with underdeveloped and fragmented private and public sectors.135 
The decision to work primarily with private sector organisations was, in practice, 
mostly ignored in countries of interest to US foreign policy aims. As will be discussed 
in detail in later chapters, in countries such as Chile, Nicaragua and Panama the NED 
had no qualms about working not only with the public sector but also directly with 
opposition parties. Although neither WOLA nor Freedom House had such prescriptive 
requirements regarding what types of organisation they should work with, both did have 
patterns and preferences when it came to the individuals and groups they chose as 
beneficiaries.  
Freedom House also expressed a strong commitment to working with the private 
sector. Within the United States, Freedom House primarily engaged with private or 
voluntary organisations such as the SDUSA. However, it did also accept funding from 
and work closely with the NED on a number of projects in the 1980-1993 period. 
Indeed, several members of its Board of Trustees worked for private sector corporations 
such as Unilever.136 As its main activity on the ground in Latin America was election 
monitoring, its direct engagement with organisations in Latin America was limited. On 
occasion its election monitoring services were solicited by Latin American governments 
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as in the case of the elections in El Salvador, for which President Duarte requested the 
organisation act as an “independent observer”.137 Outside of these situations, the 
majority of Freedom House’s work on the ground was either undertaken independently 
without a direct Latin American connection or with private and “third” sector groups. 
Freedom House stated that it particularly sought to work with centrists.138 Like the 
NED, in practice Freedom House primarily worked with Christian Democrats and 
centre right organisations within Latin America. Again, as in the case of the NED, this 
partisan preference limited the organisations with which Freedom House could engage 
and, as will be discussed in later chapters, compromised their ability to act as an 
impartial and accurate source of information for the region.  
In its early years, WOLA primarily worked with religious organisations both in 
the United States and in Latin America. Although this propensity to work with religious 
organisations and use missionaries for information gathering remained throughout the 
period, by the late 1980s WOLA was also working regularly with secular civil society 
groups. Their relationships, for the most part, were with the public and “third” sectors as 
opposed to the private sector – they engaged frequently with democratic politicians, 
unions and peasant associations and human rights groups throughout the region.139 In 
addition, WOLA worked periodically with intergovernmental organisations such as the 
UN and the OAS; it was the only US non-governmental observer at the 1988 General 
Assembly of the OAS in San Salvador and was also heavily involved in monitoring the 
Central American peace process.140 The Central American peace process was an 
agreement, proposed by the Costa Rican president Oscar Arias and signed by the 
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Central American heads of state in 1987. This agreement set out a series of terms for 
economic cooperation and a framework for peaceful resolutions to the Central 
American civil wars. Regarding the politics of the organisations it worked with, WOLA 
favoured centrist and centre-left parties and organisations. However, unlike the NED 
and Freedom House, it did not restrict itself to such organisations. As long as the parties 
and organisations were willing, WOLA would engage with them as evidenced by a 
forum of Nicaraguan politicians it organised in 1986, which included representatives of 
political parties across Nicaragua’s political spectrum.141 Similarly, WOLA’s 
involvement with the Contadora peace initiative suggests that it was less driven by 
political partisanship than the NED and Freedom House. Moreover, its willingness to 
work with those organisations that had been declared off limits or were suspect to the 
US government (such as the Sandinistas and the Chilean Socialist Party) suggests an 
approach less habitually aligned with US foreign policy interests. This is not to say it 
actively sought to work against US foreign policy or that it was consistently opposed to 
the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations, rather that its adherence to the 
traditional language and principles of the human rights movement often brought it into 
direct conflict with the Reagan administration’s anti-Communist policies.  
This discussion of the principles of the three organisations provides some 
illumination of the shift in language from a utopian vision of human rights towards a 
more politicised, democracy-led conception. Through altering the perceived relationship 
between democracy and human rights to one of almost cause-and-effect, the NED and 
Freedom House changed the dialogue to prioritise democracy and to redefine 
democracy as a human right in its own right. This, alongside the definition of 
democracy to which these organisations adhered, meant that not only did human rights 
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increasingly become understood to mean political rights, civil liberties and a basic right 
to life, but also that the concept ceased to occupy the universally applicable place it had 
found through international law and became politically charged. The employment of 
such a US-centric definition of democracy precluded countries and systems which erred 
from the US model from being perceived as democratic, no matter how many free and 
fair elections they held. The evidence of the lasting impact of this reshaping of the 
definition of democracy is clear, not only in the fact that traditional, left-wing human 
rights organisations such as WOLA had to move away from their utopian roots in order 
to remain relevant, but also in the fact that the combined association of democracy and 
human rights remains an international norm today. In the context of the 1980s, the new 
language gave the Reagan administration a new and “worthy” justification for its 
involvement in and opposition to communist countries and any regime that could be 
defined as “undemocratic” by these standards.  
Despite the fact that Freedom House was the only one of the three organisations 
that framed its approach to its work in relation to the power of the United States, the 
activities of WOLA and the NED were also tied to the United States and its perceived 
place in wider international relations. Fundamentally, these organisations shared an 
assumption that the United States had enough international authority to make their work 
worthwhile, be that through lobbying for changes in US policy or directly seeking to 
promote “US values” abroad. None of these organisations questioned the right of the 
United States to be involved in promoting democracy and human rights abroad, even if 
they did disagree about the level of direct involvement necessary. The APF’s project 
report stated that democratic aid was a “fixed element of American values”, indicating 
that it saw the work of the NED, not only as a manifestation of American values in its 
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own right, but also a method of promoting those values abroad.142 In the preamble to its 
1985 Annual Report, Gershman wrote that the NED served a “vital symbolic function” 
in showing that the United States “cares deeply about the success of democracy in the 
world”143; indeed, the idea that the NED symbolised the commitment of the United 
States to the “democratic cause throughout the world” was stressed in the preamble to 
several of the NED’s Annual Reports. Unlike Freedom House which saw its own 
legitimacy and value as deriving from the moral, economic and military strength of the 
United States, the NED perceived itself as an ambassador promoting US values and 
power abroad, thereby raising the standing of the United States in the world. By 
contrast, WOLA, as was perhaps more typical of traditional human rights groups, 
appeared to see itself as acting as a check on the actions of government.144 Instead of 
promoting US values abroad, through providing information to the Washington foreign 
policy community, WOLA hoped to change how the United States interacted with Latin 
America. Unlike many human rights advocacy organisations which took a broad 
approach to their work, lobbying within inter-governmental organisations and 
publishing reports widely with the intention of changing public opinion, during this time 
WOLA focused primarily on lobbying the US government and changing US policy 
towards Latin America.  
Having explored these organisations’ perception of themselves and their roles, it 
is worth examining their perceptions of each other and how they were understood by 
others, as the two were often dichotomous. Between 1988 and 1990, WOLA decided to 
undertake an examination of the NED in order to prepare a memo for Congress and a 
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report for the media and other non-state actors on the activities of the NED.145 WOLA 
determined that the NED had a tendency towards politically biased funding and that its 
core grantees tended to seek out organisations similar to them with little thought for the 
pluralism the NED claimed it sought to create.146 In a conference organised by WOLA 
on the NED and USAID’s work in Chile, Nicaragua and Panama, Thomas Carothers 
suggested that the NED was part of US attempts to influence Latin American election 
outcomes. Moreover, on a practical level, questions were raised about NED autonomy; 
it was suggested that the NED was an unwieldy organisation, over-burdened with 
institutions.147 These perceptions of the NED were not uncommon. George Agree, one 
of the key members of the research project that resulted in the creation of the NED, was 
unhappy with final form it took and considered its board as little more than a rubber-
stamp committee, since members of all four core grantees sat on the board and tended to 
approve each other’s proposals.148  
Contrastingly, Freedom House was largely well disposed towards the NED and 
had played a small role in its founding. In 1980, it had written a letter to President 
Carter suggesting he create a “Foundation for Freedom” to assist non-state actors and 
the US government in promoting “freedom” abroad.149 Moreover, when the NED was 
created Freedom House wrote a declaration in support of it.150 Freedom House believed 
that the NED played a central role in the international movement toward democracy and 
claimed that, unlike USAID, the NED was not controlled by Congress.151 As can be 
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seen, WOLA and Freedom House had conflicting views of the NED which, for the most 
part, reflected their respective attitudes to foreign policy. WOLA saw the NED as an 
overly biased direct attempt to influence domestic politics abroad. It and other 
opponents also raised questions about the NED’s internal organisation and claimed that 
the umbrella nature of the organisation made it less than fit for purpose. Freedom House 
saw the NED as an autonomous organisation necessary for the promotion of democracy, 
and had closely involved itself both with the NED’s founding and as a grantee once it 
was established.  
There are no records within the NED archive or publications that mention 
WOLA, suggesting that the NED had no real interest in WOLA or its work. By contrast, 
Freedom House, perhaps because it was a direct competitor of WOLA, did take an 
interest and wrote a number of negative statements and claims about the organisation. 
Freedom House stated that it established its own Centre for Caribbean and Central 
American Studies because there was a “dearth of objective political and economic 
analysis” of the region.152 In its proposal for the Center it claimed that most of the 
hemispheric organisations, like WOLA, were “outgrowths of the New Left” and 
provided a Marxist analysis of the region’s problems.153 It characterised WOLA as a 
supporter of the radical left because of the latter’s condemnation of military assistance 
to El Salvador and Honduras and labelled it an “adversarial organisation”.154 This was 
not an uncommon view of WOLA, particularly from the right-wing of the US non-state 
community, although it was perhaps most vehemently expressed by Freedom House and 
the Heritage Foundation Institution, which wrote a report entitled The Left’s Latin 
American Lobby that focused particularly on WOLA. This report stated that WOLA 
                                                 
152 FH Records, Box 8, Folder 1, Proposal for the creation of a Center for Caribbean and Central 
American Studies at Freedom House (undated). 
153 Ibid. 
154 FH Records, Box 8, Folder 1, Letter from Bruce McColm (undated). 
Mara Sankey 
 
67 
 
used “the language of human rights and social justice to delegitimize our imperfect 
efforts to nurture democratic, anti-communist regimes”.155 It also accused WOLA of 
working with “openly radical leftist groups” (such as the Institute for Policy Studies) 
and ignoring abuses in socialist countries while attacking those in US-backed 
countries.156 This is characteristic of the kind of, frequently full-frontal, attack 
campaigns many liberal human rights organisations faced during the 1980s as the new 
neo-conservative human rights movement sought to discredit the language of the 1970s 
and replace it with its own.  
There is little in WOLA’s archive to suggest how it perceived Freedom House; 
in a letter McColm suggested that WOLA labelled it as “rightist and conservative” 
because it did not seem to understand the root of the problems in the developing 
world.157 Given WOLA’s attitude to the NED, it is not implausible that it would have 
cast Freedom House in the same light. By contrast, the NED viewed Freedom House as 
a constructive organisation and held it in high regard.158 However, it became concerned 
by the active role Freedom House began to play in the US foreign policy debate 
concerning Central America after they agreed to take over the work of PRODEMCA in 
1988.159 Since PRODEMCA had previously been funded by the NED itself, this sudden 
expression of worry about Freedom House’s perceived growing political involvement 
seems disingenuous. Despite this concern, the NED spoke highly of Freedom House 
and continued its long-standing relationship with it. Outside the NED, belief in the 
competence of Freedom House appears to have been weaker. 
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In 1987, after a period of rapid expansion, Freedom House began to consider its 
image. In a series of memoranda between leading members of Freedom House 
concerning its public image, it was concluded that Freedom House was generally seen 
as a resource-poor and ineffectual organisation.160 In January 1987 Bruce McColm 
stated that Freedom House was perceived as an institution vulnerable to political take-
over and manipulation from the foundations that funded it.161 Moreover, this 
memorandum stated that Freedom House was believed by most to be “government 
funded” and reflecting the views of any current administration.162 This suggests that 
quite aside from the centrist, independent image Freedom House had of itself and 
wished to project, the impression its work gave others was of a deeply partisan, 
institutionalised organisation completely dependent on the government or foundations 
which funded it.  
The way these organisations perceived themselves and the image that they 
sought to project rarely matched up to the way they were actually perceived by their 
peers. The NED and Freedom House both sought to project images of bipartisanship 
and independence and neither successfully achieved this. Questions concerning the 
NED’s independence and structure were raised, not only by its natural critics such as 
WOLA, but also by a member of the team which initially proposed its creation. 
Similarly Freedom House, despite genuinely being legally independent from any state 
failed to project this image outside those organisations it already worked with closely. 
Despite Freedom House’s desire to establish itself as a strong centrist organisation, it 
was perceived instead as unprincipled and easily manipulated. Likewise WOLA, which 
believed itself to be bipartisan in its work, was viewed by many as openly, even 
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aggressively, left-wing. It must be said that this issue of perceptions never really filtered 
into public opinion because, outside of published articles in the US media on the part of 
WOLA and Freedom House, none of the three organisations had a particularly public 
face. As will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters, this tension between how 
they sought to portray themselves and how they were actually perceived had the 
potential to cause difficulties for these organisations in the pursuit of their work.  
 
Conclusions 
These three organisations represent two distinct human rights movements; the first, 
containing the NED and Freedom House, using the new and evolving language of 
human rights and the second espousing the more traditional human rights narrative 
which came to prominence during the 1970s. The new language combined democracy 
promotion and human rights to create an inherently politicised conception of human 
rights. Unlike the human rights language of the 1970s which became institutionalised 
over the course of the decade through the work of non-state and state groups, this new 
conception of human rights was institutionalised from the start.163 It arose partially as 
part of the new Reagan administration in the early 1980s; as described by Keys, Elliot 
Abrams was in part responsible for the redefinition of human rights as democracy 
promotion as a part of the right-wing push to reject the post-Vietnam guilt which, she 
believes, drove the rise of human rights in the 1970s.164 This language was rapidly 
picked up by Freedom House and the founding of the NED in 1983 constituted the 
administration’s attempt to legitimise and cement this new definition of human rights 
within the non-governmental sector. The backgrounds of the staff of the NED and 
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Freedom House also suggest the institutionalised nature of the new human rights 
movement. The key staff of the NED and Freedom House were deeply entrenched in the 
Washington policy-making community, be it through involvement with the SDUSA, 
political campaigning, or through work as ambassadors, State Department employees or 
in influential private organisations and trade unions. By contrast, the traditional human 
rights movement tended to come from the grassroots, deliberately choosing to be 
outside the workings of the state, and WOLA was no exception. Its original staff of 
missionaries and academics were far removed from the policy circles of Washington 
and, even after its professionalisation, its staff, while experienced in working within 
Washington, were still from the “third sector”. While such conscious detachment was 
key to the perceived independence and legitimacy of WOLA, it meant that its ability to 
access Washington’s policy circles was heavily reliant on individual relationships and 
reputation. As a result, during the early 1980s when many of the personnel with whom 
WOLA had developed relationships during the Carter administration were replaced by 
new, often more conservative and hawkish individuals, WOLA struggled to make 
headway with its work outside Congress.  
Although these organisations were part of two very distinct human rights 
movements, there were some similarities between them. All three organisations were 
home-grown in the United States; their personnel were, predominantly, of a generation 
that had grown up at the height of US power and influence following the Second World 
War and this informed not only the definitions and principles they chose to promote, but 
also the way they conceived of their work. All three organisations took for granted that 
US policy in some form, whether direct and aggressive or “soft” and involving 
international influence and pressure, was powerful and relevant enough to be worth 
either bolstering or seeking to alter as a means of achieving their broader aims. They 
were all, albeit to varying extents, proponents of US exceptionalism and entrenched in 
Mara Sankey 
 
71 
 
the belief that the United States not only had the right to interfere abroad in the name of 
morality and “freedom”, but also the duty. The NED and Freedom House (despite its 
liberal internationalist roots) were both advocates of a largely unilateral approach to 
involvement abroad, although Freedom House was willing to engage with organisations 
such as the OAS, while WOLA represented the more internationalist stance, being a 
strongly transnational organisation itself and often pushing for the United States to work 
with other states and intergovernmental organisations to promote and uphold democracy 
and human rights.  
According to Keys, by the 1980s human rights was indistinguishable from anti-
Communism.165 While Cold War anti-Communism certainly informed the redefining of 
the human rights movement by neo-conservatives and its stated values were the same, 
the two were not identical nor had they merged; rather one was a carefully constructed 
method of implementing the ideology of the other. Both the NED and Freedom House 
availed themselves of some of the language of human rights, particularly focusing on 
those civil liberties and political rights commonly associated with liberal democracy. 
That said, these rights were not the priority; through redefining the relationship between 
democracy and human rights to make them symbiotic, the new human rights movement 
successfully tied the two concepts together and, simultaneously, de-emphasised the 
importance of social rights. In conjunction with this, both Freedom House and the NED 
had a very narrow conception of democracy. A strong focus on democratic procedures 
and institutions allowed these organisations to pick and choose which countries they 
deemed democratic and which required US involvement to promote or consolidate 
democracy. This combination of a rejection of social rights and the narrow, US-centric 
definition of democracy was what made this new human rights language a powerful 
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weapon in the hands of the anti-Communists; it gave them a new moral high ground 
from which fight the ideological Cold War.  
The rise of this new human rights movement did not mean the end of the liberal 
one. While WOLA continued to work with the more traditional human rights language 
for much of the 1980s, working on social rights and the rights of minorities alongside 
pushing for policies which upheld international human rights law, as will become clear, 
it struggled to achieve much meaningful change in the context of the new human rights 
dialogue. As a result, towards the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s WOLA’s own 
focus began to shift away from these more traditional interests of the human rights 
movement towards issues of socioeconomic rights, social justice and development. This 
shift would suggest that WOLA realised that the universalist human rights language was 
no longer relevant to the debate in the United States and, as a result, alongside a move 
to formalise and professionalise its organisation, it began to seek a new niche that would 
enable it to continue promoting rights-based issues within the context of the new 
language which now dominated the debate in the United States. This is not to say that 
WOLA and the traditional human rights movement were not interested in democracy 
either before or during the 1980s; indeed, the fall of a democracy had been the spark 
that brought about its founding. However, its interest in democracy tended to stop at the 
enforcement of basic civil liberties – rights to “take part in the government” for example 
– as they appeared within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Like much of the 
traditional leftist human rights movement, the form democracy took was not important 
to WOLA provided it was free, fair and obeyed the laws of the country and this can be 
seen in the election monitoring work WOLA undertook throughout Latin America in 
this period. 
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In their book Doing the Rights Thing Maxine Molyneux and Sian Lazar argue 
that it was not until the end of the cold war that development agencies, social 
movements and non-state actors began to integrate democratic principles into their 
work.166 This investigation of the principles of the three organisations in question 
proves that this is far from the case. The rise of democratic principles as part of and 
indeed in replace of the language of the human rights movement began as early as 1981 
and being physically embodied by the founding of the NED in 1983. Even organisations 
like WOLA that were part of the traditional human rights movement began to engage 
more with issues of democracy and political rights in their work from the mid-1980s. 
Perhaps as a result of the top-down nature of the new human rights language, the 
acceptance of it and its normalisation as the primary dialogue was remarkably fast. The 
influence held by Freedom House and the NED combined with the ideologically-driven 
mind-set of the Reagan administration meant that the more traditional human rights 
groups such as WOLA were almost completely closed out of the executive branch until 
they began to adapt their language. Even then, WOLA never really regained the level of 
access it had had during the Carter years until Bush took office in 1989, by which time 
Latin America was ceasing to be a high priority. In a matter of only a few years, the 
traditional language of human rights had been overturned and replaced by the US-
centric blend of democracy and rights-based rhetoric espoused by the NED, Freedom 
House and the Reagan administration. 
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Chapter 2 - “If you have your hand in another man’s pocket, you must 
move when he moves”167: Funding and Organisational Structures 
 
Vital to an understanding of these three organisations and their place in the narrative of 
human rights and broader inter-American relations is comprehension of them as non-
state actors and their operation in this capacity. According to much of the theoretical 
literature, the question of “legitimacy” is crucial to the work of all non-state actors. 
Although there is minimal consensus on what exactly gives non-state actors 
“legitimacy”, and often the answer is highly context dependent, there are two key 
factors which seem to impact on “legitimacy”: non-state actor independence (or 
perceived independence) and the degree to which an organisation is “professionalised”. 
Both of these characteristics are linked to the issue of funding – where non-state actors 
receive capital from and the form it takes – and questions of internal structures and 
attitudes. Current thinking concerning the funding and structuring of non-state actors 
has emphasised an increase in “official donor” (bilateral and multilateral organisations 
and states) funding and the limitations this presents.168 It has been suggested that 
increased reliance on “official donor” funding severely reduces the legitimacy of non-
state actors.169 However, as Carrie Meyer suggests, it is not only “official” donors that 
can cause problems for such organisations but any kind of organisational funding. 
Meyer argues that, since donors are effectively purchasing the “goods” non-state actors 
provide they are able to set the priorities, thus making non-state actors effectively 
implementers of donor agendas.170 Similarly, donors can influence the internal workings 
and the hiring practices of non-state organisations. According to Wright, donors place 
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an emphasis on technical aspects of management and operation, leading to the 
professionalisation and bureaucratisation of non-state actors.171 This, he claims, has 
resulted in an increase in elite professionals, who lack an understanding of the lives and 
problems faced by their beneficiaries, running non-state organisations like businesses 
and costing them the legitimacy brought by the grassroots, beneficiary focused 
operating style.172  
The organisations under examination here did not really fit into the theories in 
the literature of non-state actor legitimacy. This is partially due to the fact that most of 
the literature concerning non-state actors is focused on those groups more classically 
understood as NGOs, such as humanitarian, development and advocacy groups. None of 
the organisations in question here fits the standard NGO-style model. First, these 
organisations were not specifically service providing – that is to say their projects did 
not deliver services on the ground in Latin America. While the NED provided grants, 
these were given to other US organisations for use in Latin America and none of the 
projects provided or took over essential services from local governments.  Moreover, 
aside from Freedom House, these were not organisations which accepted fee-paying, 
lay-members, being composed instead of volunteers and paid members of staff. 
Consequently none of these organisations could rely on membership fees to make up 
part of their budgets, instead relying entirely on organisational funding from the state or 
foundations.  
 Before embarking on an in-depth discussion of the funding of these three 
organisations, it is important to understand the requirements and uses for funding by 
non-state actors. In his 2006 article, Fernand Vincent divides the financial requirements 
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of non-state actors into two categories, “political” costs and “project” costs.173 
“Political” costs are those costs relating to the operation of the organisation– these may 
include salaries, travel expenses, fundraising and member communication costs. 
“Project” costs are those which relate to the activities and projects carried out by the 
organisation (be they personnel costs or advertising and lobbying or travel costs).174 
However, this distinction between “political” and “project” costs is difficult to quantify 
in the case of these three groups. Although all three institutions clearly had 
organisational costs that did not apply directly to individual projects, because their 
work, with the exception of the NED, was not really project-based, it is difficult to 
determine what costs were organisational and what costs applied to specific projects or 
campaigns. For example, several of the salaries of WOLA staff members were paid by 
religious institutions. However, given that almost all WOLA staff contributed research 
and other substantive, project-related work to the organisation should these salaries be 
classed as “political” or project-based costs?175 Similarly, Freedom House received a 
grant for the Freedom Survey; since many of the individuals working on the Freedom 
Survey were also full time operational Freedom House staff, how exactly should this 
cost be classified?176 As will be demonstrated later in the chapter, part of the problem in 
dividing these costs into categories of any kind is that often the organisations 
themselves do not make a meaningful distinction between those funds which went 
towards organisational costs and those which went specifically towards projects. This, 
combined with the fact that none of these organisations kept particularly detailed 
records concerning their funding, suggests that they were not particularly concerned 
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with issues of transparency, another factor often connected to the “legitimacy” of non-
state actors.  
 As has been mentioned, Freedom House was the only one of the three 
organisations to have any kind of lay-membership, but the majority of its funding came 
from grants made by various private foundations, companies and individuals. Although 
it investigated the possibility in the early 1980s, Freedom House never sought to attract 
a mass membership and never saw membership dues as a major part of their funding 
strategy. As a result, the amount received from this source was so negligible as to be 
irrelevant to the discussion at hand.177  While membership dues did not make up part of 
WOLA’s funding strategy, its funding sources changed greatly throughout the 1980-93 
period. In 1980, the vast majority of WOLA’s funding came from religious 
organisations but by 1987 this had decreased to 25% with the majority of its funding 
coming from private foundations.178  By contrast, the NED’s financial structure was not 
only very different to those of Freedom House and WOLA, but also much more 
complex due to its grant-making nature. With the exception of a few special 
appropriations from USAID, the NED received all of its funding via a block grant, 
determined by Congress, from the US Information Agency (USIA). Out of this money, 
the NED gave grants, primarily, to four core grantees the Centre for International 
Private Enterprise (CIPE, a branch of the Chamber of Commerce), the Free Trade 
Union Institute (FTUI, part of the AFL-CIO), the National Republican Institute for 
International Affairs (NRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (NDI); while the NED also gave grants to other organisations, these four 
received the majority of its budget. While specific grants made by the NED will not be 
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discussed in this chapter (see Chapters 5 and 6) it is worth noting that one of the key 
criticisms of the NED was that its complicated funding and grant structure made it 
difficult to trace where NED funds went and how they were used which had a negative 
effect on its perceived legitimacy in certain circles.179  
 
Donors: Influence, impact and limitations 
Between 1980 and 1993, Freedom House received grants from a variety of different 
private and corporate trusts and foundations. In 1982, grants from the Scaife 
Foundation, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, the Pew Freedom Trust and the Lilly 
Endowment accounted for around 70% of Freedom House’s income.180 These grants 
ranged between $23,000 and $125,000 and were topped up by smaller grants from 
foundations such as the Commonwealth Fund, the Ford Foundation and the Heritage 
Foundation, all of which contributed grants of between $10,000 and $24,000.181 
Freedom House received grants from these foundations fairly regularly throughout the 
1980s and into the 1990s. Many of these foundations and trusts formed part of a 
network of what Justin Vaïsse calls the “conservative counterestablishment”, a 
proliferation of conservative think tanks and foundations which occurred in the 
1970s.182 
The four main donors to Freedom House were all philanthropic trusts 
established or run by right-wing businessmen. The Scaife Foundation was founded with 
the money of Richard Mellon Scaife (owner of the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review) by his 
mother Sarah Scaife in the 1960s. Until the 1970s it was relatively apolitical, but in 
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1973 the Foundation was taken over by Richard Mellon-Scaife and after this it adopted 
a more conservative agenda.183 Scaife was known as a man who “reinvigorated 
conservative politics in America” and his tenure as chairman of the Scaife Foundation 
was influenced by his conservative views.184 The Smith-Richardson Foundation was 
established in 1935 by H. Smith Richardson, son of Lunsford Richardson, the inventor 
of Vick VapoRub. Like the Scaife Foundation, Smith-Richardson was known for giving 
grants to right-of-centre organisations including providing seed money for 
PRODEMCA.185 The Pew Freedom Trust was founded in 1957 by J. Howard Pew, who 
instructed that the trust be used to educate the American people about the “evils of 
bureaucracy” and the “values of a free market”.186 Although by 1988 the Trust focused 
more on funding research, it did not abandon its conservative priorities, nor did it cease 
to fund Freedom House, choosing instead to specify that its grant would go towards the 
Freedom Survey.187 Freedom House’s smaller donors also tended to have a conservative 
outlook. For example, the Heritage Foundation, of whose board Richard Scaife was a 
member,188 had been established in 1973 by Paul Weyrich and Ed Feulner (both of 
whom worked for Republican members of Congress) because the two men believed 
conservative ideas were absent from legislative politics.189 The Heritage Foundation 
also received funding from both the Scaife and Smith-Richardson Foundations. 
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Freedom House and the foundations and trusts that funded it were connected in a 
conservative network comprised of donors, think tanks and non-state actors. This 
network was close-knit, with many of the large donor foundations funding smaller 
foundations and organisations, which, in turn, funded each other. In addition to the 
money it received from foundations and trusts, Freedom House also received grants 
from trade unions, corporations, and wealthy or affiliated individuals. Between 1980 
and 1993, Freedom House received grants from Exxon, Chase Bank, IBM, Caterpillar, 
Chubb and the Getty Oil Company.190 Moreover, the AFL-CIO, United Steelworkers of 
America and a number of other unions made small grants ($4000 or less) to Freedom 
House during this time.191 In many cases, the Freedom House board were asked to assist 
with fundraising and many secured donations from their own unions, foundations or 
companies.192 For example, one of the largest consistent corporate grants came from 
Unilever through Ned Bandler, former director of the company; Freedom House 
received around $3000 from Unilever every year Bandler served on the board.193 The 
grants from companies and unions tended to be small but they rarely came with attached 
requirements and formed part of the general operating costs of the organisation. It 
should be mentioned here that, although Freedom House had some of the most complete 
records regarding the grants it received, its archive contained little material that shed 
light on what grants were actually spent on. However, it was recorded that occasionally 
Freedom House received one-off or shorter-term grants for specific projects. For 
example, in 1986 Freedom House administered a grant from the NED for Libro Libre (a 
publishing project run in Costa Rica); Freedom House also acted as a fundraiser for the 
project, securing one-off grants from the Olin, Smith-Richardson and Lynde and Harry 
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Bradley Foundations.194 Moreover, in the same year, Freedom House received an NED 
grant to establish a network of democratic opinion leaders and create a “two-way flow 
of ideas which would end the isolation of democratic-minded intellectuals and 
journalists in the third world”.195 Despite Freedom House’s insistence that it did not 
take US government money, in 1990 it received a $160,000 grant from USAID for use 
on its work in El Salvador.196 This was the first funding Freedom House had received 
directly from a state organisation in this period and, at least up until 1993, it did not take 
another US government grant. 
Much of the literature concerning NGO legitimacy focuses on the issues 
inherent in accepting government money; while accepting money from foundations and 
trusts sometimes brought project limitations as Meyer suggested, it rarely had the same 
impact on the way organisations were perceived outside of their peer group. Although 
Leonard Sussman stated in an internal memorandum that Freedom House did not accept 
funding which imposed projects on it, in order to court foundation funds Freedom 
House, like all foundation funded actors, had to tailor its grant applications to reflect the 
interests of donors.197 Moreover, the records suggest that regular donors had the 
potential to influence not only the type of projects Freedom House undertook but also to 
which other organisations they applied for funding. For example, in 1984 the boards of 
both Smith-Richardson and the Olin Foundation pushed the Freedom House board to 
apply for funding from the NED.198 The boards of these two foundations felt that NED 
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grants were “tailor-made for Freedom House” and were angry that it had misgivings 
about applying for NED funds.199 Internally, the Freedom House board was worried 
about whether taking NED funds would stop it being able to claim “none of [its] support 
[came] from governments”; but it was equally fearful that rejecting NED funds would 
turn large donor foundations against it.200 It is clear that the pressure put on Freedom 
House by these foundations contributed to its eventual decision to apply for NED funds 
and, by becoming involved with the NED, Freedom House also lost the ability to claim 
that it never had projects imposed on or suggested to it since, in the years that followed, 
the NED often did both. In 1985, the NED asked Freedom House to take over 
administration of the Libro Libre project from the American Institute of Free Labor 
Development (AIFLD) and the NED sent Freedom House proposals it received from 
other organisations and asked if it would consider acting as an administrator for them.201 
After Freedom House accepted the Libro Libre project, it took on an increased number 
of NED projects and became more inclined to apply to the NED for project funding 
requiring it to tailor more of its proposals to suit NED priorities.  
 In 1985, Freedom House’s relationship with the Olin Foundation became 
increasingly difficult because Olin, which had funded Freedom House’s Central 
America Centre, had reservations about the positions Freedom House was taking 
concerning issues in Central America.202 In a memorandum, Sussman accused Olin of 
curtailing Freedom House’s ability to design its own projects as it insisted on only 
giving grants for specific project support rather than for general use.203 The Lynde and 
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Harry Bradley Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts also provided unsolicited grants 
for specific projects rather than for general purposes. The Bradley Foundation gave two 
grants for a political study of the Chilean election and a documentary on Nicaragua 
while Pew specified that all of its grants were to go to the Freedom Survey.204 Such 
limitations on grants took away some of Freedom House’s control over its programme 
design, thereby compromising its independence. However, the loss of independence in 
decision-making suffered by Freedom House did not have the negative effect so often 
described in the theory concerning non-state actor funding. Unlike those non-state 
actors whose primary donors were the state or state-affiliated organisations, through 
taking foundation funding Freedom House did not lose its political independence or, for 
the most part, its ability to choose its methods. Since the majority of the foundations 
which funded Freedom House formed part of a conservative network of donors and 
non-state actors, their funding was more likely to reinforce Freedom House’s political 
attitudes and methodology decisions than undermine them; particularly given that 
several of the foundations and individuals sought out Freedom House rather than the 
other way around. The exception to this was the Olin Foundation’s questions about 
Freedom House’s engagement in Central America. That said, Olin’s objections did not 
stop Freedom House from taking political positions with regards to Central America, 
nor did the disagreement prevent Olin from funding the Libro Libre project the 
following year. This suggests that the relationship between non-state actors and 
foundation donors was more complicated than the relationship between non-state actors 
and government donors described in the existent literature. Although these donors did 
have a level of control over the types of projects that organisations ran, they did not 
appear to have the ability to change the principles or overall political leanings. Instead 
private foundations and donors tended only to fund those organisations which, in some 
                                                 
204 FH Records, Box 148, Freedom House Foundation Support for the 1991 Fiscal Year, (1990). 
Mara Sankey 
 
84 
 
way, matched their politics. Even Freedom House’s largely symbiotic relationship with 
the NED and its acceptance of funds from USAID in the early 1990s represented less 
the political co-option of Freedom House and more an invitation to Freedom House to 
enter the conservative power structure within Washington at the time. 
 Freedom House did not appear to suffer a loss of legitimacy as a result of its 
donors or its political alignment with the US government. Indeed, within the United 
States and among other donor foundations, even its involvement with the NED did not 
appear to cost it too much. Those organisations which took great exception to the 
activities of the NED, such as the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, tended to direct their 
criticisms at the NED directly or the programmes themselves instead of the 
intermediary organisations.205 Within Latin America, Freedom House suffered very 
little loss of legitimacy or authority as a result of its donor foundations. The Freedom 
Survey was cited in Latin American newspapers, as were statements by Freedom House 
employees and resident scholars and it did not struggle to find individuals and 
organisations to work with in the region.206 Although Leonard Sussman did receive 
some harassment on trips to Latin America, most notably when the Paraguayan 
government ruled that no-one could attend a conference at which he was speaking in 
1987, the harassment was not noticeably worse than that received by other non-state 
actors and their employees in countries under authoritarian rule.207 This is not to say 
Freedom House was immune from criticism from its left-wing counterparts. Indeed the 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs referred to it as a “bastion of neo-conservative 
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thought”.208 While it was attacked for its political opinions and for attempting to 
promote its politics abroad, the criticisms levelled at it rarely discussed its donors or 
their political motivations.   
Unlike Freedom House, which had a consistent funding base throughout this 
time, WOLA’s major funding sources changed a great deal mostly as a result of changes 
in its internal structuring and financial strategy. In the early years, almost all of 
WOLA’s funding came from religious organisations and this was still the case in 1980 
when 75% of WOLA’s total revenue came from religious organisations.209 By 1983 this 
proportion had dropped to 36% as more of WOLA’s funding derived from private 
foundations.210 From 1986 onwards WOLA’s single largest donor was the Ford 
Foundation which provided around a quarter of WOLA’s operational budget that year 
and into the 1990s.211 Between 1980 and 1986 WOLA had received a number of project 
grants from Ford for its seminar series on relations with Nicaragua and its human rights 
activities.212 The 1986 grant differed from those that had come before not only in size, 
but also because it was a general purpose grant which formed part of a larger drive on 
the part of WOLA to professionalise as an organisation.  
At this time Ford was one of the largest philanthropic foundations in the world. 
Originally established in 1936 to “advance human welfare”, by the 1980s it funded 
democratisation, development and cultural exchange projects throughout the world but 
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particularly in Latin America.213 By the 1980s Ford was a well-known name in the 
human rights industry, having become one of the largest funders of human rights 
activities in the United States.214  Throughout its history Ford courted criticism from all 
sides: from the right for being too liberal (particularly with regard to its domestic work) 
and from the left for being elitist and too closely tied to the US government.215 Through 
an examination of a list of Ford grantees alone it is possible to find evidence to support 
both of these opinions as Ford grants were numerous and their recipients varied. WOLA 
was a good fit for the work Ford supported in the field human rights, economic fairness 
and democratic, accountable governance abroad.216 Although WOLA did not receive 
criticism or any backlash as a result of its grants from Ford, WOLA staffers were, 
initially, worried that the grants would force a level of institutionalisation on the 
organisation that would prevent them assisting those Latin Americans who sought their 
help.217 Although Ford did insist on a level of bureaucratisation from WOLA it was not 
as extreme as WOLA staff feared, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
While the Ford grants are well documented in WOLA’s archive, when it came to 
other funding WOLA’s records are less comprehensive. WOLA received donations 
from a number of private foundations in the 1980s and 1990s including the J. Roderick 
MacArthur Foundation, the Needmor Fund and the Stern Family Fund, with the 
majority of secular foundation funding coming after 1984.  The MacArthur Foundation 
was known for its support for liberal causes such as the Death Penalty Information 
Centre in Washington and the Justice Centre at Northwestern School of Law. The 
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majority of recorded grants from the MacArthur Foundation were general purpose 
grants to WOLA, some of which were spent on in-country implementation of projects, 
such as its analysis of the Administration of Justice programme (a USAID programme 
which aimed to help improve the efficiency, accessibility and fairness of Latin 
American justice systems).218 The Needmor and Stern Funds more commonly gave 
grants for specific projects or with conditions attached. For example, Needmor funded 
WOLA’s networking and outreach project in Guatemala in 1983 and the Stern Fund 
provided a challenge grant for WOLA’s efforts to oppose the deployment of the 
National Guard to train police forces in Central America wherein they matched 
WOLA’s other fundraising efforts. Both Needmor and Stern were, like the MacArthur 
Foundation, notoriously liberal in nature, with Needmor stating its mission as seeking to 
bring about social justice and Stern directing its grants towards projects which sought to 
re-distribute political and economic power and to reform systems to tackle the causes of 
societal problems. In addition to these (and other) liberal private foundations, WOLA 
regularly applied for and received grants from Oxfam during this time. Between 1984 
and 1992, WOLA received several grants from variously Oxfam USA, UK and Mexico. 
Although the exact quantity of each grant and the specifics of what the money was spent 
on were not always recorded by WOLA, grants were usually given for individual 
projects proposed by the organisation. In 1990 Oxfam provided funds for WOLA’s 
Central America programme, enabling WOLA’s staffers to take a fact-finding trip to 
Nicaragua. From their findings, they briefed House and Senate Western Hemisphere 
Subcommittee aides on the impact of delayed development assistance and provided 
policymakers with testimony and seminars by participants in the El Salvador peace 
process and other key members of Central American political parties and human rights 
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groups.219 Prior to this Oxfam had also given WOLA funds to provide a salary for a full 
time position concerning Central America.220  
As in the case of Freedom House, WOLA generally received very few 
accusations of co-option or loss of legitimacy as a result of its private foundation 
donors. Again, those foundations which funded WOLA tended to do so because it 
shared their political outlook and matched their overall goals and, as a result, they had 
little interest in altering WOLA’s political aims. With the exception of the Ford 
Foundation, which did demand a level of professionalisation from WOLA in exchange 
for continued funding, WOLA’s foundation donors seemed to be largely undemanding 
either in terms of the programmes it ran or its internal operations. It is possible that the 
reason for this was that the majority of the grants WOLA received had been applied for 
specifically to fund certain projects and, as a result, most of the accountability and 
reporting procedures were decided and accepted in advance of money changing hands. 
Unlike Freedom House, of course, WOLA’s own politics kept it firmly out of the 
running for funding from US government agencies during this time. As a result, WOLA 
avoided accusations of co-option by the state, instead receiving criticism from the 
Reagan administration for its supposedly biased, left-wing outlook.221  
The most controversial elements of WOLA’s donor base were the religious 
organisations. Although WOLA’s financial relationship with religious organisations and 
orders fluctuated during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it still received sizeable 
donations from various religious orders including the Society of Jesus, the Maryknoll 
Fathers and Brothers, the National Council of the Churches of Christ and the Veatch 
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Program, the financial foundation of the Unitarian Universalist Congregation at Shelter 
Rock. The majority of the funds from religious organisations appear to have been 
general purpose grants, which WOLA put to a variety of uses including organising 
seminars and meetings in Washington and paying the salaries of some of WOLA’s full-
time staff.222 For the most part, these religious grants, while not particularly 
controversial in themselves, did confirm WOLA in the eyes of the public as a primarily 
religious organisation. The most contentious of WOLA’s regular grants came from the 
United Methodist Church General Board of Global Ministries (GBGM), which paid Joe 
Eldridge’s salary for his time as director and provided a number of smaller grants for 
specific projects as well.223 The GBGM proved divisive among the ecumenical 
community due to the often political nature of its grants and work which focused 
heavily on social justice issues. Organisations on the opposite side of the political 
spectrum to WOLA, such as the Heritage Foundation, highlighted the acceptance of 
GBGM funds as a symptom of WOLA’s subservience to left-wing, anti-US 
organisations. In its analysis of the “left’s Latin American lobby” (a pamphlet 
containing analysis of WOLA, the North American Congress on Latin America, the 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs and three other leftist organisations) the Heritage 
Foundation stated that they saw WOLA’s propensity to concentrate on human rights 
violations in US-backed countries while ignoring those in left-leaning nations as 
“[revealing] the political bias of the United Methodist Board of Global Ministries”.224 
The Heritage Foundation’s criticism of WOLA as heavily influenced by the GBGM was 
not without justification because a number of WOLA’s board members were also 
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members of the GBGM and the National Council of Churches. There is nothing to 
suggest that the GBGM or any of the other religious organisations which donated to 
WOLA during this period directly influenced or altered WOLA programming as a 
condition of their grants. Both WOLA’s foundation and religious donors were 
comparatively uninvolved in its project design. Since the majority of WOLA’s 
foundation grants appear to have been applied and given for specific projects, while 
WOLA may have tailored the proposal to the aims of the foundation it was applying to, 
the projects were usually designed entirely by WOLA internally. The key exception to 
this was the large grant received yearly from the Ford Foundation, which was a general 
purpose grant and did initially come with a number of demands for professionalisation. 
While Ford requested some increased bureaucratisation (which will be discussed in 
more detail later), it did not appear to involve itself with WOLA’s programming or 
project design. Despite Ford’s attempts to alter WOLA’s internal structures the 
foundation grants WOLA received, like those received by Freedom House, did not 
appear to have an impact on its legitimacy either in the United States or in Latin 
America.  
It is plausible that one of the reasons foundation grants attract less criticism and 
fewer accusations of co-option than state grants is that foundations tend to fund those 
organisations which match their own political leanings. As Keck and Sikkink suggest, 
foundations are autonomous in most respects, in that they are accountable only to their 
own boards of trustees and, although they may have their own ideas or political beliefs, 
they are incapable of implementing them themselves and must seek out those 
organisations which can.225 They are, unlike governments, a part of the network of non-
state actors and, as a result, there is less scope for visible co-option or political 
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manipulation in foundation grants. It is also possible that this type of grant provokes 
less of a reaction simply because, as foundations are private organisations, their 
financial dealings, arrangements and political leanings are simply less well known to the 
general public. What is typically general knowledge is that foundations work outside the 
state and, as a result, their grants do not produce the appearance of a foreign state 
seeking to interfere in the domestic situations of other nations, thus making foundation 
funding appear less controversial. Although WOLA did receive some criticism for its 
close relationship to religious organisations, much of this came from right-wing 
organisations seeking to discredit it. While it must be said that WOLA did have a strong 
relationship with various religious orders and, due to the circumstances of its founding 
and the composition of its board, it was influenced by the beliefs and priorities of such 
organisations, it did not hide its links to these organisations. WOLA had never claimed 
to be independent from religious circles; indeed it defined itself as a religious 
organisation. As a result, outside of those organisations which opposed it, WOLA’s 
religious contributions also received very little attention.  
Of the three organisations discussed here, the NED had the most controversial 
funding structure. Unlike WOLA and Freedom House, both of which received funding 
from a variety of different private foundations, individuals and groups, the NED’s 
whole budget came from one source. The Act which founded the NED stipulated that its 
budget would be a block grant given from the budget of the USIA.226 The USIA had 
been established in 1953 by President Eisenhower to “inform and influence foreign 
publics in promotion of the national interest” and “broaden the dialogue between…U.S. 
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institutions and their counterparts abroad”.227 USIA often performed the job of a 
propaganda agency, creating newsreels and other programmes to be broadcast abroad to 
promote US values and preserve a positive image of the United States. Throughout the 
first Reagan administration, under the directorship of Charles Wick, USIA worked to 
confront Soviet reporting and propaganda directly by contesting Soviet statistics and 
running satellite TV specials such as “Let Poland be Poland” (1982), which used 
celebrity performances and appeals to protest the declaration of martial law in 
Poland.228 By the 1980s, USIA had gathered controversy around it, not because of the 
materials it created but instead in its capacity as a censorship board and rating agency 
for material imported into the United States.229 Despite the controversy that surrounded 
USIA, critics of the NED rarely discussed its link to USIA, preferring instead to attack 
the NED as a recipient of US government funds. While it was important that the NED 
was receiving US government funding, albeit through a mediator, the fact that the 
intermediary organisation chosen was USIA is telling. Despite stating its remit to be 
assisting in the practicalities of democratic development (voting procedure, equipment, 
consultants etc.), in some respects the NED and USIA performed very similar functions, 
particularly when it came to cultural exchanges and the provision of training 
programmes in democracy and democratic values. Putting the NED under the auspices 
of USIA suggests that it was seen by the administration as, not only a provider of 
practical assistance for democratic movements abroad, but also as an aspect of the 
broader propagation of US values and positive US image abroad. The non-state image 
of the NED allowed it greater access to the domestic operations of other nations than 
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was afforded to government institutions under international law and opinion. Indeed, 
David Lowe, NED vice-president from 1989, suggested in 2008 that the NED was able 
to penetrate abroad more effectively as it had “flexibility and relative autonomy not 
available to established government entities such as USAID, the State Department and 
the US Information Agency”.230 Moreover, although USIA was a state organisation, 
using it as an intermediary for funding provided the NED with a greater appearance of 
independence than it would have had had it received funds from the US government 
directly without an intermediary organisation.  
The standard grant the NED received via USIA was (for the most part) an open 
grant to be spent as the NED’s board deemed fit. In the early years of the organisation, 
Congress did dictate that $16,300,000 of the original $31,300,000 budget for the NED 
had to be split between the FTUI and CIPE. Although this restriction did not specify 
what projects the NED should fund within the two institutions and was eventually lifted, 
it does suggest that, in the early years at least, the NED’s programme creation was 
heavily influenced by Congress despite the money actually coming through another 
organisation. According to the NED’s founding act, USIA itself did not have the ability 
to limit or alter the terms of the grant it gave to the NED; any alterations and limitations 
could only be set by Congress. In addition to funding from USIA, from 1988 onwards, 
Congress set aside a number of special appropriations for the NED via USAID. These 
appropriations proved highly controversial. In contrast to the yearly USIA grant, the 
appropriations from USAID were limited, usually to be spent on one country specified 
by Congress. The first of these large appropriations, for example, was targeted to assist 
the No Campaign in Chile’s 1988 plebiscite while the second was earmarked for 
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Nicaragua’s 1990 election.231 Although Congress never specified exactly which projects 
or groups should be funded within these countries, it did, particularly in the case of 
Nicaragua, mandate which side of the debate the NED could fund. In Chile, the 
appropriation was earmarked for organisations and projects in favour of the No 
Campaign and in Nicaragua it was allocated to assist the electoral opposition and their 
affiliated organisations.232 Again, the level of control Congress maintained over the 
NED’s programming with these appropriations suggests that the independence of the 
NED board was questionable.233  
These USAID appropriations brought a great deal of controversy, not only from 
those organisations which opposed or were critical of the NED but also from within the 
NED itself.234 Internally the NED feared that the appropriations would set a precedent 
for the earmarking of its core USIA budget and, by extension, undermine its 
independence.235 Yet, even prior to the appropriations, the NED was subject to the 
interests of and trends within Congress. The NED’s four core grantees were established 
and linked to it by Congress and the special relationships it enjoyed with the FTUI and 
CIPE initially were also mandated by Congress. This would suggest that, even though 
funds the NED received were channelled through secondary, government-affiliated 
organisations, in reality, the body with the most influence over NED programming 
remained Congress. In this regard, it would difficult for the NED to operate a 
programme that was not aligned with US government interests. Despite the fact that the 
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uses to which the USIA grants were put were, from the mid-1980s at least, largely 
decided by the NED board, special appropriations and consistent Congressional 
oversight meant that if projects were really distasteful to Congress, it could vote either 
to restrict the appropriation or to cut or abolish the NED budget altogether.236 Despite 
the use of intermediaries which somewhat concealed the funding link between the NED 
and the US government, opponents of the NED used its financial connections to the 
state as a means to question its legitimacy and its ability to help its beneficiaries.  
In fact, the NED’s funding structure accounted for a large proportion of the 
accusations and criticisms made against it. For example, the Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs suggested that the funding structure of the NED was designed to avoid oversight 
and accountability. NED denials lacked credibility since the channelling of government 
funds to the NED via third parties (even if they were also state-run) came across to 
many of its critics as suspicious and a means for the US government to fund 
organisations and carry out projects which would be unfavourable in the international 
community.237 Despite these accusations from NED critics, there is no evidence that the 
NED’s basic funding structure of grants via USIA caused concern among its 
beneficiaries. However, the USAID appropriations did create some disquiet among 
NED beneficiaries in Latin America and among its core grantees that saw the 
appropriations as calling the independence of the NED into question.238  
Overall, the NED’s financial relationships with the US government, USIA and 
USAID placed it in a difficult position. On the one hand, it did not have to seek out 
funding and enter into the competitive process of applying for foundation funds. Unlike 
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Freedom House, which suffered from foundation attempts to alter its programmes and 
WOLA which, throughout much of the 1980s, struggled from perpetual underfunding, 
the NED was, as long as Congress could be kept on side, financially secure. On the 
other hand, its financial relationships kept it firmly under the influence of both the 
White House and Congress. While its budget was, in theory, the board’s to spend as it 
saw fit, in practice, at least in the early years, Congress took control of this too through 
dictating what proportion of the budget should go to the FTUI and CIPE. Similarly, its 
critics in Congress had the ability to force votes to end its funding or significantly 
reduce it; even though only one such vote (out of four) was successful and was almost 
immediately overturned, this did put the NED’s financial stability at risk and made it 
more inclined to run projects favourable to the majority of Congress.239 Moreover, the 
NED’s funding structure opened it up to accusations of being a front for US interference 
in domestic affairs abroad. The special USAID appropriations particularly illustrated to 
critics and beneficiaries that the NED could be used by Congress to further specific 
aims of US foreign policy. The case of the NED indicates that government funding was, 
even for democracy-promoting organisations, as problematic as much of the literature 
suggests. Being a purely government-funded institution did attract accusations of co-
option and cultural imperialism as well as speculations about the NED’s legitimacy as 
an independent organisation.   
 In his article, Vincent suggests that non-state actors should keep funding from 
“external sources” to less than 50% of their total budget to avoid the dependence 
factor.240 While none of these three organisations fit this model, it would be difficult to 
claim that Freedom House and WOLA were not predominantly free in their actions. 
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While WOLA was under some pressure from its major donor to professionalise its 
internal processes, with the exception of Freedom House’s disagreement with Olin, 
neither organisation was under a great deal of pressure from donors to change its 
programme design or the way projects were implemented. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to tell from the sources whether or not these organisations tailored their 
programmes to the foundations they were applying to, although it is likely they did to 
some extent. Both Freedom House and WOLA received most of their large foundation 
grants in the form of general grants with minimal limitations; as a result, even though 
they may have tailored proposals for specific foundations, the majority of their funding 
was not project specific and, therefore, even in this context it would seem that neither 
organisation was strongly influenced by its donors. Where these organisations could be 
said to be under the influence of their foundation donors was in their own internal 
structures and operations which will be discussed in more detail later.  
 Vincent’s criticisms of the operation of NGO funding apply more to the NED. 
Although it did not have to enter into the funding market and compete for funds from 
foundations and individuals, its funding relationship with USIA and USAID meant that 
its programming decisions had the potential to be influenced, if not controlled, by the 
White House and Congress. Despite the supposed autonomy of the NED board, when it 
came to programme decisions, the fact that the NED’s budget was granted and approved 
by Congress meant that it was always at risk from having its budget revoked if its 
behaviour or projects did not satisfy members of Congress. Moreover, the use of special 
appropriations from USAID meant that Congress did have the ability to dictate the 
countries in which the NED worked if not the actual projects it worked on. This 
suggests that, in its programme design at least, the NED was, in fact, heavily influenced 
by the wishes of its primary donor, the US government. This close financial relationship 
cost the NED some of its legitimacy both abroad and in the United States. Despite 
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establishment of its financial structure in its founding documentation, accusations of co-
option were common from NED opponents within the United States and some 
opponents suggested that the NED was nothing more than a means for the US 
government to channel money to organisations it did not feel it could fund directly. In 
contrast, within Latin America, the basic funding structure of the NED did not cause too 
many problems. What worried NED beneficiaries were the special appropriations, 
which showcased Congress’ ability to direct and control NED programming.  
Unlike the NED, neither Freedom House nor WOLA suffered much of a loss of 
legitimacy as a result of their foundation donors. While both received criticism from 
their opponents in the United States for taking grants only from sources with similar 
political views, their funding sources do not appear to have been questioned much 
within Latin America. In the case of these three organisations, it would appear that what 
caused a loss of independence and legitimacy was not the question of external versus 
internal funding, but rather the issue of state versus private funding. While the state 
funding of the NED raised significant questions among its critics, the private foundation 
funding received by Freedom House and WOLA garnered almost no interest at all. The 
foundations which funded Freedom House and WOLA appeared to be less prescriptive 
in their relationships with these organisations. Perhaps because the beliefs and politics 
of these foundations were less well known and they did not appear to represent foreign 
interference, foundation funding did not result in a loss of legitimacy among 
beneficiaries and colleagues in the way that government funding did.  
 
Internal structures: Freedom, compromise and professionalisation 
How organisations handle their internal affairs can impact profoundly on how they are 
perceived by their beneficiaries and colleagues. According to much of the theory 
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concerning non-state organisations, the reporting, accounting, appraisal and evaluation 
procedures, which are often associated with taking funding from official state or 
foundation sources can divert an NGO’s attention away from its beneficiaries, thus 
giving the appearance of its no longer being accountable to its beneficiaries but rather to 
its donors. As Michael Edwards and David Hulme suggest, this growth in bureaucracy 
often stems from the general growth and professionalisation of the organisation.241 
Between 1980 and 1993, all three of the organisations under consideration here 
underwent a great deal of growth as a result of a rise in international interest in issues of 
democracy and human rights. Both WOLA and Freedom House expanded their 
programmes geographically and in scope – using new methods of promoting democracy 
and human rights and beginning new, larger projects. With this expansion came a need 
for increased funding, new funding sources and an increased level of 
professionalisation. In the case of both WOLA and Freedom House this meant seeking 
and taking on more foundation funding and refining or creating new systems for 
accounting and reporting. Unlike Freedom House, WOLA was a much closer fit to 
Wright’s theory of how non-state actors lose legitimacy through bureaucratisation.242 It 
underwent an active professionalisation in the early 1980s which formalised its power 
structures and decision and policy making mechanisms and, by the late 1980s, it had 
begun to take on professionals such as Alex Wilde to run the organisation.243As will be 
seen, this did not cost it legitimacy in the eyes of its peers or its beneficiaries as Wright 
predicts. While the NED also grew a great deal in this time, the fact that its structure 
and many of its internal processes and accountability mechanisms had been established 
by Congress at the time of its founding meant that procedurally it was barely affected by 
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this growth. The NED was a “professionalised” institution from the outset since 
Congress had devised its internal structure and it was answerable to Congressional 
committees; it was already highly bureaucratised and did not undergo the internal 
changes the other two organisations did in the 1980s. 
 All three of these organisations operated under a largely top-down structure 
when it came to decision making. In all three cases the basic method of programme-
creation involved the presentation of project ideas to a board which determined the 
projects the organisations would undertake. Freedom House had two committees which 
were involved in its policymaking: the Board of Directors and an Executive Committee. 
Freedom House’s Board of Directors was responsible for deciding which projects 
Freedom House undertook and for managing its budget and applying for funding.244 The 
Executive Committee appears to have generally overseen Freedom House’s activities 
and, while it did make suggestions to the Board, it did not appear to exert any real 
control over the Board’s decisions. It should be mentioned that the Freedom House 
records do not give a clear indication of what the role of the Executive Committee 
actually was. What is clear is that its relationship with the Board was not always 
smooth; in 1982 for example, the Executive Committee suggested that it felt some of 
the projects Freedom House undertook were “ad hoc” and that it felt the Board had lost 
control of Freedom House’s funding.245 WOLA’s Board of Directors also held the 
power to vote on projects presented to it by WOLA staff, the Executive Director and 
organisations on the ground in Latin America.246 Unlike Freedom House, WOLA’s 
Board of Directors was not subject to another committee’s oversight but to that of the 
Executive Director who also sat on the board. In the case of the NED, while the institute 
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staff prepared and planned project proposals, the board exercised the final decision on 
which projects received NED grants.247 Although organisation staff drew up proposals 
and projects, in the cases of Freedom House and the NED, these staff were almost 
exclusively based in the United States and, while they made fact-finding and research 
trips (rarely of more than a month at a time), the extent of the staff’s understanding of 
the situation on the ground is unknown. Certainly, as will be discussed in greater detail 
in later chapters, outside of such fact-finding missions, neither organisation had 
particularly extensive connections within Latin American society, which calls into 
question the extent to which these organisations could ever be said to be accountable to 
local actors in the first place. While WOLA’s projects were primarily proposed by its 
own staff, it did regularly accept proposals from organisations on the ground as well. 
The fact that it was open to proposals from local actors, combined with the extensive 
network of contacts it had within the region, suggests that it did see itself as in some 
way accountable to its contacts in the region.  
 At this point, it must be made clear that, although Freedom House’s records are 
fairly comprehensive, they are lacking in documentation about exactly how Freedom 
House made its programming decisions or in correspondence between Freedom House 
and those foundations which funded it. However, it is still possible to draw some 
conclusions from the records available about the influence its donors exerted over its 
internal workings and to draw some conclusions about the effect this had on its 
organisational legitimacy. From as early as 1983, internal memoranda from Freedom 
House board members suggest that they were aware that the organisation had grown 
beyond its means. Initially the board responded to this problem by attempting to solidify 
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its funding base and institutionalise the expansion which had already occurred.248 By 
1986, the board felt it was necessary to reorganise the Board of Trustees, consolidate 
and redesign its programmes and re-examine the central purpose of the organisation.249 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest exactly what changes to the internal 
structure of the organisation were actually introduced at this time. It is clear that after 
1986, Freedom House shifted its funding focus away from seeking smaller, project-
specific donations and towards securing regular five figure individual donors and 
growing its endowment in order to “free [itself] from the politics of foundations”.250 
There is minimal evidence that the organisation succeeded in this aim, as its list of 
foundation donors and the amount of funding they provided does not appear to have 
decreased after this strategy-shift. Moreover, at this time Freedom House sought to hire 
a liaison between itself, the foundations and the NED, who could follow up on the 
details of grants and donations relieving the Board of Trustees of the need to do so 
itself.251 Despite recognising the need for a level of reorganisation, these changes and 
some changes in the management personnel appear to be the only serious structural 
changes which Freedom House undertook at this time.  
It would seem that the impetus for internal change in Freedom House did not 
derive from its donors but rather from a realisation that its infrastructure could not cope 
with the expansion that had occurred. For the most part, the foundations from which 
Freedom House received grants do not appear to have imposed that many bureaucratic 
constraints on the organisation. Indeed, for the most part these were foundations that 
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had been funding Freedom House for many years prior to the structural changes. Aside 
from basic reporting and, in some cases, grant proposals, Freedom House’s foundation 
grants do not appear to have had a great deal of associated bureaucracy. The exception 
to this was the NED grants, which demanded a stricter reporting process due to its 
answerability to Congress. However, even in this case, the reporting requirements do 
not appear onerous. There is little evidence within the records of Freedom House to 
suggest that the organisation found the bureaucratic requirements of its donors affected 
its ability to perform its function and meet its aims. While it did re-invent itself at this 
time, most of the changes were to its ideology rather than its operational structure.252 In 
the case of Freedom House at least, the common model described by many observers 
does not seem to apply. While Freedom House did professionalise during this time, the 
process did not have had a noticeable impact on its work or where it felt its 
accountability lay. This could be ascribed to Freedom House’s own understanding of its 
work. Unlike WOLA (or many more traditional transnational development and 
humanitarian organisations) it saw itself less as serving beneficiary nations, 
communities or individuals, than as working to promote a certain, US-centric set of 
values which it saw as universal. Given this, even in its more traditional projects like 
those it administered for the NED, Freedom House could not really be said to have 
“beneficiaries” in the way much of the theory conceptualises the term.  It saw itself as 
accountable to the United States and to its own principles, which created a level of 
detachment from local actors from the start. Similarly, due to the nature of its projects, 
which were primarily concerned with information dissemination and lobbying, Freedom 
House did not require the level of institutional flexibility so often associated with non-
state actors. This could explain why the professionalisation which occurred in the 1980s 
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was comparatively minimal and did not particularly affect Freedom House’s ability to 
perform the function it set out for itself.  
For WOLA the 1980s brought much internal restructuring and redefinition of 
strategy. WOLA had begun as an organisation more like those under consideration by 
scholars such as Meyer and Wright, with little formalised structure and a very small 
staff supplemented mostly by volunteers, who, in WOLA’s case, were primarily 
missionaries on the ground in Latin America. These volunteers (and few paid staff) 
were largely left to their own devices to create and manage networks and bases.253 As a 
result, it was internally very flexible and often operated on a case-by-case basis without 
much centralised control or decision making. In the 1980s this began to change as, 
using a grant from the Ford Foundation, the organisation grew and began to need a 
more efficient infrastructure to respond to the reporting requirements of its new 
foundation grants. In 1982 WOLA began to reorganise internally, starting with the 
formalisation of its decision and policy making mechanisms.254 It began to replace the 
volunteer missionaries with paid consultants and to distance itself from its religious 
roots.255 While it retained a close relationship with the churches through its board and 
day-to-day activities, it stopped requiring any kind of church affiliation for the 
employment of staff.256  Moreover, this re-organisation formalised the roles of the 
Board of Directors and the directors themselves, as well as dividing the responsibilities 
of the organisation between three teams. The management coordinated and directed the 
planning and implementation of projects, the regional teams were responsible for 
gathering and sharing information and intervening in foreign policy formulation as well 
                                                 
253 Youngers, 30 Años de Incidencia Política por los Derechos Humanos, la Democracia y la Justicia 
Social (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2006) p. 23. 
254 WOLA Records, Box 28, Some Suggestions for WOLA’s Reorganisation (1982). 
255 Youngers, 30 Años de Incidencia Política por los Derechos Humanos, la Democracia y la Justicia 
Social (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2006) p. 59. 
256 WOLA Records, Box 2, Some Suggestions for WOLA’s Reorganisation (1982). 
Mara Sankey 
 
105 
 
as organising the publications and education activities and, finally, WOLA established 
an administrative team to run the office.257 Although this was the largest reorganisation 
WOLA undertook in the 1980 – 93 period, the Ford Foundation did request some 
further alterations to its structure in 1990. At this time, Ford requested that WOLA 
should be more pro-active in choosing well defined projects and in evaluating its 
“impact” as an organisation.258 Around this time, Ford also suggested that WOLA focus 
more on projects based on “issue” rather than their previous approach which was fairly 
evenly divided between “country” and “issue” based projects.259 “Issue” based projects 
tended to apply either to multiple countries or to the region as a whole, for example a 
study WOLA conducted concerning the Administration of Justice Program (a USAID 
funded project to provide assistance to Latin American judiciaries) and its impact within 
the region. 
WOLA’s internal procedures changed noticeably as a result of the pressure 
brought to bear by the Ford Foundation. While, several of the Ford grants were 
specifically given to help WOLA professionalise and formalise their procedures, they 
nevertheless did reduce the flexibility of WOLA as an organisation.260 Indeed, many of 
WOLA’s staff and volunteers feared that this loss of flexibility would prevent them 
from helping those Latin Americans who came to WOLA seeking assistance.261 In fact, 
although this professionalisation did force WOLA to give up some of its flexibility, it 
did not appear significantly to hinder WOLA’s work in the way the theory suggests a 
loss of flexibility should. In a study into WOLA conducted by Carlos Chipoco and Lars 
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Schoultz in the 1990s, which interviewed a number of organisations and individuals in 
Latin America who worked with WOLA, the majority of respondents suggested that 
they thought WOLA was an organisation they could turn to with confidence.262 Indeed, 
for the most part, their major criticisms of WOLA were related to issues of 
underfunding rather than its work or processes.263  
The changes WOLA made internally during this time do seem to follow the 
models laid down by much of the literature on NGO professionalisation although the 
end result did not match the theories. Where WOLA differed was in its hiring for top 
positions. According to Wright, as non-state actors bureaucratise they tend to draft in 
professionals and “elites” at the top who run the organisation as a business and, due to 
the difference in backgrounds between themselves and their beneficiaries, have little 
understanding of the needs of beneficiaries.264 In the case of WOLA, for the most part, 
its top positions before and after its professionalisation were filled by ex-missionaries, 
activists and academics rather than corporate elites. Even Alex Wilde, WOLA’s director 
from 1987, while perhaps more institutionalised than his predecessor, came from a 
background primarily of research and activism rather than business or senior 
management (although he did previously hold academic management positions at the 
Helen Kellogg Institute and the Woodrow Wilson Centre in the early 1980s). Indeed, 
even though Wilde chose to realign WOLA more behind Washington in the early 1990s 
and added a number of interested parties from Washington to WOLA’s staff, he 
continued to prioritise WOLA’s original aims of denouncing of human rights violations 
and providing a rights-led critique of US policy towards Latin America.265 It is plausible 
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that, because WOLA’s professionalisation did not include a change in hiring practices at 
the top, it avoided the corporatisation that, according to Wright, many non-state actors 
undergo as they professionalise, and successfully retained its legitimacy. The 
commitment of the organisation and the staff was still primarily to their cause and, 
although internal procedures were formalised, WOLA’s internal bureaucracy did not 
increase sufficiently to prevent it from achieving its aims. Like Freedom House, its 
primary function was not beneficiary-based project or service delivery but rather 
information dissemination and lobbying, meaning that WOLA did not require the high 
level of flexibility demanded of those organisations which were delivering services on 
the ground. Overall, despite the involvement of the Ford Foundation in WOLA’s 
internal process and the growth and professionalisation it underwent during the 1980s 
and 1990s, WOLA’s work and programmes did not appear to become any less effective. 
If anything it became a more successful lobbyist and gained the ability to run larger 
projects (and in greater numbers) as a result of the increased funding. While it did lose 
some flexibility on the ground as a result of the formalisation of its workforce in Latin 
America, it clearly remained flexible enough to gather information and respond to those 
individuals and groups that came to it seeking help. So, while a trade-off was made, it 
did not appear to have the strongly negative impact suggested in many of the models 
laid down by scholars like Wright, Hulme and Edwards.  
It is plausible that the main reason both WOLA and Freedom House did not fit 
these models of legitimacy loss lay in the inherent nature of both organisations. As 
previously mentioned, neither of these organisations fit the beneficiary-led service-
providing mould usually under investigation in the literature concerning non-state 
actors. The fact that Freedom House considered its main “beneficiary” to be the United 
States and the standing of its values in the wider world and since serving this aim 
required none of the traits described in the literature (such as flexibility and 
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accountability to beneficiaries), changes to Freedom House’s internal structure had little 
to no impact on its ability to do its work. Similarly, although WOLA did see itself as 
accountable to its Latin American network and the concerns of Latin American nations, 
it, too, lacked specific “beneficiaries” in the sense discussed by most non-state 
organisations which, to some extent, prevented bureaucracy and other internal changes 
from hindering its work. While clearly WOLA valued and needed to maintain a certain 
level of flexibility within Latin America, the level required for information gathering on 
the ground was much lower than that required by, for example, a disaster relief effort. In 
the case of Freedom House, information gathering was achieved in a much more 
systematic and, indeed, bureaucratic way than would be possible for a development 
project. Similarly, the level of added bureaucracy required in order to hinder either 
organisation in its lobbying and information dissemination efforts at home would be 
significantly higher than that required to disrupt humanitarian, development or service-
providing work.  
Due to the fact that most of its internal structures and funding were dictated by 
its founding congressional act, the NED’s internal processes did not change during this 
time except in minor ways. Moreover, Congress dictated its budget and therefore size 
and ability to execute projects, it did not undergo the same level of growth that either 
Freedom House or WOLA did during the 1980s. Most of the NED’s internal 
bureaucracy derived from its annual reporting requirement to Congress. One of the 
conditions of its founding act was that it must provide Congress with detailed reports of 
its activities, operations, finances and accomplishments.266 While these reporting 
requirements were stringent, they did not appear to over-burden the NED or have any 
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real impact on its ability to achieve its aims since it had been designed to handle this 
level of bureaucracy from the start. What did cause bureaucratic problems for the NED 
were the appropriations from USAID. In a memo to the NED Board of Directors in 
1990 Gershman discussed the organisation’s growing relationship with USAID, stating 
that the AID grants were burdening NED staff with excess paperwork.267 Yet despite 
this objection, the extra bureaucracy created by the AID appropriations did not appear to 
hinder the NED in distributing these funds. Given that later in this memo Gershman 
states his willingness to continue serving as the coordination point with AID for those 
initiatives involving its core grantees and that the NED continued to receive AID 
appropriations after 1990, it would appear that the additional paperwork created by AID 
grants was more of a nuisance than an active hindrance to its work. From its inception 
the NED had been a profoundly bureaucratic organisation and, as a result, while 
additional bureaucracy did burden its staff and increase their individual workloads, it 
does not appear to have had much of an impact on the organisation as a whole.  
Like Freedom House, the NED was a strongly top-down organisation with no 
grassroots strategy; politicians, union bosses and corporate leaders filled the majority of 
its board seats and it had a largely professional staff and a formalised internal process. 
As a result, it never underwent the process of professionalisation that WOLA or 
Freedom House (to a lesser extent) had to experience. Since it began in the position 
Wright describes as the end-point of NGO bureaucratisation, the NED did not suffer 
from a loss of legitimacy as a result of its internal bureaucracy. Moreover, while the 
NED did have beneficiaries in the service-providing sense, it had never really 
considered itself as accountable to beneficiaries abroad. Due to an extensive reporting 
requirement to Congress and the use of intermediaries in grant provision to Latin 
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America, it had always been more accountable to officials and grantees in the United 
States than to its ultimate beneficiaries in Latin America. The detachment of the NED 
from its beneficiaries on the ground was built into the very design of the organisation. 
While this did call into question its ability to fully understand situations on the ground 
and to implement projects which answered to the needs of the local population, it was 
principally organisations in the US which levelled such criticism, which were opposed 
to the NED due to its proximity to the US government. While Latin Americans did 
accuse the NED of co-option and cultural imperialism, most notably the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua, such criticism did not stop local organisations from accepting 
NED grants and the NED rarely struggled to find willing beneficiaries.  
 
Conclusions 
It is clear that none of these three organisations really fit the models laid out by the 
current secondary literature in terms of their funding, structures and associated issues of 
legitimacy. While all three organisations took the vast majority of their funding from 
“official” (state or foundation) sources, only the NED really suffered any repercussions 
as a result. The fact that the NED’s largest source of funding was the US government 
did prompt some organisations within Latin America to shy away from accepting funds 
from it. Moreover, the fact that its budget came from USIA rather than directly from the 
US government provoked accusations that the NED was another vehicle for US covert 
involvement in domestic affairs abroad. Despite these criticisms, the NED did not have 
too many problems finding organisations in Latin America willing to receive its funding 
until the appropriations from USAID. The USAID appropriations highlighted the 
influence Congress could exert over the NED’s programme design and this made many 
organisations, including some of those the NED already worked with and at least one of 
its core grantees, nervous. With beneficiaries courting accusations of co-option and 
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third party grantees worried about the reluctance on the part of beneficiaries to accept 
funds, the USAID appropriations proved very costly for NED legitimacy in the late 
1980s. Given the outcry concerning government involvement in the NED via the 
USAID appropriations, it is interesting to note that, in contrast, the basic USIA grants 
was rarely questioned despite also deriving from the US government. One possible 
explanation for this is that the third party funding system disguised the level of 
influence the US government could actually have over NED programmes. As the 
funding came through USIA, it is possible that the NED’s beneficiaries did not know 
that Congress had the ability to put the NED budget to the vote and therefore reduce or 
increase its budget as it saw fit, thus giving Congress a level of influence over the 
manner in which the NED decided to conduct its affairs.  
By contrast, Freedom House and WOLA, which took much of their funding 
from foundation sources, suffered almost no crisis of legitimacy as a result of the 
origins of their funding. While Freedom House did have an altercation with the Olin 
Foundation concerning its Central American policy, for the most part the foundations 
which funded it largely kept out of policymaking. Although, since many Freedom 
House grants were project specific, it is reasonable to assume that it tailored its 
proposals to fit the interests of the foundations it was applying to, this was (and 
remains) common practice for organisations seeking funding and represents a conscious 
decision on the part of non-state organisations. There is evidence of some pressure 
exerted by foundations on Freedom House, since it initially applied for grants from the 
NED in an attempt to please the Smith-Richardson and Olin Foundations. Like WOLA 
and, indeed, most foundation-funded, non-state organisations, Freedom House tended to 
receive its funding from foundations with a similar mind-set and political allegiance to 
the majority of its board and staff. Overall, neither its beneficiaries nor many of 
Freedom House’s US-based colleagues seem to have had many criticisms, nor indeed 
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did they ask any questions concerning the sources of Freedom House’s funding. Indeed, 
even its relationship with the NED received very little criticism even though the NED 
was very active in suggesting and pressuring Freedom House to undertake NED-
designed projects. This kind of demonstrable influence and loss of independence is what 
many scholars claim causes a loss of legitimacy in humanitarian and development 
organisations, yet in this case it did not appear to have any serious negative impact on 
the standing of Freedom House. In the case of WOLA, while neither critics nor 
beneficiaries discussed its foundation funding, its religious funding was a source of 
some criticism and did come under scrutiny from its critics. Although WOLA had never 
concealed its religious connections, it was accused of seeking only to further the 
agendas of the religious organisations which funded it. These criticisms aside, WOLA, 
like Freedom House was subjected to very little scrutiny over its funding sources. 
These three cases indicate that, contrary to what much of the secondary literature 
suggests, foundation funding did not produce the same issues of legitimacy that other 
“official” funding often created and that even government funding did not always bring 
with it a legitimacy crisis. While state funding did occasion some problems for the 
NED, the major criticisms of it did not result from its taking funds from the US 
government, but from its acceptance of the conditioned appropriations from USAID. 
This suggests that a loss of legitimacy was less the result of accepting government 
money and more the visible involvement of the government in programme design and 
decision-making. Although there were always organisations wary of working with the 
NED as a result of its relationship with the US government, the serious problems did 
not emerge until Congress granted the 1988 USAID appropriation and mandated it be 
used to promote democracy within Chile. As long as the NED budget was given without 
limitations and the veneer of independence maintained, many organisations in 
beneficiary nations had few exceptions to accepting grants from it. With regards to 
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foundation funding, the fact that foundations were largely considered, if not politically 
unbiased, than at least impartial and independent meant that funding taken from them 
did not produce the same legitimacy crisis as funds taken from state or pseudo-state 
organisations. Foundations formed a key part of the broader domestic and international 
political networks, which worked to push human rights and democratic transition to the 
fore of the international consciousness. Indeed, foundations could bring non-state actors 
into a broader network of political and state actors engaged with the same issues. In the 
case of Freedom House, the foundations which funded it cemented its place in the wider 
neo-conservative network which, in the 1980s, wielded a great deal of power within the 
White House and the State Department. The Ford Foundation in particular, provided 
WOLA with an air of professionalism and mainstream legitimacy that it lacked prior to 
the 1982 grant and, simultaneously, drew it further into the broader international human 
rights network that had come to the fore in the 1970s.  
In terms of the question of professionalisation and the effect of increased 
bureaucratisation on non-state organisations, these three organisations once again fell 
outside of the generally accepted norms. First, only WOLA actually underwent the 
professionalisation process often described by scholars; both Freedom House and the 
NED began life in a state similar to the end result of this process. From the outset 
Freedom House enjoyed a more formalised structure, relationships with foundations and 
a concrete internal bureaucracy and while they did seek to change their financial 
strategy during this time, it was predominantly an attempt to strengthen and grow those 
grants already in place and in practice changed very little about the organisation. 
Similarly, the NED, having been founded much later and by congressional act, had its 
structure and reporting procedures predetermined by Congress. Moreover, the boards of 
both organisations were largely made up of “professionals”, often even professional 
managers, resulting in both being run with a business-like attitude from the start. As a 
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result, neither Freedom House nor the NED had to contend with a sudden increase in 
bureaucracy or a change in the type of individual making policy decisions which, the 
literature suggests, triggers crises of accountability and work management. Although 
WOLA did undergo the more typical professionalisation process, it too did not suffer 
from a crisis of accountability. Through a combination of a well-managed expansion of 
the internal bureaucracy and a largely unchanged commitment to its beneficiaries, 
WOLA successfully navigated professionalisation without too much change to its 
priorities or its ability to achieve its aims.  
Since, for the most part, the work of these organisations was not of the service-
providing kind common to humanitarian and development organisations, they simply 
did not have “beneficiaries” to whom they should have been accountable. Similarly, due 
to the more broad nature of their aims, they did not gravitate towards easily quantifiable 
and more extensively documented and reported projects in the manner of many 
humanitarian and development organisations. Although WOLA came under some 
pressure to assess its own “impact”, that was the extent of the pressure to quantify its 
work and there is little evidence to suggest that this was supposed to be an ongoing 
process. While information gathering did require a strong network of volunteers and 
informants on the ground and in Washington, most of the work carried out by WOLA 
and Freedom House did not require the level of on-the-ground fieldwork or flexibility as 
that of service providing actors. As a result, these organisations could afford to lose 
some flexibility and manpower to increased bureaucracy without a significant 
impairment of their work.  As a grant-giving organisation, while the NED could have 
been said to have beneficiaries in the form of its grantees, it was by no means 
accountable to them – rather, they were accountable to it. Moreover, since its direct 
grantees were not, in fact, groups on the ground in Latin America but rather third party 
organisations within the United States, it saw itself as accountable, mainly, to US 
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organisations. Freedom House, also believed itself to be primarily accountable to the 
United States and the democratic centrist values for which it stood. These organisations 
were able to hold a half-way position between those on the ground in Latin America, 
those making policy in Washington and those foundations with an interest in the region 
without being subject to questions about the impact on their accountability or their 
legitimacy. None of this is to say that these organisations did not have their own issues 
concerning legitimacy and accountability (which will be discussed in later chapters), 
just that it is difficult to measure them by the standards of and models based on service-
providing non-state actors. Instead they, particularly Freedom House and the NED, 
represented a new type of non-state actor that was neither service-providing NGO nor 
think tank nor foundation, but a blend of all three.  
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Chapter 3 - Political Networks: NED, Freedom House, WOLA and the US 
Government 
 
Through the work of William Schmidli, we have seen how human rights organisations 
developed strong relationships within Congress in the 1970s and, with the election of 
Jimmy Carter in 1976, became closer to the executive branch as well.268 As yet there is 
very little work on the relationships between non-state actors and the Reagan 
administration. While WOLA had been brought into an advisory role in the 1970s, the 
Reagan administration had a deep distrust of traditional human rights groups which 
damaged WOLA’s relationship with the Washington foreign policy community.269 
Moreover, what of the new human rights movement with its more political, Reaganite 
outlook? What relationships did organisations such as the NED and Freedom House 
have with the US government during this period? This chapter will examine the 
relationships between the NED, Freedom House, WOLA and three key parts of the US 
government: the White House, the State Department and Congress.  
As Keck and Sikkink suggest, the relationships between non-state actors and 
governments, particularly Western governments, were “simultaneously the most 
powerful and the least dependable” part of the working networks these actors built.270 
These organisations needed some kind of relationship with the state in order to carry out 
their work but, at the same time, too strong a relationship with state bodies could be 
detrimental to their legitimacy both at home and abroad. In the United States much of 
the early impetus for human rights policies came from Congress. In the early 1970s 
individual members of Congress worked with human rights groups to try and promote a 
human rights policy based on their opposition to the Nixon/ Kissinger policy of tacit 
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support for the Argentine and Chilean military dictatorships.271 This interest in a 
coherent human rights policy was picked up by the Carter administration and, later, by 
the Reagan administration as a means to criticise the Soviet Union.272 Under the Reagan 
administration the new democracy-focused human rights policy, publicly at least, 
appeared to be primarily the reserve of the executive branch, while Congress was still  
more interested in the promotion of the utopian human rights of the 1970s. This is not to 
say that some members of Congress were not in favour of democracy promotion or did 
not push for human rights policies which encompassed the promotion of democracy 
abroad alongside more traditional human rights (indeed, the impetus for the NED came 
mostly from members of Congress), but rather that the majority of interest in democracy 
promotion policies seemed to stem from the executive branch with Congress’s approval 
coming later. Throughout this period, the NED had fairly close and involved 
relationships with both the Reagan and Bush administrations as well as the State 
Department; but its relationship with Congress was more fraught, with several members 
of Congress protesting its creation and repeated attempts by members of Congress to 
defund it during this time. Perhaps the most consistent relationships were had by 
Freedom House, which was relatively well accepted by all three key branches of the US 
government. Members of Freedom House testified fairly regularly before Congressional 
committees and their reports were often used by both Congress and the State 
Department.273 Moreover, members of Freedom House were periodically employed or 
headhunted to take on posts within the broader foreign policy apparatus and the 
organisation was called to testify before the Kissinger Commission in 1983.274 In 
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contrast, WOLA had a small network of close relationships with individual members of 
Congress as well as a small group of members of Congress who were strongly opposed 
to its inclusion in policy matters. Under the Reagan administration, its relationships 
with both the White House and the State Department were strained and it was often shut 
out of the foreign policy debate on account of its left-wing attitude. Whereas, under the 
Bush administration, WOLA’s relationship with the White House and the State 
Department improved dramatically and it was again accepted by the executive branch of 
policy-making. The White House correspondence discussed in this chapter was found 
predominantly in the archives of the non-state organisations themselves or in archives 
of Reagan and Bush’s public papers.  
 
The White House 
While the Reagan administration for the most part isolated itself from human rights 
groups and other non-state actors, it did engage to an extent with the new human rights 
movement. Both Freedom House and the NED were, at various points, seen as helpful 
by the White House, with their work being used or lauded and, in the case of Freedom 
House, its staff used to brief personnel on Latin American issues. Reagan personally 
appeared to see the NED as an important part of his ideological legacy. He incorporated 
it into his “soft power” rhetoric and often defended it from criticism both internationally 
and in Congress. By contrast, WOLA spent much of the 1980s completely unable to 
gain access to White House staff. Like many of the traditional human rights groups, it 
was regarded by Reagan with great suspicion and was often accused of having strong 
left-wing bias as it regularly found itself in direct conflict with the administration. 
However, it was WOLA that gained the most from the election of George Bush. While 
the Bush White House was generally more distanced from non-state actors than either 
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the Carter or the Reagan administrations, it did re-open a dialogue with WOLA and 
engaged with it (although minimally) in much better faith than before.  
The NED was connected to the Reagan White House from its inception.  As 
mentioned previously (see pp. 38-39), the APF study which led to its creation had been 
proposed to and approved by Reagan himself in a letter written by the leaders of the 
DNC, RNC and the United States Trade Representative. 275 A copy of the report and its 
recommendation to create the NED were sent directly to Reagan himself.276 In 1983 
Reagan held a ceremony at the White House to inaugurate the NED after its founding at 
which he stated that the NED went “right to the heart of America’s faith in democratic 
ideals and institutions”.277 Moreover, the National Endowment for Democracy Act 
established a basic bureaucratic relationship between the White House and the NED 
wherein copies of the General Accounting Office’s audits of the organisation were sent 
to the President and all NED annual reports were received by the White House before 
being transmitted to Congress.278 Aside from letters or words of support from the White 
House, however, the NED rarely appears to have interacted with White House staff or 
Reagan directly. Although both Reagan and Bush did occasionally intervene or speak 
on behalf of the NED internationally and in Congress, there does not appear to be any 
evidence of personal relationships between NED staff and, Reagan, Bush or other White 
House staffers during this time.  
 Despite the seeming lack of relations between the NED and the White House, it 
is clear that Reagan believed in the importance of the NED and supported it when 
necessary. In its early days, Reagan sent a personal letter of support to the organisation 
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and, in 1984 wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Mark Hatfield, appealing against an amendment to reduce the NED budget.279 In this 
letter, Reagan called the NED the “cornerstone of our efforts to promote the growth of 
democratic institutions throughout the world” and lauded it as an alternative to using the 
military to defend democracy abroad.280 This was a sentiment that Reagan repeated 
regularly; in a note attached to the NED annual report in 1986, he informed Congress 
that the NED was a “key instrument in our ability to support what we believe in” and 
stated that “this Administration strongly [backed the NED] and [would] work…with 
Congress to ensure [its] continued growth and expansion”.281 In the late 1980s, the NED 
cultivated a relationship with Colin Powell (then National Security Advisor) who sought 
to increase the foreign affairs budget and NED funding for 1990 and set his staff to 
work with Gershman to “achieve everything we can for NED”.282 Throughout his term 
in office, Reagan often praised the NED in speeches concerning democracy promotion 
and the furthering of the democratic cause within Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
For example, at a White House event marking the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw 
Uprising, Reagan made a speech in which he cited the NED as evidence for the United 
States, in the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, taking off its “Kick Me” sign when it came to 
advocating for the US way of life.283 He made similar claims before the Council of the 
Americas in 1984, a special session of the European Parliament in 1985 and the 
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Congress on America’s Agenda for the Future in 1986. Furthermore, Reagan added a 
mention of the NED to a joint communiqué following negotiations with President José 
Napoleón Duarte of El Salvador concerning the Central American peace process. In this 
communiqué, Reagan and Duarte called for greater support for Central American 
democratic organisations from Western public and private sources such as the NED.284 
Reagan evidently supported the NED and its work and saw it as key to creating positive 
perceptions of the United States within the world.  
 It was not only Reagan who made statements in support of the NED during his 
administration: in his role as Vice-President, Bush also lent his support to the NED. 
When the NED risked being defunded again in 1985, Vice-President Bush wrote letters 
to a number of senators urging them to vote in support of the continued funding of the 
NED.285 Following Bush’s inauguration as President, direct communication between the 
NED and the President’s office and between Bush and other institutions on behalf of the 
NED appears to have fallen off. This is perhaps not surprising as, by 1990, the NED 
was fairly well established and more secure in its work and position than it had been in 
the 1980s, as evidenced by the fact that between 1984 and 1988 there were five attempts 
to cut or abolish NED funding in Congress whereas between 1990 and 1993 there were 
only two, both of which were attempts to reduce the budget rather than abolish it 
completely.286 As the NED gained recognition, grew in size and became more 
institutionalised, there was less need for the White House to defend it against attack. It 
is plausible that, in addition to the NED’s increased ability to fight its own battles 
without external assistance, Bush was simply less willing to vocalise his support for the 
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organisation during his presidency. Promoting democracy had been Reagan’s campaign 
and, although there is little evidence to suggest Bush disagreed with or actively opposed 
the NED, it is plausible that he was less enthusiastic about it than Reagan had been. 
Despite the seeming lack of direct communication, the NED did have a working 
relationship with the Bush White House. For example, when the NED hosted Violeta 
Chamorro in 1989, they arranged for her to have a meeting with Bush to discuss the 
situation of press freedom under the Sandinistas.287 When Chamorro was honoured at an 
NED sponsored awards banquet in 1991, Vice-President Quayle was in attendance.288 In 
1989, when Congress granted a special appropriation to the NED Marlin Fitzwater 
(Bush’s Press Secretary) gave a statement in support of the appropriation praising the 
NED’s previous work in Chile, the Philippines, Poland and Paraguay.289  Although this 
would suggest that the White House maintained its support for the NED, albeit in a less 
public capacity, Bush himself was significantly less forthcoming with vocal support 
than Reagan had been.  
 Given the level of personal interest Reagan had taken in the NED and its work, 
it is perhaps surprising that it was Freedom House that appeared to have the strongest 
working relationship with the office of the President. Although the most consistent 
period of communication between Freedom House and the White House coincided with 
the start of the APF’s Democracy Program, in 1980 Freedom House had actually 
written to Carter urging the creation of a “Foundation for Freedom” to assist US NGOs 
in their work abroad.290 Following Reagan’s speech to Parliament in 1982, John 
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Richardson wrote a letter to Reagan congratulating him on his call to “advance human 
freedoms” and offering Freedom House’s willingness to help organise an international 
conference on democracy.291 This letter received a response from Lawrence 
Eagleburger thanking Freedom House for its support of the London speech and stating 
that he hoped Freedom House would contribute to the APF study (which it later did).292 
Similarly, in 1985 Reagan wrote a personal letter to Leonard Sussman thanking him for 
the time he had dedicated to USIA.293 Reagan and the White House offices also 
regularly used Freedom House reports and statistics in speeches and White House 
documentation. In a 1982 speech to the OAS about the creation of a new programme for 
the Caribbean Basin, Reagan cited a number of Freedom House reports on Central 
America, and John Richardson was invited as a guest of the White House for the 
address.294 Reagan also cited the Freedom Survey in speeches to illustrate that more of 
the world lived in relative freedom in the 1980s than in the 1970s.295 Moreover, in his 
remarks at the signing of the Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights 
Week Proclamation Reagan included Freedom House in a list of organisations that he 
claimed made up the community of “heroes” advocating for human rights.296  
 While Freedom House did not elicit the level of public support from Reagan or 
Bush that the NED did, its work was regularly used by the White House and individuals 
within the organisation had long-standing relationships with the White House and White 
House staff. Moreover, Freedom House was often vocally supportive of the Reagan 
administrations’ foreign policy throughout the 1980s. For example, in 1980, two 
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Freedom House scholars published an article in the New York Times entitled “Reagan’s 
Bipartisanism – a Promising Start” in which they praised Reagan’s stated commitment 
to bipartisanism when it came to foreign policy.297 Similarly, in 1982, Raymond Gastil 
responded to an interview with Pat Derian in The Interdependent with a letter stating 
that Freedom House believed Reagan was moving towards a “consistent and reliable 
bipartisan human rights policy”.298 During the late 1980s, Freedom House published a 
policy statement on Panama in which it stated its support for the Reagan administration 
and Congress’ policy of supporting the Panamanian people in removing Manuel 
Noriega (Panama’s military dictator) through political and economic means.299 
Although vocal support from the White House for Freedom House was rare, the White 
House did often show that it had great faith in Freedom House staff. In 1983, Bruce 
McColm was nominated by the White House for membership to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, a position he was elected to by a large majority.300 
Freedom House staff were also called upon, on occasion, to brief White House staff on 
events in Latin America. In 1984 the Freedom House delegation to the March election 
in El Salvador was invited to brief Reagan and key cabinet members on the situation on 
the ground.301 Later that year some Freedom House staff members were called upon to 
brief the White House Outreach Program on the strategy of the Sandinistas and the 
Salvadoran guerrillas.302 Although these calls to brief the White House were less 
common than calls for Freedom House to brief or testify before Congress, the fact that 
they were invited to do so when most human rights organisations were unwelcome 
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suggests that the White House saw Freedom House as a trustworthy organisation and a 
key link in the Washington information network.  
 Despite the trusted position Freedom House held within the Reagan 
administration, the relationship between it and the White House did have points of 
tension in the 1980s. Freedom House occasionally criticised, albeit mildly, the Reagan 
administration’s policies and, particularly, its inability to reach policy agreements with 
Congress. In a policy statement released in 1988, Freedom House criticised both 
Reagan and Congress for failing to reach an agreement on how to respond to Esquipulas 
II which, it claimed, gave credibility to those who wished to see the plan fail.303 
Furthermore, although not publicly, Sussman expressed displeasure at the way in which 
Reagan portrayed US policy towards El Salvador. In a letter to Leslie Lenkowsky of the 
Smith-Richardson Foundation he stated that, the “US position on El Salvador [was] far 
sounder and broader based than the Reagan Administration stated”.304 Perhaps the most 
significant falling out between Freedom House and the Reagan White House, occurred 
in 1987 when Freedom House attempted to bring the ex-Sandinista and then leader of 
the Contra organisation, Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE), Edén Pastora 
Gómez, to the Freedom House offices.305 Although Pastora and his movement were part 
of the Reagan administration-backed Contra forces, he was personally disliked by the 
CIA and many Reagan administration insiders (including Oliver North) because of his 
unwillingness to subordinate his organisation to the CIA-controlled Fuerza Democrática 
Nicaragüense. According to Sussman, the White House was “furious” and demanded to 
know “who put [Freedom House] up to it”.306 Unfortunately, there does not appear to be 
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a record of the discussion between the White House and Freedom House on this issue, 
but it seems that Pastora’s visit was cancelled as a result of this incident.  
 As was the case with the NED, after the 1988 elections and Bush’s inauguration 
Freedom House’s working relationship with the White House suffered. During the 
election, Freedom House wrote letters to both Bush and Michael Dukakis urging 
discussion of the Central American peace process and civil wars and a bipartisan 
programme for foreign policy suggested by Freedom House.307 There is no evidence of 
any response to this letter and, when it came to dealing with Central America in the 
early 1990s, Bush decided to give his backing to the Esquipulas peace accords in 1989 
instead of implementing the Freedom House programme. Although Freedom House 
suggested the US work with the creators of the Esquipulas plan and assist them in 
policing each other’s adherence to it, the organisation’s bipartisan programme also 
suggested the continuation of a number of US policies which had the potential to 
undermine Esquipulas. Aside from this letter, there is little evidence that Freedom 
House sought to have much of an institutional relationship with the Bush White House. 
There is no record of further correspondence with Bush or his staff and Freedom House 
focused its efforts on Congress and the State Department during the 1990s. Given that 
neither the NED nor Freedom House were able to sustain the strength of their 
relationship with the White House through the Bush years, it would appear that either 
the Bush White House was simply less interested in the types of issues Freedom House 
and the NED were working on, or, perhaps, was less convinced of the utility of the neo-
conservative human rights movement as a whole.  
 While neither the NED nor Freedom House could be said to have had a great 
deal of direct contact with the White House, WOLA was almost completely cut off from 
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it, particularly during the first Reagan administration.308 WOLA’s relationship with the 
White House was strained throughout the 1980s, although there was some improvement 
during the second Reagan administration and into the Bush years. Throughout much of 
the Reagan era, WOLA found itself in conflict with the administration, often rebuking 
Reagan directly as well as questioning State Department policy. For example, in 1983 
WOLA prepared a statement for Congress concerning the administration’s human rights 
policy in which it criticised the Reagan administration for not discharging its human 
rights obligations adequately.309 Similarly, in 1986 WOLA criticised the Reagan 
administration for continuing to approve loans to Chile, stating that loans were illegal 
and against the will of Congress.310 WOLA also accused the Reagan administration of 
failing to meet the consultation requirements of the International Financial Institutions 
Act (1986) with regards to Chile. Under the provisions of this act, the Secretary of the 
Treasury was supposed to consult relevant Congressional subcommittees and 
committees regularly. WOLA claimed that, when it came to approving multinational 
loans to Chile, committees had often failed to receive notice of policy changes and, in 
one case, were only informed of a key policy shift after the fact.311 In 1987, WOLA 
commissioned a study into how the US public viewed Reagan’s policy on Central 
America, which suggested that Reagan personally had failed to convince the public that 
the regime in El Salvador was worth defending or funding.312 The impact of this 
pamphlet is difficult to assess, but it does provide a clear example of the nature of 
WOLA’s consistent low-level conflict with the Reagan administration. Moreover this 
                                                 
308 WOLA Records, Box 15, Program Evaluation of the Washington Office on Latin America: Prepared 
for the Ford Foundation by Carlos Chipoco and Lars Schoultz (undated). 
309 WOLA Records, Box 288, Review of Human Rights Policy Towards Latin America: Statement 
Prepared for Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organisations (2th June 1983). 
310 WOLA Records, Box 66, Conference Report: Chile on a Path to Change (1986).  
311 WOLA Records, Box 66, Chile, the Multilateral Development Banks and US Human Rights Law: a 
Delegation Report (1986). 
312 WOLA, Central America and the Polls: A Study of US Public Opinion Polls on US Foreign Policy 
toward El Salvador and Nicaragua under the Reagan Administration (Washington: WOLA, 1987) p. 23. 
Mara Sankey 
 
128 
 
antagonism was not one-sided. During the 1980s, Reagan (as well as members of the 
State Department and some centre and centre-right NGOs) accused WOLA of heavy 
bias, ignoring human rights abuses inflicted by leftist states and exaggerating the abuses 
of governments it found disagreeable.313 Although WOLA still found itself regularly at 
odds with the Reagan White House, during the second administration it was able to find 
some common ground and collaborate, albeit in minor ways, with the Reagan 
administration to push for democratic transition in Chile and Paraguay.  
While WOLA’s relationship with the Bush White House was less contentious, it 
still occasionally found itself opposing the White House on a policy issues, most 
notably the Central American peace negotiations and the invasion of Panama. During 
the early 1990s, WOLA sought to push the administration for full disclosure concerning 
the human and financial cost of the 1989 invasion.314 To this end, in January 1990 
WOLA circulated a memorandum to members of Congress containing the report of a 
WOLA delegation which was sent to Panama in the aftermath of the invasion. This 
memo requested that interested members ask questions about the number of casualties 
and the state of judicial processes in Panama as a result of the invasion.315 In 1991, 
Alexander Wilde testified twice before Congress, stating WOLA’s opposition to the 
Bush administration’s policy concerning military aid to El Salvador and its concerns 
about the administration’s drugs policy. Bush had been pushing Congress to allow a 
package of military aid for El Salvador and Wilde urged members of Congress to 
demand the aid package be made conditional on the progress of reconciliation.316 A 
                                                 
313 Youngers, 30 Años de Incidencia Política por los Derechos Humanos, la Democracia y la Justicia 
Social (Washington: Washington Office on Latin America, 2006) p. 53. 
314 WOLA Records, Box 2, A Decisive Moment for Central America: A Proposal to OXFAM (23rd April 
1990). 
315 WOLA Records, Box 37, Memorandum from WOLA “to those interested in Panama” in Congress 
(17th January 1990). 
316 WOLA Records, Box 24, Prepared Statement of Alexander Wilde before the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US House of Representatives (6th 
November 1991). 
Mara Sankey 
 
129 
 
similar disagreement had occurred the previous year when, urged by a number of NGOs 
including WOLA, Congress had voted to withhold military aid; but the Bush 
administration released the aid anyway, leading to WOLA accusing the administration 
of undermining Congressional intent.317 Similarly, in 1992, WOLA created two issue 
briefs concerning US policy toward Nicaragua. The second of these briefs criticised the 
Bush administration’s handling of a conflict over property rights in Nicaragua. It 
claimed that administration policy was based on “misleading information” about the 
property rights issue and admonished the administration for suspending $100 million of 
aid destined for Nicaragua.318 Perhaps what is most striking about the disputes between 
WOLA and the administrations after 1984 is that, unlike during the first Reagan 
administration, the White House, for the most part, did not respond to these criticisms at 
all. Instead of answering opposition from WOLA by painting their motives as 
suspicious or somehow traitorous or unnecessarily combative towards the state, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the White House engaged directly with WOLA in anyway 
after 1985.  
 As can be seen, in the cases of these three organisations, direct engagement with 
the White House was at best intermittent and, at worst, hostile. It would appear that, 
during the 1980s and early 1990s neither Reagan, Bush nor their respective White 
House staff, had much one-to-one contact with non-state actors. While Reagan publicly 
took up the cause of the NED and whole-heartedly supported its founding, his contact 
with it was mostly limited to the occasional public statement of support or 
congratulations. These statements, if taken alone, give the impression that Reagan was 
more involved with the work of the NED than the almost complete lack of 
correspondence between the two would suggest. Indeed, for all his vocal support for the 
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NED, of the three organisations discussed here it was Freedom House which appeared 
to have the confidence of the White House. While the mentions Reagan made of the 
NED’s work were vague, only occasionally citing country specific work and almost 
never specific NED funded projects, he discussed and used specific Freedom House 
reports, projects and the Freedom Survey in a number of speeches. Even though the 
relationship between Freedom House and the Reagan White House was not always free 
of tension, it appears that Freedom House staff were trusted by the White House in a 
way that was not true of either the NED or WOLA. The lockdown WOLA faced when 
trying to engage the Reagan White House stemmed almost entirely from political 
animosity. Its left-wing stance and willingness to criticise US allies in the hemisphere 
created an atmosphere of hostility between the two institutions, particularly in the early 
part of the 1980s, before the administration sought to distance itself from authoritarian 
governments, particularly in Chile and Paraguay.  
 Despite the Bush administration’s more conciliatory attitude towards non-state 
actors of any political leaning, under his leadership there was very little contact between 
the White House and any of these organisations when it came to Latin American issues. 
Although Bush had, as Vice-President, voiced his support for the founding of the NED, 
during his presidency there is little evidence to suggest the White House engaged 
directly with the NED on any issue. Similarly Freedom House had no real involvement 
with the Bush White House at all. Even in their work one can see very little direct praise 
or criticism for US policy towards Latin America between 1989 and 1993, unlike during 
the Reagan era when Freedom House policy briefs and statements often praised US 
foreign policy. This shift in Freedom House reporting was not necessarily as a result of 
relations with the White House or any change in attitudes towards US policy, but rather 
that, as an organisation, Freedom House’s focus after the end of the Cold War moved 
away from Latin America toward the ex-Soviet bloc and, later, the first Gulf War. 
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Although WOLA continued to challenge US policy under the Bush administration, the 
reaction they received from the White House was significantly less hostile than under 
Reagan. While the Bush White House does not appear to have actively engaged with 
WOLA, this lack of hostility allowed WOLA to regain some access to the higher 
echelons of the US government since, as will be shown, a less hostile White House 
brought with it a less hostile State Department as well.  
 Although the White House had never constituted a key part of the relationship 
non-state actors had with the US government, since foreign policy is primarily the 
reserve of Congress and the State Department, under the Carter administration the 
White House had been more open to information and dialogue with these groups. It is 
clear is that the arrival of the Reagan administration damaged the relationship between 
liberal non-state human rights organisations and the White House. The access liberal 
human rights groups had had to the White House under Carter rapidly vanished under 
Reagan and even the pro-Reaganite Freedom House was rarely granted access to the 
White House itself. Since the Reagan administration was prone to taking charge of 
foreign policy, particularly in relation to Latin America, and the State Department 
tended to follow the lead of the White House this lockdown on access created problems 
for WOLA during this period. Moreover, the public support of the NED and the 
occasional use of Freedom House’s work within the White House clearly went some 
way to establishing the neo-conservative human rights movement within the 
Washington hierarchy even though they were never as accepted as the liberal human 
rights groups had been during the Carter era. 
 
The State Department 
For the most part, State Department interactions with these organisations broadly 
followed those of the White House. Since its remit was foreign policy all three 
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organisations made a greater effort to engage with the State Department than they did 
with the White House itself, but for the most part, it was the NED and Freedom House 
that established working relationships while WOLA was often left out in the cold. The 
NED had a strong relationship with the State Department under both Reagan and Bush 
and maintained extensive relations with State Department and embassy personnel. 
Immediately after the founding of the NED, the State Department requested that its 
embassies in Latin America send demographic and political information about their 
respective countries to build up the NED database.319 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
the State Department regularly assisted NED staff on trips to Latin America and asked 
embassies to schedule appointments and arrange cars for Gershman when he travelled 
around Latin America.320 In 1985, in a report concerning a visit to the region Gershman 
stated that he sought to foster a cooperative relationship between the NED and embassy 
staff and encourage them to assist in identifying potential grantees.321  For the most part, 
the NED did maintain good relations with the majority of Latin American embassy 
staff, but there were moments of tension in these relationships. For example, in 1985, 
the Ambassador to El Salvador, Thomas Pickering, wrote a letter to Gershman 
expressing his annoyance at the NED’s lack of funding for Salvadoran projects.322 
Although there is no response to this letter in the NED’s archive, by 1987 the NED had 
begun to run more projects in El Salvador and the budget for the country was increased 
suggesting that the NED did take on board suggestions made by embassies.323 These 
kinds of complaints from embassies appear to have been few and far between and 
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mostly embassy staff saw the NED as an “asset for greater outreach” and as increasing 
their ability to work with groups that otherwise had minimal contact with the United 
States.324  
 The NED also had close relations with the Washington offices of the State 
Department and the country desks based in the United States. It had a particularly 
extensive relationship with Gerald Helman, the Deputy to the Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs. Throughout the 1980s, the NED sent project proposals to Helman for 
review and comments before putting them before the board for a final decision.325 
While, this review process was a mandated procedure required by the NED Act in 1986 
Helman testified before Congress stating that the State Department had strong support 
for the NED’s activities and that there was a growing dialogue between the NED, the 
State Department and US embassies abroad.326 In this statement Helman also said that 
the State Department actively encouraged this dialogue and was providing assistance to 
the NED and its affiliated institutions so that its activities could proceed more 
smoothly.327 In 1984, in a document written by Peter Rodman the Director of State 
Department Policy Planning Staff, outlining State Department policy towards Chile, the 
NED was stated to be integral to the State Department’s long-term policy of 
strengthening the democratic centre and centre-right in Chile.328 Indeed, when Charles 
Gillespie took over from Harry Barnes as ambassador to Chile in 1988, he was sent a 
letter by George Shultz (the then Secretary of State) stating that he should carefully 
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monitor those programmes run by the NED in Chile, “lend them any support they… 
require and suggest modifications or new directions”.329 Throughout the Reagan era, the 
NED received regular cables from the State Department containing information from 
embassies across Latin America concerning events and local feeling about the NED and 
its projects. For example, in 1985 it received a collection of cables detailing criticisms 
from organisations within Nicaragua and suggesting that the NED’s funding of 
PRODEMCA was creating a great deal of displeasure within the country.330 Moreover, 
State Department country desks assisted the NED in arranging meetings with visiting 
politicians and officials to help it keep in touch with the situation on the ground in Latin 
America.331 In 1988, the NED requested that a Foreign Service officer be assigned to 
liaise with it and the State Department granted this request; but there is little evidence of 
direct contact with the individual appointed to oversee NED activities.332 This person 
had no power over the NED or their decision making processes, but the fact that the 
Foreign Service agreed to set aside a position specifically to liaise with the NED gives 
an indication of how strong the relationship between the State Department and the NED 
was during the Reagan era. Yet despite this, there is little evidence that the NED had 
much contact with Elliot Abrams, Richard Schifter or any other staff at the Bureau for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. 
 After Bush took office, the NED had less contact with the State Department than 
it had under Reagan. Although the mandatory communication concerning NED projects 
continued, there is little evidence of communication concerning Latin America outside 
of this. In 1990 the “El Salvador amendment” put forward a supplemental authorisation 
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for emerging democracies – this amendment cut military aid to El Salvador and granted 
$10 million for a democracy-building programme to be carried out “by the Secretary of 
State through an agreement with the NED”. However, the memorandum concerning this 
appropriation does not make clear exactly what this money was for and there is no 
mention of an extended relationship between the NED and the Secretary of State during 
the Bush administration.333 In 1992 a state dinner was held to honour Patricio Aylwin, 
the recently elected President of Chile and long-time US ally, and the State Department 
included Gershman on the list of suggested guests.334 Aside from this event, what non-
mandatory communication there was between the NED and the State Department 
between 1989 and 1993 was primarily concerned, again, with the ex-Soviet bloc.  
 Like the NED, Freedom House had an amicable and productive relationship 
with the Reagan State Department. Throughout the 1980s the State Department 
regularly used Freedom House reports to inform its human rights reports and 
certification statements. Between 1982 and 1986 the State Department human rights 
reports for much of Latin America included some reference to the Freedom Survey’s 
ratings of countries.335 Unlike the NED, Freedom House did work with the Bureau for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and it appeared to have a good working 
relationship with Abrams, although there is little evidence of a similar relationship with 
Schifter. In a memorandum written to Thomas Enders, the then Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Abrams referred to Freedom House as a “responsible 
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group” and cited its reports on Chile’s deteriorating human rights situation.336 Sussman 
was regularly invited to attend meetings at the State Department; in 1982 he attended a 
meeting with those members of staff of the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs charged with working with NGOs to clarify the administration’s position on 
human rights.337 Until 1985 Sussman was sometimes also invited for personal meetings 
with Abrams to discuss the human rights situations in specific countries, for example in 
1983 the two men met to discuss the situation in Uruguay.338 The State Department 
valued Freedom House’s election monitoring reports and expressed its disappointment 
that Freedom House would not be present for the 1984 election in El Salvador, stating 
that it was the “only one to write useful reports”.339 It even went so far as to offer 
transportation and security for one member of Freedom House staff to go to El Salvador 
for the election, an offer which Freedom House accepted.340 Freedom House reports 
were regularly used as reference points for State Department documents in the later 
1980s, particularly those concerning Chile and El Salvador. In 1987, Bruce McColm’s 
El Salvador: Peaceful Revolution or Armed Struggle? was used as the main source 
concerning the formation of the FMLN in a State Department report entitled Financing 
Terrorism in El Salvador: The Secret Support Network for the FMLN.341 Although 
Freedom House regularly claimed that it would not take on case work, in 1983 it wrote 
to the State Department concerning the case of a Guatemalan man whose wife and 
children had been disappeared in 1982. Although there is no evidence of a resolution 
coming from the State Department regarding this case, the fact that Freedom House felt 
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it could write to the Department regarding the individual cases of non-US citizens 
suggests that it believed its relationship with the Department was strong enough to lend 
weight to its appeal.  
 Under the Bush administration, direct contact between Freedom House and State 
Department staff, again, appears to have waned. Since the focus of the State Department 
under Bush shifted away from Latin America towards Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East, relations between the State Department and Freedom House, on issues relating to 
Latin America at least, became largely formulaic. What little contact did occur between 
the two concerning Latin America, centred on the civil war in El Salvador and, to a 
lesser extent, Cuba (due to the particular interests of Frank Calzon who ran Freedom 
House’s Washington Office). Freedom House continued to provide relevant State 
Department personnel with its reports on the region throughout the early 1990s.342  In 
late 1989, the State Department sought to engage Freedom House in the task of 
formulating reports concerning the situation in El Salvador.343 It used the reports of 
Freedom House delegates concerning the 1991 municipal elections in El Salvador to 
calm the worries expressed by members of Congress about the human rights situation in 
the country.344 Moreover, Freedom House’s Washington Office continued to supply the 
State Department with information and invitations to meet individuals it brought to the 
United States. In 1991, for example, Calzon brought one of the individuals involved in 
smuggling tapes to Radio Martí (a US-sponsored independent Cuban radio station). 
Although the name of this individual is redacted in the State Department’s reports, the 
documents make it clear that he was granted asylum in the United States and that in 
1991 the State Department was considering allowing asylum for his wife and children 
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as well.345 As can be seen, although the Bush State Department was less involved with 
Latin American issues, Department personnel still saw Freedom House as a valuable 
asset. Its reports and contacts remained useful to the Department and, while the 
relationship became more one-sided in the 1990s, Freedom House was also able to 
make use of its State Department contacts to gather information and further its work.  
 While the NED and Freedom House enjoyed a great deal of contact with and 
respect from the Reagan State Department, but saw a reduction in Departmental 
engagement under Bush, for WOLA, the trend was reversed. WOLA’s relationship with 
the State Department under Reagan was just as strained as its relationship with the 
Reagan White House. During the first Reagan administration WOLA sent regular 
reports and appeals to the State Department, both on its own and as part of coalitions. 
However, these were often met either with hostility or little response at all. In 1980, 
WOLA wrote to the State Department expressing concerns over US relations with 
Argentina, particularly its fear that Reagan would reverse the policy of pressuring the 
Argentine government about human rights abuses.346 In the same year WOLA also 
wrote to the State Department in coalition with four other human rights groups and legal 
associations voicing concerns about the human rights situation in Chile.347 Both of these 
appeals appear to have been ignored by the Department. There is no evidence that the 
State Department responded to either letter and there is no suggestion that it changed its 
policy regarding either country as a result. Despite the lack of interest in policy requests 
or discussion, the State Department did take some interest in WOLA’s human rights 
reports, and did include information from WOLA investigation in its 1982 country 
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report on Chile.348 In the same year, the Department also utilised a WOLA report 
concerning the treatment of prisoners in its human rights report for Uruguay.349 What is 
interesting to note is the different reactions of the two embassies to the State 
Department’s use of WOLA’s work in country reports. While there was no reaction to 
the inclusion of the WOLA report from the embassy in Montevideo (which was under 
the control of an interim diplomat at this time), the Santiago embassy under James 
Theberge responded angrily, stating that it believed the inclusion of such reports to be 
“ill-advised and harmful”.350 The Santiago embassy felt that including private reports 
which contradicted its own reporting would undermine its work and “legitimize and 
strengthen those human rights organisations[…]who are better known for their 
consistent opposition to US foreign policy than for their determination to arrive at fair 
and balanced human rights judgements”.351 It is clear that some members of the Foreign 
Service took the view of Reagan and the White House, that WOLA was not a reliable 
source of information and that it was more concerned with undermining the US 
government than the proper execution of its work.  
 By the start of the second Reagan administration some of the hostility WOLA 
experienced from members of the State Department had eased. In 1985 a number of 
State Department staff agreed to speak at a three-day conference WOLA organised to 
discuss the human rights situation in Chile alongside staff of the Vicaría de Solidaridad 
and over 50 missionaries who had recently returned from the country.352 Also around 
this time, the State Department began to acknowledge and respond to queries and issues 
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raised by WOLA. For example, in 1986 WOLA contacted the Department concerning 
the arrest and torture of a number of students in Chile and, in response, the Department 
cabled the embassy requesting any information they had concerning this incident.353 
Although this suggests that the State Department was still unwilling to trust WOLA’s 
information completely, it also indicates that it was taking information received from 
WOLA and other sources like it more seriously than it had during the early part of the 
1980s. In 1986 WOLA organised and sponsored a delegation to Chile for Rep. Bruce 
Morrison which was planned with sizable input from the State Department. WOLA 
requested the embassy’s assistance while the delegation was in Chile and the 
Department instructed the embassy to “provide all appropriate assistance”.354 However, 
the State Department’s assistance was not provided without strings attached. It urged 
WOLA to include a meeting with the CDT on the schedule and “expressed hope” that 
meetings with party leaders would “include full spectrum of political views, such as 
conservative parties”.355 The Santiago embassy assisted WOLA again in 1988 when 
WOLA and the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CI-IR) took a delegation 
to Chile. Harry Barnes met the delegation personally and they were briefed by embassy 
staff upon arrival.356 It is clear that WOLA’s relationship with the Santiago embassy 
improved dramatically following the departure of Theberge. Under Barnes, WOLA 
developed a relationship with the Santiago embassy that was better and more productive 
than that it had cultivated with the US-based branch of the State Department. It would 
appear that under Reagan WOLA had more success in its dealings with embassy staff, 
particularly in the Santiago embassy, than with the State Department offices in 
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Washington. WOLA also had little or no contact with the Bureau for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. This represents a complete break from the high level of access 
WOLA had had to the Bureau when it was under the control of Patricia Derian. 
 Under Bush, WOLA regained its very productive working relationship with the 
State Department. In the early 1990s it regularly sent reports to the Department and 
Department staff often attended the seminars and discussions WOLA held in 
Washington.357 WOLA’s 1990 report entitled El Salvador: Is Peace Possible?, was 
widely distributed by the State Department to its staff in the San Salvador embassy and, 
in 1991, WOLA sent its International Drug Policy Briefing Papers, a periodic series of 
research and analysis concerning US drug policy, to a large proportion of State 
Department and congressional staff.358 Moreover, during the 1990s, WOLA began to 
receive requests from the State Department (and other branches of the executive) to 
brief teams and staff concerning Latin American issues. For example, in 1991, it was 
called upon to work with the House Government Operations Committee to design 
studies on the impact of US military aid to Peru, Columbia and Bolivia.359 WOLA 
briefed the three teams from the office of the Chief Administrative Officer and the State 
Department, who had carried out three studies previously, and provided them with 
contacts to individuals and organisations which could provide alternative views. In 
1992, WOLA was called to give human rights training seminars in relation to Latin 
America. These were provided to a number of branches of government, including staff 
from the State Department, the Department of Defence and the School of the 
Americas.360 This would suggest that WOLA had not only regained some of the ground 
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it lost under Reagan, but had also begun to take on something of an advisor status on 
certain issues as well. Furthermore, this improvement in feeling seems to have been 
mutual. During the Reagan years WOLA had often been critical of the State 
Department, particularly of its country and human rights reporting, but by 1991 it was 
praising the State Department for its reports concerning the human rights situation in 
Guatemala.361 It would appear that the Bush administration’s more conciliatory attitude 
and WOLA’s decision to align itself more behind Washington policy led to a very fast 
improvement in relations between the two institutions.362 
 As can be seen, the State Department did have some kind of working 
relationship with all three organisations, although with WOLA this did not begin until 
1985. Under Reagan, it worked closely with both the NED and Freedom House, 
exchanging information with the latter and taking an active interest in the programmes 
and decision-making processes of the former. While the State Department’s interest in 
the NED was in part mandated by Congress, the relationship that developed between the 
two went beyond formality. Embassy staff throughout Latin America provided the NED 
with information and assistance and, in the United States, State Department officials 
such as Helman not only monitored NED project proposals, but also engaged with them, 
providing suggestions and advice to the NED Board. However, the NED relationship 
with the State Department was rather one-sided. The Department provided information 
and assistance to the NED, but the NED does not appear to have provided a great deal in 
return. By contrast, the relationship between Freedom House and the State Department 
formed around a reciprocal exchange of information. Throughout the 1980s, Freedom 
House delivered reports and, occasionally, briefings to the State Department while the 
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Department provided them with assistance on the ground in Latin America. Freedom 
House was held in high regard by the State Department which sought out its election 
monitoring services and human rights reports, deeming them more reliable than those 
coming from WOLA or Amnesty International, with which the Department had more 
strained relations. Under Reagan, WOLA’s interactions with the State Department often 
ended in hostilities, particularly concerning the human rights situation and US relations 
with Chile. Although the State Department did make use of some of WOLA’s work in 
its human rights reports, the reaction from elements of the Foreign Service was hostile 
and led to the Department ceasing to include their work in such reports. The most 
productive relationship WOLA developed within the Reagan State Department was 
with Harry Barnes, who regularly assisted them in their work in Chile and, seemingly, 
was sympathetic to their cause. Perhaps one of the most interesting changes between the 
1970s and the 1980s was the attitude of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs to liberal human rights groups. In contrast to the Derian Bureau which had had 
an inclusive policy towards non-state actors, including WOLA and Freedom House, the 
Abrams Bureau almost completely cut WOLA off from policy-making, choosing 
instead to take Freedom House as its primary non-state source of information.  
 Under the Bush administration, the State Department generally appears to have 
stepped back from involvement with the NED. It is possible that, because the NED now 
had its own member of staff in the State Department, much of the communication 
between the two ceased to be written and, as a result, is simply inaccessible; but there is 
little evidence to suggest this was the case. Although relations between the NED and the 
State Department never turned hostile, with changes in the State Department’s staff they 
do appear to have become more formulaic and closer to the type of relationship 
Congress envisioned when they laid down guidelines for the Department’s monitoring 
of the NED. While the State Department maintained a strong relationship of information 
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exchange with Freedom House under Bush, it became more one-sided with regards to 
Latin America. Freedom House received a great deal less from the State Department 
than they had in previous years while maintaining the quantity of information they 
passed the other way. That said, Freedom House maintained a good base of contacts and 
supporters within the Department, which aided them in their work in the early 1990s. 
Despite the State Department’s increasing focus on the former Soviet Union, it was 
WOLA that really developed its relationship with the State Department under Bush, 
with a regular flow of information between the two becoming the norm. WOLA’s slight 
political re-alignment under Wilde and the more conciliatory attitude of the new 
administration created the conditions for WOLA to become a respected and valued 
institution within the State Department.  
 
Congress 
During the 1980s and 1990s, members of Congress on both sides of the political 
spectrum took a keen interest in human rights and democracy abroad. As it was a key 
part of the US foreign policy decision-making process, it was vital for non-state actors 
such as the three in question here to build relationships within Congress. Throughout 
this period, all three of the organisations in question here cultivated connections with 
individual members of Congress. Some members of Congress sat on the boards of the 
NED and Freedom House and WOLA assisted many members of Congress in travelling 
to Latin America on fact-finding missions. At the time of its founding, the NED had 
genuine bipartisan support within Congress, albeit from individuals with similar 
hawkish foreign policy outlooks. The NED’s founding documents demanded that 
Congress take on oversight of the NED and, throughout the 1980s and 1990s required 
that the NED make annual reports to Congress.363 In the early days of proposals for the 
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NED’s founding, it was suggested that its board should be appointed by the President 
with the approval of the Senate and should contain members of Congress. While the 
suggestion for the Board to be appointed by the President was not put into practice, 
between 1983 and 1993 there were always at least two members of Congress on the 
NED Board, one from each political party.364 From 1983 Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) 
and Congressman Dante Fascell (D-FL) sat on the board and they were replaced by 
Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY) in 1992. 
Despite congressional representation on the NED board, it still proved contentious 
within Congress. The initial debates concerning the NED’s founding were fraught with 
questions concerning the involvement of the NDI and NRI as core grantees.365 Some 
members of the House were concerned that making these organisations core grantees of 
the NED came perilously close to the US government funding political parties and, as a 
result, Rep. Hank Brown (R-CO) put forward an amendment to the funding act to 
remove funding for these institutions.366 This amendment narrowly passed and was 
disputed by the Senate, but it appears to have stood since the NED cited this as a 
restriction on its ability to assist in democratic processes abroad in its 1985 annual 
report.367 There were several other attempts to defund the NED or to cut its budget 
during this period one of which succeeded but was rapidly repealed. Of the four 
attempts made to alter NED funding between 1985 and 1993, two were brought by Rep. 
John Conyers (D-MI) who sought to delete NED funding completely and two by Rep. 
Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) both of which sought to significantly reduce its funds.368  
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These attempts to abolish NED funding brought out a number of members of 
Congress in support of the NED. In 1984 Reps. Fascell and Solarz, in conjunction with 
Representatives Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), William Broomfield (R-MI) Michael Barnes 
(D-MD) and Dan Mica (D-FL) wrote to their fellow Congressmen attempting to 
“correct misrepresentations about the NED”. They directly addressed the question of 
party funding, stating that the NED was “forbidden from supplying funds to candidates 
for public office” and explaining why the NED would not be subject to Freedom of 
Information requests.369 Moreover, Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D-NY) issued a statement in 
1985 in support of the NED receiving its full funding. However, the NED had its vocal 
critics too; after his initial concern about the NED’s funding of party affiliated 
institutions, Rep. Brown continued to question NED policy and affairs throughout this 
period. In 1986 he wrote a letter to Gershman informing him of concern in Congress 
over the fact that many NED Board members were also affiliated with its core 
grantees.370 This complaint resulted in a bill being put to the House to stop the NED 
from funding any organisation which had had an employee on the NED Board in the 
previous two years.371 Although this particular bill never passed, it gives an indication 
of the sort of concerns members of Congress had about NED operating procedure. In 
1984, the NED was involved in a scandal concerning its alleged funding of a military 
backed candidate. In reaction to this scandal some members of Congress issued a 
statement claiming that the NED was a “disruptive new force that would complicate 
relations with foreign countries.”372 
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 While battles over funding made up a large part of the congressional debate 
concerning the NED, there were reciprocal working relationships to be found as well. 
During this time, the NED informed members of Congress about its project decisions, 
often sending members reports and asking for assistance with lobbying in Congress. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the NED had extensive relationships with Senators 
Bill Bradley and John McCain, both of whom defended the NED within Congress on a 
number of occasions. In 1989 McCain and Sen. Bob Graham wrote to Secretary of State 
James Baker voicing support for additional funding for the NED.373 Members of 
Congress also sent the NED proposals for projects that had been sent to them by 
organisations on the ground or other US non-state actors. In 1985 Rep. John LaFalce 
sent the NED a joint proposal from SUNY and the Universidad de los Andes for a 
research project entitled “Democracy in Latin America: The Colombian Case”.374 The 
NED also received a letter of support for this project from Senator Alfonse D’Amato.375 
As a result of these recommendations, the NED chose to fund the project suggesting 
that either it valued the suggestions of these members of Congress, or that it was keen to 
keep on good terms with them. The NED maintained this kind of reciprocal relationship 
with several members of Congress. In 1987, members of Congress wrote to the NED 
concerning the harassment of Paraguay’s Radio Nanduti. The NED responded to this 
with a letter stating that it had approved a grant to assist the station.376  Throughout this 
period, members of Congress wrote to the NED’s Board asking for special 
considerations for specific projects requesting NED funding, many of which the NED 
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eventually gave grants to.377 Perhaps the most obvious illustration of Congressional 
trust in the NED’s abilities was the special appropriations for Chile and Nicaragua 
which gave the NED money from the USAID budgets for democracy promotion in 
these countries. However, within the NED there was contention concerning this display 
of Congressional confidence as the board found USAID bureaucracy burdensome and 
struggled to deal with the backlash against appropriation funding in on the ground.378  
 Freedom House had a strong relationship of information exchange with 
Congress during this period. In a memorandum to Kampelman and Riehm, Sussman 
stated that the purpose of the Central America Centre would be to “put ideas into the 
marketplace that [could] be taken up by Congress or the Administration”.379 How much 
importance Freedom House attached to its relationship with Congress is evident in its 
creation of a Washington office in 1987 in order to “monitor congressional activity” and 
identify congressional staffers who were interested in its work.380 Although Congress 
does appear to have valued Freedom House’s work, their relationship was often fraught 
with tensions. In 1983 Freedom House defended the Democracy Project against Rep. 
Joel Pritchard’s (R-WA) claim that the idea made him nervous, stating that the United 
States had to have a role in democracy promotion in the world.381 In an interesting 
insight into its attitude about the relationship between US governmental branches, 
Freedom House criticised Congress for not cooperating with the Executive branch 
enough, particularly in relation to Central America.382 In some cases these clashes were 
very public. For example, in 1983, McColm went on the radio to debate the issue of 
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continued aid to El Salvador with Rep. Solarz. McColm stated that he wanted aid to be 
conditional on improvements in human rights and that the certification process had been 
trivialised by the human rights lobby and Congress.383 In 1984, Freedom House 
produced a document of recommendations for El Salvador in which it encouraged 
Congress to provide funding for El Salvador’s land reform policies or, at least, issue a 
statement acknowledging the legitimacy of the reforms.384 Freedom House also clashed 
with Congress concerning congressional attempts to cut funding for the NED. It drafted 
a declaration of support for the NED, urging Congress not only to keep the NED budget 
as it stood, but to increase it to $35 million.385 This request was not acknowledged by 
Congress and the NED’s budget did not change a great deal during the 1980s.  
 Although Freedom House did clash with Congress on some occasions, it 
maintained very close relationships with many individual members of Congress and its 
work was well respected by Congress as a whole. Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) gifted 
Freedom House a $500 donation in his will in 1983, suggesting that he was supportive 
of the work Freedom House was doing and, potentially, indicated a strong relationship 
between the two prior to his death.386 Freedom House staff were regularly called to 
testify before Congress, particularly before Senate committees. In 1982, McColm was 
called to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the 
mistreatment of Miskito Indians in Nicaragua. Moreover, he was also invited to 
meetings with Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC), Paul Tsongas (D-MA), Claiborne Pell (D-
RI) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) to explain the situation.387 Freedom House testified 
before Congress repeatedly concerning the situation in El Salvador. As a result of this 
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testimony and its work with the media, it claimed that it “played a significant role in 
shaping the discussion on El Salvador”.388 Given the regularity with which Freedom 
House was called in to Congress in an advisory role, it certainly seems to have been a 
highly respected and well used source of information concerning the country. Later in 
the decade, Freedom House staff even took on advisory roles with Senator Dodd asking 
McColm to sit on the Senate monitoring committee for the Guatemalan peace 
process.389 Freedom House’s inclusion on committees as a consultant suggests that 
members of Congress held the organisation in high regard.  Moreover, Freedom House 
organised meetings and receptions for congressional staff and members of Congress to 
enable them to meet visitors from Latin America and hear their viewpoints.390 By the 
1990s, Freedom House had built up strong relationships of information exchange within 
both the House and Senate. According to its activity reports, it routinely distributed 
literature and reports to over 75 congressional offices and held regular briefing meetings 
with Senators Bob Dole (R-KS), Ted Stevens (R-AK), George Mitchell (D-ME), 
Connie Mack (R-FL), Graham and Pell and around thirteen Representatives through the 
Freedom House Washington Office.391 However, it must be said that the majority of the 
events organised for Congress by the Washington office of Freedom House centred on 
Cuba due to the personal interests of Frank Calzon who led the Washington office.  
 Like Freedom House, WOLA had strong relationships with members of 
Congress. However, unlike the NED and Freedom House, WOLA’s congressional 
relationships were its most consistent and, in many ways, vital to its work and its ability 
to achieve its aims.392 WOLA saw Congress as one of its three “major audiences”, had a 
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strong core following within Congress throughout the period and, by the 1990s, 
Congress more generally had developed a level of respect for its work.393 Many of those 
who supported WOLA in Congress during this period had been doing so since its 
founding in the 1970s. In the 1970s much of WOLA’s work had concerned Chile and it 
had developed its network of support partially through assisting members of Congress 
and their staff to travel to Chile to assess the human rights situation for themselves. In 
1976, WOLA took Rep. Tom Harkin to Chile which began a long-running relationship 
between the two.394 When WOLA published its report on El Salvador in 1990, it passed 
the report to (then) Sen. Harkin who distributed it to his colleagues in the House and 
Senate.395 In 1983, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA) praised WOLA in a speech as an 
excellent source of information and assistance in the cause of returning democracy to 
Chile. He stated that WOLA played an “indispensable role…in educating Congress and 
the country to the ongoing crisis in human rights”.396 Moreover, WOLA provided Sens. 
Kennedy, Ted Weiss (D-NY) and David Bonior (D-MI) with information throughout 
their attempts to pass a congressional resolution denying aid to Chile until it had 
improved its human rights record.  WOLA also developed a strong relationship with 
Rep. Bruce Morrison (D-CT) after assisting him with a trip to Chile. When WOLA took 
a delegation to Chile in 1988 it included a member of Rep. Tom Lantos’ (D-CA) 
staff.397 WOLA also entreated members of Congress to write letters to the Pinochet 
government concerning specific human rights cases, such as its attempt to fight the 
barring of Judge René García Villegas from the bar.398  
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 Unlike Freedom House and the NED, WOLA’s relationship with Congress was 
largely reciprocal. While it passed information to Congress concerning the situation on 
the ground in Latin America, members of Congress (particularly Ted Weiss) in turn 
passed information about what was being discussed in Congress for WOLA to distribute 
to its beneficiaries in Latin America.399 WOLA regularly organised meetings and 
seminars with Latin American politicians, dissidents, victims of abuse and members of 
civil society organisations which were attended mostly by members of Congress and 
their staff. In 1984 it organised a delegation to Nicaragua containing members of 
Congress from both parties, which resulted in a series of seminars on US military 
involvement in Nicaragua. These seminars were attended by around 100 individuals 
over half of which were Congressional staff.400 WOLA ran a similar series of seminars 
again in 1990, sponsoring visits from Nicaraguan politicians from across the political 
spectrum. Moreover, at this time, WOLA successfully lobbied Congress for statements 
of concern to be made concerning Nicaragua’s human rights situation and the need for 
greater civilian control of the security forces.401 During the 1980s and 1990s WOLA’s 
work was regularly used in congressional reports and WOLA staff often testified in 
congressional hearings, particularly during the Bush era. In 1989, Wilde testified before 
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs pushing for an end to US Contra aid 
and requesting a normalisation of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.402 Between 1983 
and 1993, WOLA was called to testify before Congressional hearings on at least eight 
occasions concerning issues as diverse as the Administration of Justice Program and US 
drugs policy. While it would appear that WOLA had a very strong relationship with 
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Congress between 1980 and 1993, it must be noted that, with one stated exception, all 
the members of Congress who worked closely with WOLA were Democrats. The 
Republicans within Congress were, apparently, either indifferent to WOLA or accepting 
of the information it provided but did not support its work enough to want to offer 
assistance. Some were even outwardly hostile towards WOLA. For example, in a letter 
to Rep. Morrison, Rep. Robert Dornan (R-CA) wrote about his displeasure at WOLA’s 
involvement with a conference held by the Third World Debt Caucus. In this letter he 
referred to WOLA as part of the “pro-Castro lobby” and accused of them of being 
biased and an unreliable source of information.403 This was not an uncommon attitude 
among Republicans within Congress, particularly those who counted themselves as 
supporters of Freedom House or the NED. 
 As can be seen all three of these groups had both supporters and detractors 
within Congress. While the NED and WOLA had very vocal antagonists in Congress, 
Freedom House was the least divisive of the three and, overall, WOLA’s relationship 
with Congress was one of its most productive. Although Freedom House had 
disagreements with Congress and with specific members of Congress, it never 
experienced the level of hostility from individual members of Congress that WOLA and 
the NED faced. It is clear that the NED had majority support in Congress in the early 
1980s, since its founding Act passed with a sizable majority; however, even the original 
establishment of the organisation faced opposition from traditionalists such as Rep. 
Brown who feared the precedent that might be set by the Congressional funding of party 
affiliated organisations. The majority of the opposition the NED encountered from the 
US government during this time came from Congress, most of it in the form of attempts 
to reduce or delete NED funding.  
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 By contrast, both WOLA and Freedom House had much more equal 
relationships with Congress and, in both cases, these relationships were mostly based 
around information exchange. Both Freedom House and WOLA provided members of 
Congress with reports concerning human rights abuses and political issues within Latin 
America and sought to keep Congress informed about those issues they deemed 
important. Staff from these organisations were regularly called to testify before 
Congressional committees and provided individuals from Latin America to brief 
members or, in the case of WOLA to testify in hearings. Although, unlike WOLA, 
Freedom House did not appear to provoke any real direct hostility, it also was not 
interested in and did not develop the kind of reciprocal information exchange WOLA 
achieved. Members of Congress do not appear to have supplied Freedom House with 
information concerning congressional affairs or, particularly, seek to help it in its work. 
In this, WOLA cultivated a small, but tight-knit, group of Democratic supporters within 
Congress who shared information fairly freely for WOLA to pass on to contacts in Latin 
America and helped it lobby within Congress and table issues it saw as important. 
While it is possible that Freedom House did not seek such a relationship as it did not see 
itself as being part of a wider network of information exchange with organisations in 
Latin America, it would be safe to assume that its inability to develop relationships as 
close as those developed by WOLA would have hindered its ability to act as effectively 
in its lobbying attempts. As a result of WOLA’s loss of access to other branches of the 
US government, its relationship with Congress during this period became even more 
important as one of its only sources of information concerning the US policy-making 
process.  
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Conclusions 
With the arrival of the Reagan administration, the executive branch’s willingness to 
work and engage with non-state actors changed significantly. Those human rights 
groups of the 1970s that had gained influence during the Carter years were suddenly 
largely shut off from the executive and their work was replaced by that of the neo-
conservative human rights movement. Under both Reagan and Bush the White House 
did not really involve itself with non-state actors. Although Reagan provided some 
personal support to the NED and both administrations made some use of the work of 
Freedom House, neither White House really engaged these organisations in a 
relationship either of information exchange or practical assistance. This could have been 
because the administrations wished to be free to pursue their own agendas without 
interference from non-state actors or because such organisations simply felt the White 
House was not the branch of government best placed to provide them with assistance. 
Despite Reagan’s vocal support for the NED and the fact that he clearly saw it as an 
important part of his foreign policy legacy, actual contact between it and the Reagan 
White House was comparatively rare. Although their relationship was changeable, 
Freedom House appeared to have a closer relationship with the White House than the 
NED had. By contrast, WOLA’s left-leaning views and regular criticism of the Reagan 
White House for undermining Congress meant that it was, for the most part, either 
excluded from the White House network completely or met with great hostility for 
much of the 1980s. With the election of Bush contact between the White House and the 
all three organisations regarding Latin American issues became rare. Between 1989 and 
1993, the White House had almost no contact with either the NED or Freedom House 
concerning Latin American issues. Although it continued to oversee the NED through 
its annual reporting, for the most part this was the extent of the contact between the two 
institutions. While WOLA continued to be critical of Bush administration policy in the 
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region, its own realignment under Wilde and the more conciliatory nature of the Bush 
administration more generally meant that it was no longer met with active hostility. 
Although it too did not have much engagement with the Bush White House, it was no 
longer persona non grata. The lack of communication between the White House and 
these three organisations is not, perhaps, surprising. Although the White House was an 
important part of the foreign policy-making process, for organisations seeking to 
influence government policy and organise projects abroad good relationships with the 
State Department and Congress were far more important. Carter may have opened the 
White House up to more contact with non-state actors concerning human rights, but 
even in the 1970s, direct communication with the President’s offices was limited.  
  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the NED and Freedom House developed 
strong reciprocal relationships of information exchange and practical assistance with the 
State Department. Although the NED had the terms of part of its relationship with the 
Department dictated by Congress, in the 1980s at least, it went beyond this, developing 
a strong relationship with Gerald Helman which continued until he left his position in 
1991. After the departure of Helman, the NED’s relationship with the State Department 
appears to have become more formulaic. WOLA struggled in its dealings with the State 
Department during the first Reagan administration but, during the second Reagan 
administration, it began to cultivate more productive working relationships with State 
Department staff within the United States and, by the Bush administration, were seen as 
a reliable source of information by the State Department. Only Freedom House had a 
consistently stable relationship with the State Department. Possibly because it had been 
developing this relationship since the 1940s it was already well respected within the 
Department by the 1980s and, since it was politically in favour during the Reagan and 
Bush administrations, remained so throughout both the period.  
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When it came to Congress, despite a great deal of initial support, the NED 
struggled to maintain a working relationship throughout the period. Although it clearly 
had a strong base of support within Congress, the majority of the attacks on it also 
emanated from Congress. Regular, almost yearly, attempts to defund the NED came not 
only from members ideologically opposed to it, but also constitutional traditionalists 
and members with practical worries about the proportion of the budget being sent 
abroad. In fact, the power Congress held over the NED, made this relationship a very 
challenging one. The NED needed Congress in order to continue performing its 
function, but it was also consistently forced to fight against attacks from those members 
who were less than favourable towards its practices. In some ways, this compromised 
the NED’s position as an independent actor as it was unable to negotiate with Congress 
or engage in programmes with members of Congress on an equal footing. By contrast, 
both Freedom House and WOLA cultivated and maintained strong relationships with 
members of Congress. Both organisations established themselves as reliable sources of 
information for members seeking to understand or put forward bills concerning Latin 
American issues. Both were successful in developing groups of supporters within 
Congress which they could count on to put forward policy they suggested or draw 
attention to their reports and briefs in debates. However, it must be said that only 
Freedom House really successfully gained support from members of Congress from 
both parties which gave it a powerful advantage when it came to putting forward its 
policy suggestions. While WOLA’s supporters within Congress were very dedicated 
and often vocal, they were almost all Democrats which, particularly in the Senate, 
meant that WOLA struggled to get its policy suggestions and information to a wide 
audience until the 1990s. That said, during this period Congress was WOLA’s main 
access route to the Washington foreign policy community and the fact that it had such a 
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strong support network within Congress was vital to its survival particularly during the 
Reagan years.  
 According to Keck and Sikkink, in order for relationships between non-state 
and state actors to be effective they had to be reciprocal. While the NED was given a 
great deal of assistance by the State Department, it gave very little back, perhaps due to 
its privileged position as a Congressional creation. By contrast, Freedom House and 
WOLA had to work for the assistance they received from the State Department. 
Reports, information and contacts were all passed from these organisations to the State 
Department and, in exchange, the Department assisted them in practical matters, such as 
arranging trips and delegations to Latin America, and with information about US policy 
issues. Similarly within Congress, possibly because of the balance of power involved in 
the relationship, the NED relied on Congress to provide its budget and support it while 
providing almost nothing in return. In the case of Freedom House its relationship with 
Congress was largely one-sided with it providing members of Congress with 
information and reports while never really receiving anything in return. By contrast, 
WOLA had a two-way relationship with its contacts in Congress with information being 
passed freely between the two. WOLA’s reciprocal relationship with Congress made it 
considerably more effective when working with organisations in Latin America since it 
was able to help them with knowledge about what was happening in Washington as 
well as taking their concerns to Congress.  
Overall, relations between these organisations and the US government during 
this period were mixed and often relied heavily on individuals. People such as Gerald 
Helman and Harry Barnes allowed the formulation of deep relationships between 
organisations which did not always outlast them when they left their positions. Within 
Congress all three organisations developed their own groups of supporters (which 
sometimes overlapped in the case of the NED and Freedom House) on whom they could 
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rely for information dissemination and practical assistance. Similarly, within the 
organisations themselves, the right individuals in the right positions could open doors 
that were unavailable previously. For example, Bruce McColm’s appointment to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights opened up a space for Freedom House 
within the White House and State Department networks which had previously been 
closed to them. In the case of WOLA, Alex Wilde’s willingness to realign the 
organisation behind Washington policies allowed WOLA access to higher levels of US 
government and, as a result, a greater audience for its work. However, as is often the 
case with non-state actors of this type, relationships with the state could be a double-
edged sword. Although they were clearly necessary for these organisations to achieve 
their aims, there was a fine line between these relations being perceived on the ground 
in Latin America and among their US colleagues as necessary working relationships 
and co-option by government forces. 
 
  
Mara Sankey 
 
160 
 
Chapter 4 – Working Networks: NED, Freedom House, WOLA and the 
Third Sector 
 
In addition to working relationships with the US government, the NED, Freedom House 
and WOLA also needed to maintain some kind of working relationship with their peers. 
According to Keck and Sikkink, effective advocacy networks involved international 
NGOs as well as activists from the target countries.404 The ability to collaborate with 
other international non-state actors allowed these organisations to pool their resources 
and work on larger projects. Moreover, collaborative efforts between non-state actors 
from both Latin America and the United States had the potential to give these 
organisations more legitimacy in their relationships with the US government and in the 
public perception of their work. Strong working relationships with Latin American non-
state actors, for example, had the potential to lend credibility to these organisations’ 
claims of understanding and providing accurate information on Latin American 
issues.405 These relationships with organisations and individuals on the ground were 
what enabled human rights movements to be truly transnational. For non-state actors, 
particularly those engaged with human rights, transnationality was deemed essential for 
the effective gathering of information and testimony and the provision of assistance. As 
will be shown, unlike the human rights movement of the 1970s, the new human rights 
movement was not that transnational in nature. Where WOLA had an extensive network 
of contacts in Latin America, the NED intentionally kept its Latin American 
beneficiaries at arm’s length and what little contact Freedom House had was primarily 
with Latin American governments or groups which supported the US world-view. This 
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chapter will explore the relationships between the three organisations in question, their 
US-based colleagues and their Latin American counterparts.  
 
Other US Non-State Actors 
All three of these organisations exchanged information, collaborated or, in the case of 
the NED, funded other international non-state actors during this period. However it was 
the NED which had the most consistent and formalised relationship with other 
organisations, as laid down by the NED Act. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the NED 
was required to channel grants to Latin American democratic organisations primarily 
through its four core grantees and sometimes through other US-based non-state 
organisations. This system gave the NED a unique relationship with its core grantees 
which were simultaneously independent organisations and also inextricably linked to 
the NED.406 Indeed, these four organisations, the NDI, NRI, FTUI and CIPE, were 
created specifically to act as middle-men for NED funding. The core grantees would 
propose on-the-ground projects to the NED board (on which their members often sat) 
for approval and would then, essentially, act as administrators for NED funding for 
these projects. 
In 1986 the NED undertook a review of its grant-making policy and its grantee 
relationships. In this review, it was stated that the four core grantees had a mandate to 
carry out programmes in their respective sectors (labour, business and party politics) 
and that it was the staff of the core grantees who had responsibility for programme 
development and the preparation of proposals for consideration by the NED board.407 
Around 75% of the NED’s budget was given to its core grantees with the majority of 
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that being granted to the FTUI and CIPE.408 Although all grantees, both core and 
otherwise, were required to monitor and administer the programmes for which they 
received grants, the NED provided additional funding for any significant administrative 
costs its core grantees incurred in this process.409 This tied the core grantees very 
closely to the NED by making it less lucrative for these organisations to seek funding 
elsewhere to carry out their projects, since providing additional funding to cover costs 
was not standard procedure for most foundations. In 1990, a time when the 
independence of the NED board and, indeed of individual board members was coming 
into question, the Congressional Subcommittee for International Operations held a 
hearing concerning the relationship between the NED and its core grantees. This 
hearing focused on how the core grantees carried out their mandate and operated their 
programmes as well as on their relationship with the NED.410 Directors of all four core 
grantees testified before Congress and all of them were overwhelmingly positive about 
their relationships with the NED, although none of them went into great detail about 
what exactly these relationships entailed and the Subcommittee does not appear to have 
pushed this enquiry. This would suggest that, regardless of the actual state of the 
relationship between the NED and its core grantees, these four organisations felt that it 
was better to be a core grantee of the NED than to risk Congress dismantling the system 
that was in place by voicing concerns about how the NED handled its relationships with 
them.   
For the most part, these groups did have amicable working relationships with the 
NED, but it did face tensions in its relationships with both CIPE and the NDI. In 1988, 
Edward Donley, the Chairman of CIPE, wrote a letter to William Brock registering his 
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concerns about the NED taking the Congressional appropriation for Chile. In the letter 
he stated that the appropriation had made CIPE grantees less willing to take CIPE funds 
because they came from the NED and urged the NED not to accept further 
appropriations.411 Given that in 1989, the NED received another appropriation from 
Congress for work in Nicaragua, it would seem that it did not take this suggestion on 
board. However, it must also be mentioned that there were also no further complaints 
from CIPE concerning congressional appropriations or any evidence of further 
animosity between the two organisations, suggesting that either CIPE came to terms 
with the NED’s policy on appropriations, or it felt that attempting to register the 
complaint again was pointless. Aside from this complaint, the relationship between the 
NED and CIPE was mostly amicable. By contrast, the NED’s relationship with the NDI 
was fraught with tensions during the late 1980s. It seems that the NED and the NDI had 
some irreconcilable differences both of political beliefs and in conception of what the 
relationship between the two should look like. In September 1988, Brian Atwood, 
Director of the NDI, wrote a letter to Gershman accusing the NED of not showing 
confidence in the NDI and of not being concerned about what happened to taxpayers’ 
money once it left NED coffers.412 This letter was written in response to accusations 
Gershman made about Atwood and the NDI. He claimed that the NDI had nothing but a 
“rubber-stamp board” which agreed with whatever Atwood presented to them. 
Gershman had also accused the NDI of being “excessively political” and not caring 
enough about development issues.413 In response to this accusation, Atwood stated that 
the NDI “[wanted] to represent the Democratic Party overseas, not the NED”.414 
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Although there is no recorded response by Gershman to this letter, the exchange 
suggests that there was both procedural tensions between the two institutions and 
political ones. Yet, in the 1990 congressional hearing concerning the NED’s 
relationship with its grantees, Atwood was complimentary of the relationship stating 
that the NED “[respected their] independence as an organisation and [oversaw] 
activities appropriately”.415 This implies either that some effort had been made to 
improve relations, or that the NDI saw their position as an NED grantee as more 
important than the disagreements they had.  
The complaints Gershman made about the NDI had, in fact, been some of the 
regular accusations made against the NED. Indeed, questions about the composition of 
the NED board had been common in Congress in the mid-1980s. In 1986, Rep. Hank 
Brown wrote a letter to Gershman stating that members of Congress had raised concerns 
about the fact that many of the members of the NED board were affiliated to its core 
grantees – thus making the NED board itself little more than what it had accused the 
NDI’s board of being.416 While, in the case of the other three core grantees, relations 
between them and the NED were cordial, this dispute is indicative of the peculiar 
circumstances under which the NED and its core grantees operated. The fact that the 
NED board did have a number of members who were either affiliated with or board 
members of its core grantees would suggest that the relationship between the NED and 
its core grantees was symbiotic, with little to suggest that either the grantees were 
autonomous of the NED or that the NED was entirely autonomous of its core grantees. 
Moreover, this arrangement was typical of the almost complete lack of transparency 
with which the NED operated. This relationship became a little less unclear in 1990 as 
the original NED Board of Directors began to be replaced by new board members. In 
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1992, Congress amended the NED Act to prevent anyone affiliated with an organisation 
which received more than 5% of the NED program fund from sitting on the NED board; 
as a result, by 1993 when the turnover in board members was complete, there were no 
representatives of the NED’s core grantees on its board.417 
In addition to its mandated relationships with its core grantees, the NED also 
released some grants to other US-based organisations including Freedom House, 
PRODEMCA, and Delphi International.418 Of the non-core grantees, Delphi was the 
largest receiver of grants from the NED and had been a large-scale contractor for both 
USIA and USAID since the early 1980s.419 During this period, Delphi administered a 
large number of NED grants for Latin America. Most notably it took over the grant for 
La Prensa in Nicaragua after PRODEMCA was discredited for its involvement with the 
Contra movement. It also administered several grants for independent radio stations 
throughout the region and grants for the Conciencia women’s movements in Argentina 
and Nicaragua. 420 These were groups focused on increasing participation in politics, 
particularly women’s participation. Indeed, Delphi managed most of the Latin American 
grants relating to communications media, youth and women’s groups. For the most part, 
the NED’s relationship with Delphi was little more than a functional working 
relationship. There is little in the NED’s own archive by way of correspondence with 
Delphi or any suggestion that this relationship was anything other than amicable. 
Indeed, the fact that Delphi was asked to take over the La Prensa grant in the late 
1980s, suggests that the NED was confident in Delphi’s ability to manage grants 
effectively and without issue. Despite one of Delphi’s programme co-ordinators having 
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been involved with the Iran-Contra Scandal, the NED does not appear to have ever 
received any criticism for its relationship with Delphi. Henry Quintero had previously 
run the Institute of North-South Issues (INSI) which had been exposed as one of Oliver 
North’s front groups, forming part of the covert network used to channel funds to the 
Contras. 421 It was discovered that the INSI had been engaged in laundering funds for 
the Contra forces while it was simultaneously managing a $493,000 grant from the 
NED for projects in the Caribbean.422 Although in 1987, the NED board did vote to 
remove all unspent funds from the INSI, there is no suggestion that the move of 
Quintero to a programme management role at Delphi raised any questions about the 
close relationship between the two organisations.423 Even the scandal attached to the 
defunding of the INSI only appears to have been covered by two US newspapers.424 
This is perhaps even more surprising given that this was not the first time the NED had 
been associated with the Contras and Contra-related scandals.  
In 1986, PRODEMCA came under attack for having taken out pro-Contra 
adverts in a newspaper, urging support for military assistance to the Contra forces.425 
While this incident brought its own share of criticism, in 1987 PRODEMCA came 
under investigation for having taken funds from the National Endowment for the 
Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), another organisation accused of being a front in the 
Iran-Contra scandal, and the reaction to this within Congress brought about the end of 
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the relationship between the NED and PRODEMCA.426 Prior to these scandals, the two 
organisations had a strong working relationship. PRODEMCA handled the NED’s 
grants to La Prensa from 1985 until 1988 when, discredited, the organisation was 
merged with Freedom House.427 As early as 1985, the NED was criticised in Latin 
America for its use of PRODEMCA for grant management. A number of State 
Department cables, which discuss reactions to the NED’s work in Nicaragua, state that 
it was known as the “covert CIA” due to its inability to give grants directly.428 These 
cables also state that the use of PRODEMCA (which, even before the scandals was a 
known pro-Contra organisation) in Nicaragua was “not good”.429 After the 
PRODEMCA board had been outed as firm Contra supporters through the newspaper 
advertisements and the investigation into the NEPL, the NED and La Prensa 
collectively decided that it would be best for the grant to be administrated by another 
organisation and PRODEMCA was defunded.430 Unlike the scandal concerning the 
INSI, the PRODEMCA scandal was widely reported in the US media and sparked a 
demand in 1986 from Rep. Daniel Mica (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee which was responsible for oversight of the NED) for a full report into the 
activities of PRODEMCA stating that “if they spent one cent of government money [on 
the pro-Contra advertisements] we’ll throw the book at them”.431 Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the incident, the NED was so concerned about its outward appearance in 
relation to PRODEMCA that in 1988 Gershman wrote to Bruce McColm of Freedom 
House voicing the NED’s concern about Freedom House’s decision to incorporate and 
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merge with PRODEMCA since the NED “[wished] to avoid being drawn into the 
debate over Contra funding again”.432 Despite the scandal and the NED’s fear of being 
associated with issues of Contra funding, key members of the NED board, such as 
Gershman, maintained strong working relationships with Penn Kemble, the ex-director 
of PRODEMCA and, as of 1988, a consultant at Freedom House.433 Given that 
Gershman and Kemble both came from the background of the SDUSA, this would 
suggest that the NED, and particularly Gershman himself, were more committed to the 
neo-conservative agenda espoused by it and, during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Freedom House than they were worried by the potential repercussions of associating 
with a man linked to one of the Reagan administration’s most embarrassing scandals.  
It is important to remember that while the NED gave grants, it was itself a 
grantee of USIA and, on occasion, USAID. While neither of these organisations could 
be said to be non-state actors or “peers” of the NED, it is important to briefly discuss 
the NED’s relations with the USIA. There is little evidence in the NED archive of 
extensive written communication between the NED and USIA, but it is clear that the 
two organisations maintained a functional and, it would seem, respectful working 
relationship with Congress as an intermediary. In its 1988 annual report, the NED 
thanked USIA stating that it had been “greatly assisted by Members of Congress from 
both parties…the USIA and AID and the State Department” during the year.434 It is also 
interesting to note that the NED’s relationship with USIA had symbiotic elements to it 
as well. Not only was USIA the source of the NED’s budget, but NED grantees also 
worked on projects directly with USIA at various times. For example, in 1988, CIPE 
and USIA co-sponsored a series of programmes on trends towards market economics in 
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Uruguay.435 Overall, the NED and USIA appeared to have had a cordial, if minimal, 
financial relationship managed in no small part by Congress. By contrast, the NED’s 
relationship with USAID, while similarly managed by Congress, was more turbulent. 
USAID had been the original funder of the APF’s Democracy Program and, in addition 
to funding the project, had provided research concerning systems for assessing 
democratic liberties.436 After the NED was formally founded, there was no apparent 
relationship between the two organisations until 1988 when Congress granted the NED 
the first USAID appropriation. In addition to causing controversy concerning the NED’s 
status as an independent organisation, these appropriations brought with them practical 
difficulties for the NED.437 In the late 1980s, USAID established a number of regional 
offices for “Democratic Initiatives” which caused the NED to voice its concern that 
USAID was being set up as a governmental alternative to it.438 Despite its internal 
reservations about the position USAID was potentially being given, the NED decided 
that it should work with USAID staff to clarify the types of programmes and groups 
suited to NED involvement rather than direct USAID funding and, essentially, to divide 
the workload of democracy-promotion. Moreover, the NED declared that it was happy 
to continue to act as a coordination point and grantee for USAID for significant 
democratic initiatives involving its core grantees.439 Although controversial, the NED’s 
financial relationship with USAID proved to be lucrative for it throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s with large appropriations being given between 1988 and 1993 for 
Poland, Chile, Nicaragua and Eastern European transition. 
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Due to the nature of the NED, its relationships with US-based organisations 
were primarily financial rather than collaborative, with the NED in a position of 
financial power over other organisations. The majority of its budget was given to its 
four core grantees which existed in something of a complicated position, rather like the 
NED itself. While the NED walked a fine line between complete non-state autonomy 
and looking like a branch of the US government, its core grantees held a similarly 
precarious position between independence and being extensions of the NED itself. 
While for the NRI, CIPE and FTUI, all of which were perhaps closer in ideology to the 
NED itself, this relationship worked with few problems, the NDI clashed with the NED 
concerning ideological and practical differences. Despite occasional tensions, it is clear 
that these organisations gained a great deal from the initial lack of transparency in their 
relationship with the NED. Between 1980 and 1993, the relationship between these five 
organisations was fluid, with the core grantees holding some power within the NED 
itself through their members’ positions on the NED board. However, after 1990 
Congress began a process of formalising these relationships and creating some distance 
between the NED and its core grantees, forcing the NED into a position of 
accountability and transparency more akin to those expected of non-state actors like 
Freedom House and WOLA which had no formal attachment to the US government.  
When it came to other grantees, the NED maintained a few, long running 
relationships for its Latin America projects, the largest receiver of funds being Delphi 
International. It maintained close relationships with those organisations through which it 
channelled funds to Latin America. This caused some problems for it during the Iran-
Contra Scandal. It is noteworthy that, despite its very clear connections to organisations 
indicted in the scandal, the NED itself does not appear to have fallen under suspicion as 
a front organisation and appears to have incurred little criticism for its relationships with 
such controversial groups. While the PRODEMCA scandal raised some questions from 
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Congress concerning PRODEMCA’s use of NED funds, the NED itself did not feature 
in the Congressional inquest.  
Unlike the NED, neither Freedom House nor WOLA had financial relationships 
with other US non-state groups. During the 1980s and 1990s, Freedom House as an 
institution does not appear to have engaged in a great deal of collaboration with other 
US organisations. Given Freedom House’s remit as a clearing-house of information, this 
lack of collaborative engagement with its peers appears peculiar; but Freedom House 
did maintain some relationships with other non-state actors and its staff had personal 
relationships with individuals at other US-based institutions. For example, Bruce 
McColm had personal relationships with individuals at the Inter-American Center for 
Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL) and the Inter-American Institute for 
Human Rights.440 However, these relationships tended to be one-sided with Freedom 
House using other organisations for information gathering while rarely giving anything 
in return. During this time, Freedom House focused a great deal of attention on the 
plight of journalists abroad and, as a result, it cultivated good working relations with the 
Centre for Foreign Journalists (CFJ) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). 
Freedom House and the CFJ were in regular correspondence and often gave each other 
suggestions about where their respective work should be heading.441 The relationship 
between Freedom House and the CPJ was perhaps the most long-standing and fruitful 
collaborative relationship Freedom House had during this period. In the early 1990s the 
two organisations regularly shared information about country-specific problems. In 
1992, Freedom House sent the CPJ a collection of information concerning violations of 
journalists’ rights in Colombia and Peru.442  Sussman met with the Director of the CPJ 
in 1993 and he stated that the organisation welcomed queries from Freedom House 
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concerning press freedoms.443 This relationship with the CPJ also gave Freedom House 
access to a network of journalists world-wide which could be called upon for 
information.444 This network was one of Freedom House’s only truly transnational 
connections, as will be seen later in the chapter.  The other major collaborative project 
Freedom House undertook was the Central American Peace and Democracy Watch in 
1987. This was a collaboration between Freedom House, the Puebla Institute, 
PRODEMCA, the Policy Project and the AFL-CIO. The project aimed to monitor the 
Central American peace process and provide information on the process to the 
Washington foreign policy Community.445 Peace and Democracy Watch collaborated to 
publish a regular bulletin with information and analysis on the progress of the peace 
process as well as organising delegations and fact-finding missions to Central America 
and trying to set and enforce minimum criteria and calendar deadlines by which the 
terms of the Arias plan should be met.446 In 1988, Freedom House took this project over 
completely, having merged with both PRODEMCA and the Puebla Institute, although 
its collaboration with the Policy Project and AFL-CIO continued.  
In the late 1980s, Freedom House merged with PRODEMCA and the Puebla 
Institute. As mentioned previously, the merger with PRODEMCA was somewhat 
controversial and was primarily a way for PRODEMCA to distance itself from the 
Contra scandal while still continuing its work. This was not a formal merger, 
PRODEMCA was dissolved as a legal and financial entity and Penn Kemble, its 
president, became a senior associate at Freedom House. Publicly, the merger was 
portrayed as a sensible consolidation of similar organisations. In an open letter to 
PRODEMCA members, Freedom House stated that the two organisations “worked 
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closely on Latin American issues” and that the merger would avoid “wasteful 
organisational duplication”. 447 In reality PRODEMCA’s association with the Contra 
scandal meant that it would have been almost impossible for it to continue as an 
independent entity, especially after the loss of NED funding. This merger with Freedom 
House allowed Kemble to keep his place in the neo-conservative democracy-promotion 
network while simultaneously allowing PRODEMCA and the rest of its board to save 
face as the organisation was dissolved. Unlike the PRODEMCA merger, Freedom 
House’s merger with the Puebla Institute was not the result of scandal. The reasons for 
this merger appeared to be much closer to those publicly given for the merger with 
PRODEMCA. In the late 1980s, Nina Shea (founder of the Puebla Institute) and Penn 
Kemble wrote a memorandum to McColm stating that the two institutions should 
establish a “close programmatic and administrative relationship”. At this point, 
according to Shea, the two organisations shared common values and, since they had 
significant overlap in personnel and funding sources it was suggested that the two 
should establish a joint management committee.448 This memorandum laid the ground 
work for the merger between the two organisations, although Puebla at this point 
remained an independent corporation. The new management committee oversaw a new 
collaborative office which eventually became Freedom House’s Centre for Religious 
Freedom.449 Before this memorandum, there is little to suggest that Freedom House and 
the Puebla Institute had much of a relationship at all. The Institute had been founded in 
the mid-1980s by Shea and the Nicaraguan Catholic leader Humberto Belli as a human 
rights organisation promoting religious freedom. However, there is no recorded contact 
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between the two organisations before the late 1980s when, due to organisational 
difficulties in the Puebla Institute, this merger was proposed.450 
Aside from its few collaborative projects and the two mergers which Freedom 
House undertook during this period, much of its involvement with other US non-state 
organisations was confrontational. In 1982, McColm wrote a letter to Thomas 
Hammarberg, Amnesty International’s Secretary General, after Hammarberg had 
accused him of misrepresenting Amnesty International’s work in Central America.451 
McColm had accused Amnesty International of being “soft” on Salvadoran guerrillas 
and not identifying groups as guerrilla fronts when there were “no authoritative sources 
on Salvadoran politics – left, right or center – who would not”.452 It would appear that 
McColm refused to correct or retract these accusations and this became a point of 
contention between the two organisations. However, by the late 1980s it seems that the 
two organisations were able to put aside this disagreement since, in 1988, they 
collaborated to secure the release of Andrés Solares, a Cuban dissident.453 The tension 
in Freedom House’s institutional relationship with Amnesty International does not 
appear to have stopped it from making use of Amnesty International’s reports and 
information in its own work.454 In 1986 Freedom House clashed with the Institute for 
Contemporary Studies (ICS) over the NED grant Freedom House managed for Libro 
Libre. The Libro Libre project was a book publishing programme based in Costa Rica 
which aimed to make the classics of Western democratic thought available in Latin 
America in affordable paperbacks. In 1986, this project began to be undercut by the US 
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Embassy in San José.455 Although it is unclear exactly what occurred, it appears that the 
ICS was attempting to begin a programme through the US Embassy which would 
compete directly with Libro Libre.456 Freedom House brought this issue to the attention 
of the US Embassy and eventually reached an arrangement to provide Libro Libre with 
access to a portion of publishing rights in the US Embassy’s name. ICS disavowed any 
intention of attempting to duplicate the programme and ceased its Central American 
programming completely.457 What is particularly strange about this incident is the fact 
that the Executive Director of ICS sat on Freedom House’s board throughout the mid-
1980s, suggesting that this was a calculated act designed to compromise the Libro Libre 
project.458 Otherwise, there is little to suggest that the relationship between Freedom 
House and ICS was particularly combative. The Executive Director of ICS did not lose 
his seat on the Freedom House board and was, in fact, given a place on the Freedom 
House advisory board as well. Indeed, aside from this clash and the overlap in personnel 
there is little to suggest that the two organisations had much of an institutional 
relationship at all.  
For the most part during this period, Freedom House was not particularly 
engaged in collaboration with other US non-state actors. Although it clearly recognised 
the utility of collaboration under certain circumstances, as evidenced by its relationship 
with the CPJ, its instance of collaboration with Amnesty International and its regular 
use of academics in research projects, it does not appear to have embraced collaboration 
as one of its main methods of operation, choosing instead to use the work of other 
groups without passing anything back the other way. This was particularly true of its 
relationship with those organisations which fell outside its own political ideology or the 
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personal networks of its staff. The mergers Freedom House undertook during this period 
were with organisations with which Freedom House or its staff already had some 
connection. Penn Kemble had come to his involvement in PRODEMCA from a 
background in the SDUSA where he met a number of individuals who held senior 
positions in Freedom House such as Bayard Rustin. As a result, by the time of the 
merger he was already well integrated into the Freedom House staff as well as the neo-
conservative network in which Freedom House was operating at the time. The exception 
to this was the Puebla Institute. Indeed, the only truly collaborative project Freedom 
House undertook was the Peace and Democracy Watch project and at least one of the 
other organisations involved in this was already a subsidiary organisation of Freedom 
House anyway. This lack of peer collaboration seems counter-productive for a non-state 
actor which primarily concerned itself with information dissemination. It is clear that 
Freedom House did not think of itself as part of a greater “NGO community”.459 That 
said, Freedom House was part in a small network of neo-conservative organisations, 
such as PRODEMCA and the NED, which constituted the “new” human rights 
movement of the 1980s. The, largely non-collaborative nature of this network is perhaps 
one of the defining features of the new human rights movement which distinguished it 
from the human rights advocacy networks of the 1970s described by Keck and 
Sikkink.460  
Unlike Freedom House, WOLA engaged regularly in collaborative efforts with 
other US-based and international, non-state actors. The most extensive relationships 
WOLA maintained throughout this period was its relationships with various religious 
organisations, the financial side of which has already been discussed.461 WOLA also 
maintained collaborative relations with a number of religious human rights 
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organisations in the United States as well as foundations and orders, particularly when it 
came to its work in Chile. In 1988 WOLA published a report with the CI-IR on the 
Chilean plebiscite concerning the role of municipal and military authorities in the 
election process, fair campaigning and opportunities for electoral fraud.462 In addition to 
organisations such as the CI-IR, WOLA had long-standing collaborative relationships 
with Amnesty International, Human Rights and Americas Watch. Between 1980 and 
1993, WOLA regularly organised seminars in conjunction with Amnesty International 
and used its staff as experts and panellists for conferences.463 WOLA maintained a 
similar relationship with Human Rights Watch which, along with representatives of 
Amnesty International and Americas Watch, was involved in WOLA’s 1992 project 
delivering human rights training and education to various branches of the US 
government.464 In addition to the collaborative work Human Rights Watch undertook 
with WOLA, it clearly had a great deal of respect for WOLA as an institution and spoke 
very highly of it. In the early 1990s when the Ford Foundation employed Carlos 
Chipoco and Lars Schoultz to undertake a program evaluation of WOLA, they 
interviewed Holy Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch who said that WOLA was the 
“glue of the Washington human rights community”.465 WOLA maintained a similarly 
close relationship with Americas Watch with a member of Americas Watch sitting on 
WOLA’s board in the 1990s.466 As with Human Rights Watch, WOLA organised a 
number of seminars with Americas Watch and regularly invited their staff to be 
panellists and speakers. Moreover, during the 1980s WOLA worked closely with 
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Americas Watch and Amnesty International gathering and disseminating information 
concerning political prisoners in Chile.467 Further evidence of WOLA’s key role within 
Washington’s liberal human rights network comes in its involvement in the Central 
America Working Group (CAWG), which, in the 1990s, became the Latin American 
Working Group. These groups were coalitions of religious, humanitarian and peace and 
justice organisations which lobbied to change US policy towards the region. WOLA 
played a key role in both of these organisations, working with congressional offices to 
redesign US aid packages to the region and attempts to relax the trade embargo on 
Cuba, amongst other projects.468 
In addition to these relationships with other non-state human rights 
organisations, WOLA also maintained strong relationships with a number of think 
tanks, professional organisations and academic institutions, the most long-standing of 
which appears to have been with the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS). The IPS assisted 
WOLA with its work on Chilean political prisoners in the 1980s and collaborated with 
it to create the Drugs Policy Forum, a seminar series on drugs policy with US and 
Andean experts.469 While the relationship WOLA cultivated with the IPS gained it 
access to a great deal of information and a means to disseminate its own research, the 
relationship was used against it by those organisations which disagreed with WOLA 
politically. For example, in the Heritage Foundation’s pamphlet The Left’s Latin 
American Lobby it accuses WOLA of coordinating efforts with “openly radical leftist 
groups” and cites the IPS as an example of such a group.470 Since this particular 
pamphlet was directed at organisations and individuals which would not have approved 
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of WOLA’s political leanings and affiliations to begin with, these accusations did little 
to damage WOLA’s reputation among its US non-state colleagues. WOLA’s work with 
various legal organisations was less controversial. In the early 1980s WOLA regularly 
engaged with the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG). In 1983, it assisted 
the IHRLG and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights in organising 
reports for the UN on human rights violations in Peru.471 WOLA and the IHRLG also 
collaborated to send a delegation to Nicaragua in 1984 to investigate US military 
involvement in Central America which resulted in a very well attended seminar in 
Washington.472 WOLA also maintained strong links with various academic institutions 
during this time. Throughout the 1980s, it had two academics sitting on its board, one 
from the American University and one from George Washington University.473 It also 
maintained regular contact with the Central American Historical Institute at 
Georgetown, particularly concerning Nicaragua and the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.474 
Moreover, as would perhaps be expected, WOLA regularly brought in academics to act 
as expert panellists and speakers at seminars and conferences; for example in 1988 it 
held a roundtable with John Booth, an academic at the University of North Texas, 
concerning the issue of national reconciliation in Nicaragua.475 
WOLA developed and maintained relationships with a wide variety of different 
US-based, non-state organisations and actors during this time. This network helped 
WOLA in its role as a disseminator of information as it could both exchange 
information with other US organisations and also use the networks of other 
organisations to disseminate its own research further. WOLA’s collaboration with other 
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organisations, particularly those with a greater global reach and greater global 
credibility increased their own credibility. These relationships meant that WOLA was 
able to not only run larger and longer-term projects by combining funding and 
administration with other organisations, but also increase awareness of its work outside 
of the Americas. Unlike Freedom House, WOLA very much saw itself as part of a 
wider community of non-state actors and embraced the opportunities collaboration 
could offer. Indeed, WOLA was close to the centre of Washington’s liberal human 
rights network; through its willingness to share information and co-ordinate 
collaboration between numerous organisations WOLA was able to perform its work 
effectively and maximise the impact of its projects.  
Since these were three of the key organisations involved in the inter-American 
democracy promotion project, it is important to understand how they interacted with 
each other. Throughout this period the NED maintained a strong working relationship 
with Freedom House. Prior to the NED’s founding, Freedom House had worked with 
the APF on the Democracy Program, with Raymond Gastil working on the Task Force 
on Democratic Electoral Processes and writing a number of memos on giving aid for 
constitution writing.476 Through this, he worked and developed relationships with a 
number of people who would later be on the NED board. Once the NED had been 
formally established Freedom House became a regular grantee, often involved in 
managing grants for Latin American press outlets and radio stations. In 1986, Freedom 
House took over the management of the Libro Libre project from the AIFLD which had 
decided that the labour movement was not the best supervisor for the programme.477 
Also at this time, Freedom House took on grant management for the journal 
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Pensamiento Centroamericano, which published original writings by Central American 
authors and political thinkers, to help it expand distribution within Central America.478 
In the late 1980s, Freedom House also took on NED grants for Chilean publishing 
house Editorial Andante, Paraguay’s Radio Nanduti and the Nicaraguan cultural 
magazine El Pez y la Serpiente.479 It would appear that the NED and Freedom House 
had a very close relationship in the 1980s, aside from Freedom House’s willingness to 
administer grants. Indeed, as has been discussed in an early chapter, the two 
organisations not only shared personnel in the form of John Richardson who resigned 
from Freedom House in 1984 to join the NED as the chair of the Board, but were also 
connected through personal relationships between some of their staff.480 The two 
organisations also appear to have had a more informal working relationship and asked 
each other for advice concerning projects. In 1984 the NED sent Freedom House a 
proposal they had received from the Caribbeana Council for a journalist training 
programme in Grenada requesting Freedom House’s thoughts and feedback on the 
proposal.481 Moreover, when Sussman asked a third party about what the NED’s 
Program Committee thought of its proposals, he was informed that the NED board held 
Freedom House in very high regard.482 Freedom House regularly wrote papers and 
letters in support of the NED in the late 1980s and, in 1989, stated that it must be 
careful not to accidentally interfere with the work of the NED and stated that the NED 
should be strengthened.483  
While the relationship between Freedom House and the NED was broadly 
supportive and amicable, towards the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, a few 
                                                 
478 LoC, NED, NED Annual Report 1986 (1986) JC421.N37a 
479 See NED Annual Reports 1987 and 1988 and LoC, NED Records, Series 2, Box 7, Folder 35, 
Summary of Programs for Nicaragua Funded by the Special Appropriation (1989). 
480 FH Records, Box 3, Folder 16, Minutes: Executive Committee (11th April 1984).  
481 FH Records, Box 51, Folder 2, Memorandum from Gershman to Sussman (27th August 1984). 
482 FH Records, Box 51, Folder 2, Memorandum from Sussman to Gershman (5th September 1984). 
483 FH Records, Box 63, Folder 9, US Foreign Policy and the Democracy Revolution: A Working Paper 
on Strategy for the Freedom House Board of Directors (19th September 1989). 
Mara Sankey 
 
182 
 
tensions emerged. In 1988, Gershman wrote to McColm to pass on the NED’s concerns 
about the role Freedom House appeared to be taking in the debate concerning Central 
America after its merger with PRODEMCA. The letter states that, although the NED 
had a “broad and cooperative” relationship with Freedom House, it was concerned by 
Freedom House’s decision to take on PRODEMCA’s work and take a more active part 
in the debate on US Central American policy.484 Moreover, in 1991, Freedom House 
found itself in the middle of some of the rivalry between the NED and USAID. At the 
time Freedom House was seeking to open an office in San Salvador using USAID 
money, but members of the board felt that some powerful Senators were strongly 
supportive of USAID and saw the NED as an interloper. The Freedom House board 
believed that its close relationship with the NED may have been hurting its cause with 
these senators.485 Although there is nothing to suggest this tension was long-lasting, it 
clearly caused Freedom House a great deal of concern in the short term. In January 
1991, Gershman was invited to speak to the Freedom House Board of Trustees 
concerning the difficulties the NED was having in Congress. He explained that 
congressional rivalries between supporters of USAID, USIA and the NED were causing 
problems for the NED’s attempts to create compromise between internationalism and 
isolationism in democracy promotion policy. In this speech he also stated that he 
believed Freedom House could continue to contribute greatly to the NED’s project.486  
Despite the mild tensions in the relationship towards the end of the period in question, 
overall, Freedom House and the NED had a strong institutional relationship. Freedom 
House was a regular and trusted grantee, often lent vocal support to the NED against its 
critics and members of the two boards had close personal relationships.  
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WOLA’s relationship with the NED was almost entirely one sided. While 
WOLA was a regular critic of the NED, the NED itself does not appear to have 
responded to WOLA at all during this period. In a 1988 policy document WOLA stated 
that it believed that the US government was seeking to find new ways to “promote 
democracy” in Latin America by expanding programmes such as the Administration of 
Justice (AoJ) and the NED.487 As a result of this WOLA undertook a project to monitor 
the progress of US democracy-promoting programmes, especially the NED and AoJ, 
report its findings to Congress and lobby to stop those programmes it saw as 
counterproductive.488 The end result of this project was particularly damning of the 
NED’s work in the 1989 election in Chile and the 1990 election in Nicaragua. In a 
report concerning Chile’s transition to democracy, WOLA stated that aid given by the 
NED for the 1989 election was more likely to be seen as partisan than the aid the NED 
gave for the plebiscite the previous year, since the electoral aid could be perceived as 
partisan, whereas the plebiscite was not a politically partisan event.489 While for the 
most part the NED and its affiliated organisations refused to engage with WOLA, Brian 
Atwood of the NDI did agree to be interviewed by WOLA concerning the NED’s 
activities as part of this project.490 By the 1990s, WOLA was sending regular 
memoranda to members of Congress raising questions about the NED, particularly its 
practices and its administration and distribution of electoral aid.491 In association with 
this project, WOLA proposed a conference discussing the electoral programmes of the 
NED and USAID to Chile, Nicaragua and Panama. In the lead-up to this conference 
WOLA wrote to the staff of the Foreign Aid Conference Committee questioning the 
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appropriateness of using the NED to support democracy in Nicaragua, suggesting 
instead that the aid should be limited to projects consistent with the Central American 
peace accords.492 During this conference in 1990 WOLA criticised the NED for tending 
to fund certain aspects of the political spectrum at the expense of others and accused the 
NRI and the AIFLD of seeking out organisations with similar political attitudes to 
themselves for grantees instead of trying to create truly pluralistic systems. 493 
Moreover, WOLA questioned the structure of the NED, stating that it was encumbered 
by too many associated institutions and would have been more successful if it had had a 
model similar to the Inter-American Foundation, which awarded development grants 
directly to Latin American organisations.494 WOLA was particularly critical of the 
NED’s work in Nicaragua, claiming that the NED’s prohibition on funding political 
campaigns was “more theoretical than real” since a great deal of the aid for the 1990 
election went directly to the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO).495 While the NED, NDI 
and NRI sent representatives to the 1990 conference, aside from this, there is no 
evidence that the NED engaged with WOLA at all.496  
Although WOLA and Freedom House do not appear to have communicated 
directly or engaged with each other Freedom House was openly critical of WOLA’s 
political leanings and clearly saw it as competition. In the 1980s, McColm referred to 
WOLA as an “adversarial organisation” in response to WOLA labelling Freedom House 
as “conservative”.497 Freedom House claimed that it needed to create its Center for 
Caribbean and Central American Studies because the majority of the active hemispheric 
organisations, like WOLA, were “outgrowths of the New Left” and, as a result, there 
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was no objective analysis on the region.498 In the same document, Freedom House 
claimed that WOLA was a supporter of the radical left, condemned military assistance 
for El Salvador and Honduras and supported the normalisation of relations with Cuba 
and Nicaragua.499 Despite these criticisms, not only did WOLA never respond to these 
accusations or criticise Freedom House directly, but it actually attempted to engage 
Freedom House in its work. In 1983, WOLA invited Freedom House to a conference it 
organised entitled “1982 Salvadoran Elections: A One Year Retrospective” to discuss 
human rights and the prospect of political solutions to El Salvador’s problems.500 
Freedom House refused to attend this conference and there is no evidence that after this 
WOLA attempted to engage Freedom House in its work again. However, Freedom 
House’s criticisms of WOLA and the frosty relationship between the two organisations 
did not prevent Freedom House from occasionally using WOLA’s reports. In 1991 
WOLA published a report concerning the Salvadoran election which was used by 
Freedom House in its own work.501 It is worth noting that Freedom House did not 
acknowledge WOLA’s work as valuable until after Bush’s election, by which time 
WOLA was no longer a political pariah in Washington. Apart from the letter inviting 
Freedom House to the 1983 conference, there is no evidence of direct contact between 
WOLA and Freedom House between 1980 and 1993.  
As can be seen, all three organisations interacted with other international non-
state actors although in very different ways. The NED’s involvement with other US 
organisations was enshrined in its founding by-laws, which required it to channel 
funding through US-based organisations instead of giving grants directly to the 
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beneficiaries, putting it automatically at one remove from its Latin American 
beneficiaries. Its relationship with its four core grantees was strangely symbiotic and for 
much of the period very ill-defined. Until 1993, all four core grantees had affiliates or 
members on the NED board, making the process of grantees proposing projects to the 
NED largely irrelevant as it was unlikely that board members would refuse to fund 
projects proposed by their own organisations. This arrangement, combined with the 
third-party funding system, meant that the NED lacked transparency and its operations 
were inscrutable to the general public and its peers. Although the NED’s relationships 
with US-based organisations was mandated by its by-laws, these financial relationships 
were not, in fact, strictly necessary; there is no discernible reason why the NED could 
not have operated like many other grant-making organisations and made grants directly 
to their beneficiaries. The NED’s middle-man structure put them at a remove from the 
activities of grant beneficiaries and, as a result, meant that it incurred less risk if Latin 
American organisations were found to be misusing money. As evidenced by the 
PRODEMCA scandal, this system did not protect the NED from scandals or 
investigations involving its US-based grantees. As evidenced by the fact that the other 
NED grantees tended to fit into the NED’s neo-conservative political ideology and fund 
projects which furthered this political agenda, the NED formed part of a broader neo-
conservative human rights network which was in part distinguished from its liberal 
equivalent by a lack of internal collaboration. This is not to say there was no contact 
between groups involved in the neo-conservative human rights network, merely that it 
relationships rarely involved collaborative pooling of resources and staff.  
Clear evidence of this non-collaborative network can be seen in Freedom 
House’s minimal collaboration with other US-based organisations. Although it clearly 
saw the utility in information exchange and collaboration with its colleagues, as 
evidenced by its work on the Peace and Democracy Watch project, it did not prioritise 
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working with its US peers and, when it did form relationships, they were largely one-
sided with Freedom House in the position of control. When Freedom House did 
collaborate it was again with those organisations which shared similar political 
ideologies or with which its staff had personal connections, such as PRODEMCA. The 
mergers Freedom House undertook during this time suggest that it was willing to assist 
other, politically affiliated organisations which were in trouble and that it saw itself as 
established enough by the 1980s to not suffer from taking on organisations undergoing 
scandals. As suggested by its clashes with Amnesty International and WOLA, at least 
until the 1990s, Freedom House was actively hostile towards those organisations it saw 
as being on the other side of the political divide. This highly politicised attitude towards 
international advocacy which led to hostility towards liberal human rights groups, but a 
willingness to defend and assist like-minded groups while simultaneously being leery of 
entering into direct collaboration with them, was distinct to the neo-conservative human 
rights movement.   
By contrast, WOLA operated in more a traditional collaborative network and 
viewed itself as very much part of a wider community of organisations working toward 
similar goals. It regularly collaborated and engaged with other liberal organisations. It is 
possible that WOLA, which was in an almost constant struggle for funding and 
legitimacy that the neo-conservative organisations did not face, had a greater need to 
collaborate with its peers in order to be able to achieve its working aims. Through its 
collaboration with larger organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
and Americas Watch, WOLA gained contacts and international credibility as well as the 
ability to work on larger and longer-term projects. Although it came under attack from 
some neo-conservative organisations, including Freedom House and the Heritage 
Foundation, for the most part, it positioned itself as a centre-point in a network of 
Mara Sankey 
 
188 
 
human rights organisations in Washington.502 Its collaboration with this network put it 
in an excellent position to achieve information dissemination and, given that WOLA 
spent much of the 1980s shut off from key governmental channels, helped in its 
lobbying work as well. A strongly collaborative network, which Keck and Sikkink 
deemed to be essential for the functionality of human rights organisations, gave WOLA 
the means and the credibility to operate effectively. It would appear that the new neo-
conservative groups found a way to operate without these collaborative relationships. 
Perhaps because they did not struggle for funding or resources during this period they 
did not require the two-way relationships that formed the foundation of the liberal 
human rights movement. More plausibly, the top-down structures of these organisations 
made them less inclined to work with other organisations to build movements, choosing 
instead to operate alone using other like-minded organisations for information where 
necessary.  
 
Latin American Actors 
The other essential part of advocacy networks, according to Keck and Sikkink, is a 
relationship with activists from target nations.503 It would be expected that all three 
organisations would have to work with or at least communicate with their Latin 
American counterparts in some capacity, whether to achieve their working aims or to 
lend credibility to their claims of interest in the region. Indeed, from the outside, some 
kind of relationship with local non-state actors would seem necessary for these 
organisations to have enough knowledge of the situation on the ground to provide 
funding or act as experts on the region; but, as will be shown, these organisations were 
not as transnational as they proclaimed to be. In order to illustrate that the country case 
                                                 
502 WOLA Records, Box 25, The Heritage Foundation “The Left’s Latin American Lobby” (11th October 
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503 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) p. 28. 
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studies are not anomalies, this section will give a brief overview of the relations these 
organisations had in various countries throughout the region, excluding Chile and 
Nicaragua which will be discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6.  
 Since the NED was required to channel funds through US-based organisations, 
its contacts in Latin America were minimal.  While the NED’s core and other grantees 
had working relationships with Latin American non-state actors, the NED itself limited 
its Latin American relationships to like-minded state and political organisations and 
some personal relationships between NED staff and individuals on the ground. Before 
the founding of the NED, as part of the Democracy Program, APF members held 
meetings and consultations with various Latin American political parties concerning the 
idea of the NED. In 1983 the APF held meetings with a number of El Salvador’s right-
wing and centre-right parties including Acción Democrática, Partido Autentico 
Institucional Salvadoreño and the Christian Democrats, all of which responded 
favourably to the concept of the NED.504 Later in the year, Allen Weinstein of the APF, 
held a consultation with the Organisation of Christian Democrats of the Americas which 
made a number of suggestions for the NED including the request that political party 
programmes should be run in conjunction with Latin American party foundations and 
those parties without foundations should be encouraged to form them.505 Although the 
APF only consulted political parties in Latin America during the Democracy Program, 
the fact that it held consultations with any local groups, suggests that it took an interest 
in establishing what Latin Americans felt they wanted or needed from an organisation 
such as the NED. That said, this desire to consult with local organisations does not 
appear to have carried over into the NED itself.  
                                                 
504 NED Records, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 26, Report on Meetings in El Salvador with Political Party 
Leaders, (4th May 1983). 
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 From the evidence and correspondence available, it seems that the NED had 
almost no contact with non-state organisations in Latin America at all. During this 
period, it received a number of letters from Latin American individuals and 
organisations, mostly thanking the NED for allowing them to participate in conferences 
or for grants.506 However, these letters display no evidence of long-term contact 
between the NED and any of these beneficiaries, nor does it appear that the NED 
responded to any of them. Indeed, the only Latin American individual with whom there 
is evidence of sustained communication is Violeta Chamorro, the leader of Nicaragua’s 
UNO coalition. Aside from this personal relationship between Gershman and the 
Chamorro family, it would appear that the NED had little to no direct involvement with 
those organisations which received its grants or any other groups on the ground in Latin 
America. Given this lack of direct contact with local organisations it is logical to 
assume that the NED had a minimal knowledge or understanding of the situation on the 
ground and that this might compromise its ability to make effective grants. Since the 
NED’s priority was US interests rather than those of local actors, its lack of knowledge 
of the situation on the ground was perhaps not as problematic as it first appears. That 
said, the lack of interaction with organisations on the ground in Latin America suggests 
that the NED was not the transnational organisation it claimed to be; rather it was a US 
organisation with interests in promoting certain ideals abroad.  
 By contrast, both Freedom House and WOLA had relationships with individuals 
and both state and non-state organisations within Latin America. As part of their remit, 
both organisations often brought individuals and representatives from various Latin 
American organisations to the United States to give seminars and provide testimony 
before Congress. For example, in 1980 Freedom House sponsored a luncheon with a 
former Cuban political prisoner, met with the President of the Paraguayan Lawyers’ 
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Association and delivered a number of speeches concerning the work of Freedom House 
to an audience of Latin America journalists in Costa Rica.507 During the 1980s, 
Freedom House maintained particularly extensive relationships and contacts in Central 
America, which formed the focus of much of its work, especially in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. It organised press conferences for members of the Unión Popular 
Democrática and worked with the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador as well as 
other religious and labour leaders from the country.508 In the early 1980s Freedom 
House had a good working relationship with José Napoleón Duarte, El Salvador’s 
president, who invited it to observe the 1982 elections describing Freedom House staff 
as “neutral personalities”.509   
 Although Freedom House did not have institutional relationships with most 
Latin American governments in the 1980s and 1990s, it did appeal to and communicate 
with a number of heads of state in the region concerning press freedom. In 1980, it 
cabled Alfredo Stroessner protesting the arrest of a Paraguayan journalist.510 During the 
1980s, Freedom House regularly sent cables to various Latin American governments 
concerning the arrest or demanding the release of journalists. In 1983 alone, Freedom 
House sent cables to General Hudson Austin requesting the guaranteed safety of 
Grenada’s journalists and to Pinochet and Stroessner demanding the release of journalist 
Juan Pablo Cardenas (Chile) and Alcibiades Gonzalez Delvalle (Paraguay).511 Freedom 
House also hosted groups of Latin American journalists at their offices for meetings and 
discussions concerning press freedom and Freedom House policy. In 1984, four 
journalists from Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Colombia visited Freedom House to 
discuss the issue of international communications and the work that Sussman had been 
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doing on the subject.512 Similarly, in 1986 a group of Central American journalists came 
to Freedom House to meet with Sussman and discuss Freedom House’s projects.513 This 
interest in press freedom was what gave Freedom House the majority of its relationships 
in Latin America and this remained the case into the 1990s. In 1992, Freedom House 
sent a letter to Alberto Fujimori protesting against the harassment of Peruvian 
journalists and demanding he restore full freedoms to Peruvian and foreign journalists 
within Peru.514 
 During the 1980s and 1990s Freedom House observed many of Latin America’s 
elections, particularly those of countries having their first democratic elections after 
authoritarian regimes. In 1985, Freedom House sent observer delegations to both 
Grenada and Nicaragua. In the process of observing the Grenada election McColm and 
Bayard Rustin met with the Trade Union Committee for Civic Understanding, a number 
of journalists, pollsters and members of the competing political parties.515 Some of 
Freedom House’s observer delegations were funded by Latin American organisations, 
such as McColm’s 1990 trip to observe the Guatemalan election which was paid for by 
the Fundación para el Desarrollo de Guatemala, a non-profit organisation which was 
founded by Guatemalan entrepreneurs seeking to reduce poverty and develop 
democracy in the country through a market economy.516 Through its observation work, 
Freedom House made connections with many, like-minded, Latin American political 
parties. During its observation of the 1982 El Salvador elections, Freedom House staff 
held meetings with party workers and leaders of El Salvador’s governing junta.517 In 
1984 Freedom House was visited by members of Uruguay’s Blanco Party and the 
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treasurer of Guatemala’s Partido Renovación Nacional.518 As might be expected given 
its political leanings, Freedom House also had strong relations with Christian Democrat 
parties throughout Latin America, including those of El Salvador, Panama and Chile.519 
Indeed, Freedom House sought out these parties as a matter of policy. In a proposal for 
a South American visitors’ program, Freedom House explicitly stated its desire to “seek 
centrists, Christian Democrats and moderate Social Democrats” to bring to the United 
States to help educate the US population.520  
 As can be seen, Freedom House did seek out and engage with Latin American 
groups and organisations. Unlike the NED, it seemed to see contact with Latin 
American state and non-state organisations as necessary to its work. It used its 
relationships with Latin American groups to gather information and improve its 
standing as a clearing house for information and analysis concerning the progress of 
democracy and human rights in Latin America. Since, during this time, Freedom House 
had a minimal staff presence on the ground in Latin America, the ability to gather and 
amalgamate reports and information compiled by organisations on the ground allowed it 
to retain its credibility as a reliable source of information for US citizens. Freedom 
House maintained close relations with like-minded Latin American press institutions 
which not only made its work on press freedom easier, but also meant that it was able to 
ensure some good publicity within the region. Moreover, Freedom House’s electoral 
observation work gave it access, however temporary, to a cross-section of Latin 
American society, including labour and religious groups, non-profits, human rights 
organisations and political parties. The relationships Freedom House maintained with 
political parties and powerful political families, made it easier for it to access the upper 
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echelons of Latin America’s political systems. Often those political parties with which 
Freedom House had favourable relations came out victorious after democratic 
transition, giving Freedom House a level of influence within some Latin American 
countries that it would not have otherwise had. The fact that many of these 
organisations were either in power or a key part of the local establishment meant that 
Freedom House missed out on the more grassroots view of events in the region. 
 Of the three non-state actors, WOLA had the most extensive, and the most 
reciprocal network of contacts within the region. While most of its relations were with 
other non-state groups, such as the Chilean human rights organisations, WOLA did 
develop relations with Latin American political parties, particularly left-wing parties 
which were, at this time, usually ignored or condemned by the US State Department. 
For example, WOLA hosted a number of politicians from Latin American countries 
including the leader of Colombia’s Unión Patriótica, a Peruvian senator and Edgar 
Camacho (Bolivia’s former Foreign Minister).521 Unlike Freedom House and the NED, 
which engaged almost exclusively with the region’s governments, the majority of 
WOLA’s Latin American contacts were non-state actors. Although WOLA brought 
political party members to the United States as speakers, most of its day-to-day work 
with Latin American groups was with non-party affiliated organisations and individuals, 
particularly other human rights organisations. WOLA worked consistently with the 
Peruvian National Coordinating Committee for Human Rights (a coalition of thirty 
Peruvian human rights organisations) and, in 1992, WOLA took a delegation to Peru’s 
Huallaga region where it met with Peruvian local government officials, police 
commanders and human rights groups.522 An undated document provides a list of some 
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of the contacts WOLA had maintained within Peru; the list is extensive and includes 
organisations as diverse as the Andean Commission of Jurists and the Comité de Paz y 
Esperanza as well as individual politicians such as the Mayor of Cusco and academic 
institutions.523  Unfortunately there are no similar lists for other countries within Latin 
America, but from WOLA’s archive it is clear that this list is a good representation of 
the variety of organisations WOLA engaged with across the region. 
 As can be seen, WOLA’s contacts within Latin America were extensive and 
mostly reciprocal, although direct collaboration was not as common as it was with US 
organisations.  The majority of WOLA’s contact with these groups and individuals 
appear to have consisted of information exchange. Members of Latin American human 
rights organisations, political parties and professional groups regularly visited WOLA 
and provided them with reports, testimony and consultations concerning the political 
and human rights situation in their respective countries. While it had a broad base of 
contact with local human rights groups from across the political and social spectrum, its 
political contacts were primarily with left-wing parties, including a number of 
organisations that the US government avoided contact with due to ideological clashes. 
WOLA’s most important contribution to the inter-American policy conversation in 
Washington was to open the debate to voices which would otherwise have not been 
heard under the Reagan and Bush administrations.  
 
Conclusions 
While all three of these organisations did operate within a more extended network of 
non-state actors, only WOLA fit the more typical model of human rights networks 
described by Keck and Sikkink. The NED’s relations with other US non-state actors 
were primarily grant-based relationships and, due to the structure of the NED and the 
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personal networks of its staff, the relationships between the NED and its grantees were 
not only often very one-sided, but also almost completely inscrutable. When it came to 
other US-based non-state actors the NED gave grants only to a small network of like-
minded organisations. This network not only included Freedom House, but also had 
significant overlap with Freedom House’s own US-based network. Although the NED 
does appear to have worked with its grantees on more equal terms than many grant-
making organisations, these relationships were not collaborative. The NED used its 
grantees as middle-men so that it would be able to be at a remove from the risks 
involved with engaging with beneficiary organisations directly. Indeed, aside from a 
few personal relationships, the NED completely avoided contact with the Latin 
American beneficiaries of its grants. This shows that the NED was less a transnational 
non-state actor and more an organisation with little interest in the needs or desires of 
local actors. It relied on the knowledge of organisations such as its core grantees and 
Freedom House for its understanding of the situation on the ground and, since these 
organisations were politically aligned with the NED, this meant that the information it 
received was largely just reinforcing its own beliefs anyway. 
 Freedom House’s relationship with other US-based organisations was similarly 
one-sided. There was minimal collaboration with other organisations with the only large 
collaborative effort Freedom House engaged with during this time being the Central 
America Peace and Democracy Watch. Since, mid-way through this enterprise, 
Freedom House took over PRODEMCA, the key force behind the project, and inherited 
almost complete control of Peace and Democracy watch by extension, even this was 
only truly collaborative for a short time. Aside from this, Freedom House’s main US 
relationships were with the CPJ and CFJ and both of these relationships were based 
primarily around Freedom House using them for information and contacts. Unlike the 
NED, Freedom House did have a significant network of contacts in both the US and 
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Latin America, so while it was unwilling to share its resources or collaborate with other 
organisations from either continent, as had been the norm for the traditional liberal 
human rights network, it does appear to have seen the creation of some information 
gathering network to be essential to its ability to operate projects. Indeed, since 
Freedom House stated one of its primary aims to be acting as a clearing house for 
information regarding the region, a strong network of contacts and information 
exchange within Latin America provided Freedom House’s information with a level of 
legitimacy. As can be seen, this new breed of human rights organisation brought with it 
a new type of human rights movement. Unlike its liberal counterpart, the neo-
conservative human rights movement was characterised by a lack of the collaboration 
and resources sharing. This new movement also lacked the reciprocal institutional 
relationships with local actors on the ground, opting instead, in the case of the NED, to 
keep itself at arms-length from Latin American actors and, in the case of Freedom 
House, to maintain a series of contacts in the region for the purposes of information 
gathering but with little of the back-and-forth relationship characteristic of the liberal 
human rights network.  
 WOLA formed a key part of Washington’s liberal foreign policy network.  It 
regularly undertook projects with other US-based organisations, collaborating often 
with larger, more resource-rich international organisations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, which allowed it to run larger and longer-term 
projects and gave it a level of international legitimacy within other Western nations that 
it might not have otherwise had. While it was often the smaller organisation in its 
relationships with its peers, these relationships were usually reciprocal with resources 
and information being shared both ways. In its relationships with Latin American 
organisations it was similarly forthcoming with assistance and information, passing 
information concerning events in Washington back to local actors as well as using them 
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to gather information about the situation in the region. Unlike Freedom House which 
tended to seek out like-minded actors in Latin America, WOLA’s contacts in Latin 
America represented a broader cross-section of Latin American politics and society. 
This not only provided it with a more accurate picture of the situation on the ground but 
also allowed it to give Washington’s foreign policy community access to those voices in 
the region which were shut out by the Reagan administration.   
 It is worth noting that both the NED and Freedom House worked fairly 
exclusively within their own political circles within both the United States and Latin 
America. Aside from its relationship with the NDI, which was often tense, the NED 
exclusively used like-minded organisations to administrate its grants. Similarly, those 
organisations within Latin America that received grants from NED grantees were 
almost entirely of the right or centre-right as were the individuals with whom NED staff 
had personal relationships. Freedom House too, tended to work with those organisations 
of the right within the United States. Its engagement with organisations to the left of the 
US political spectrum were often hostile until the 1990s when it worked briefly with 
Amnesty International. Within Latin America, particularly in Central America, Freedom 
House had very few contacts within the left. The exception to this was its relationship 
with some of Chile’s human rights organisations and, even here where the moderate left 
could have provided a very useful source and ally for Freedom House, its willingness to 
engage did not extend to political parties or the labour movement. Although the 
majority of WOLA’s US-based contacts were also part of the liberal human rights 
network, it did make an effort to engage with those organisations on the other side, 
including the NED and Freedom House, by inviting them to speak at WOLA events.   
 All-in-all, these organisations formed two distinct approaches to forming 
advocacy networks. The NED and Freedom House rarely engaged in any form of 
collaborative relationships. The NED had little choice about its involvement with its 
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four core grantees and, beyond that, it kept engagement with other non-state actors, 
either as grantees or as information contacts, to a minimum. While Freedom House did 
build a strong information network around itself, it shied away from resource sharing or 
full collaboration with its peers. WOLA came closest to fully involving itself in a 
broader non-state network, sharing resources and information and collaborating with 
those organisations which shared its values. It would be almost impossible to refer to 
the NED as a “transnational” organisation since its grant structure actively avoided 
direct contact with Latin American actors. Even personally, members of staff did not 
maintain significant relationships with actors on the ground in the region. While 
Freedom House was more transnational, with a network of contacts across the region, 
its relationships in Latin America were one-sided and almost entirely with actors and 
organisations which would reinforce the beliefs the organisation already had. Of the 
three, WOLA was the most traditionally transnational. It maintained an extensive 
network of contacts in the region and worked closely both with and on behalf of local 
actors. This vast transnational network meant that WOLA was, when given access to the 
US government, a very effective lobbying force. While Freedom House was also a very 
well used source of information during this time, its lack of willingness to collaborate 
with its peers compromised its ability to lobby and this flaw began to show more clearly 
during the Bush administration.  
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Chapter 5 – Chile: “The Lesser Evil” Democracy Promotion for the Greater 
Good?524 
 
Although it was never a top priority of US foreign policy in the twentieth century, 
during the late 1980s Chile became the focus of a series of campaigns within the United 
States calling for an end to its military government led by General Augusto Pinochet. 
The military junta had ruled Chile since 1973, when they ousted the democratically 
elected, left-wing government of Salvador Allende. In the years following the coup the 
Pinochet regime suspended the Constitution and waged a brutal war against domestic 
“subversives”. Although characterised by wide-spread human rights abuses, mass 
disappearances and the complete suppression of leftist political groups, Pinochet’s war 
against Chile’s left was seen by the United States as a necessary part of the fight against 
Latin American communism. Until the mid-1970s, the US government increased the 
military and economic aid budgets for Chile regularly and overlooked the abuses of the 
Pinochet government. After the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the ex-Defence 
Minister of Chile, by the Chilean secret police in September 1976, the United States 
formally cut military aid to Chile; but Henry Kissinger continued privately to provide 
the junta with assurances of support throughout the final months of the Ford 
administration525.  
  During the Carter administration, the United States ceased to provide public or 
private support for the Pinochet regime, and, instead, partially as a result of pressure 
from human rights groups such as WOLA, began to push the regime to improve its 
                                                 
524 A quotation from a member of the Christian Democratic Party about NED appropriation funding. 
Christian, Shirley, “Group is Channelling US Funds to Parties Opposing Pinochet” in the New York Times 
(Jan 15, 1988) p. A1. 
525 Sikkink, Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2004) pp. 118 – 119.  
Mara Sankey 
 
201 
 
human rights record.526 Between 1977 and 1981, the United States voted against or 
abstained on five multilateral development bank loans to Chile and continued the 
sanctions on military aid put in place by the Ford administration.527 Assurances of 
support from top-level US officials stopped and were replaced by public condemnation 
of human rights practices and pressure from the State Department concerning specific 
cases of detention and torture. In the aftermath of a 1977 UN resolution to condemn his 
government for human rights abuses, Pinochet promised a timetable for democratic 
transition for Chile to begin in 1980.528 In that year, the regime held and won a 
plebiscite on its draft constitution, guaranteeing the continuation of the Pinochet 
presidency until 1989.  
After his inauguration in 1981, the Reagan administration sought to improve 
relations with the Pinochet regime by easing the sanctions imposed by Carter. In the 
same year Congress passed an amendment requiring the administration to certify that 
the Pinochet government was improving its human rights record and assisting in 
bringing those involved in the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976 
to justice before any aid could be given.529 Although a plebiscite in 1980 had secured 
Pinochet’s position at least until the end of the decade, by the mid-1980s the Reagan 
administration had begun to worry that Pinochet’s unwillingness to engage with 
opposition movements would push Chile’s moderates towards more radical, left-wing 
solutions. The resultant policy towards the country sought to strike a careful balance 
between developing US relations with the opposition, while attempting to exclude and 
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discredit the more radical leftist parties, and pressuring the Pinochet regime to 
implement the democratic transition timetable set out in the 1980 Constitution. After 
1985, US policy towards the Pinochet regime became more hostile; between 1985 and 
1988 the US abstained on several World Bank loans to Chile, turned down visa 
applications for prominent Pinochet supporters and continued to demand that suspects 
in the Letelier case be extradited.  
In 1988, the Pinochet regime held a second plebiscite to decide whether 
Pinochet should retain the presidency for a further eight years. It mandated that, if he 
lost the vote, the military government would continue to hold office for one year, during 
which Presidential and parliamentary elections would be held for a new government to 
take power in 1990. In the months preceding the plebiscite, Washington channelled 
money to Chile’s democratic opposition and gave repeated warnings about junta 
interference in the election process. Despite Pinochet’s expectations, his government 
lost by around 840,000 votes and agreed to hold elections in 1990. The plebiscite 
garnered a great deal of interest in the international community and financial and 
technical aid poured into Chile from a number of European political parties and 
foundations as well as from a variety of US organisations. After the inauguration of 
Bush in 1989, interest in Latin America moved away from issues of democracy towards 
the promotion of free trade. Aside from a small spike in interest around Chile’s1989 
elections and the inclusion of Chile in Bush’s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, a 
programme of debt relief, investment incentive and the negotiation of a free trade area, 
the country’s internal affairs were no longer one of Washington’s main concerns in the 
region.  
As a result of the extensive human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime, Chile 
had been of primary interest to the liberal human rights movement throughout the 
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1970s. Surprisingly, there is little evidence to suggest that either WOLA or Freedom 
House commented on or lobbied in Washington about the 1980 constitution until 
several years after the plebiscite. After 1983, WOLA began to work more consistently 
in Chile and on Chilean issues, running a conference to mark the tenth anniversary of 
the coup and beginning a programme for the regularisation and systemisation of Chilean 
exile policy.530 Neither Freedom House nor the NED began to take a serious interest in 
Chile until the mid-1980s when they began to assess the prospects for transition and 
provide support to opposition parties. For all three organisations, interest in Chile 
peaked around the 1988 plebiscite and its immediate aftermath before falling off again 
in the early 1990s. This chapter will examine the networks these organisations had in 
Chile, the manner in which they applied their own principles to the situation on the 
ground and the role of each of these institutions in the 1988 plebiscite.  
Neither the NED nor Freedom House were particularly well connected in Chile. 
Indeed, since for the most part the interests of these organisations echoed those of the 
Reagan administration, in the early part of the 1980s neither organisation took a great 
deal of interest in Chile. The NED’s middle-man funding structure meant that, although 
it did provide a fair number of grants to the country during this period, it did not make 
many contacts within its grantee organisations on the ground. What contacts the NED 
had in Chile were mostly within the US Embassy. While Freedom House did have a 
larger network within Chile, it consisted mostly of political figures from the right and 
centre-right parties with almost no representation from the left or from civil society 
organisations. It is worth noting that, although Freedom House did send telegrams to 
Pinochet on occasion, none of these three organisations appears to have any contacts 
within the Pinochet regime itself.  
                                                 
530 WOLA Records, Box 9, Final Report on J Roderick MacArthur 1983 Grant to the Washington Office 
on Latin America (1984).  
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 During this period, the NED had almost no contact with organisations on the 
ground in Chile at all. Although it did fund the Central Democrática de Trabajadores 
(CDT), a trade union affiliated to the Christian Democratic Party, throughout the period, 
it did not have any recorded contact with anyone in the organisation. Indeed, the only 
direct contact the NED had on the ground in Chile aside from members of staff from its 
core grantees was with the US Embassy. In 1985, Gershman visited US embassies in 
Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil to brief the embassy staff on upcoming 
NED projects and to review the status of existing projects.531 Although this is the only 
recorded visit Gershman made to the country, it suggests that the NED did actively seek 
to maintain a good relationship with the Embassy in Chile. In his report on the visit, 
Gershman stated that the programme for his visit was organised by the Embassy in an 
attempt to foster greater cooperation between the NED and Embassy staff. He also 
stated that he hoped Embassy staff would begin to identify groups and projects the NED 
could fund.532 While Gershman’s report does suggest that he met with local 
organisations that had submitted proposals for funding to explain the NED’s aims to 
them, there is no mention of which local groups he met or the content of these meetings. 
What is made clear by some cables sent from the State Department to its embassies in 
Chile, Paraguay and Brazil is that the US embassy in Chile arranged all the meetings 
Gershman had during his visit to the country.533 The NED’s lack of contacts within 
Chile calls into question its ability to make informed decisions about which projects it 
should fund to assist in building democracy in the country. It is clear that the NED’s 
main point of contact within Chile was the US Embassy and, while the Embassy was no 
doubt very well informed about the situation on the ground in Chile, it approached this 
                                                 
531 NED Records, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 10, Memorandum from Gershman to the Board of Directors: 
Report on visit to Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, (22nd February 1985). 
532 Ibid. 
533 NED Records, Series 2, Box 7, Folder 33, Cables from State Department to Embassies in Chile, 
Paraguay and Brazil, (1985). 
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information from a very specific pro-US mind-set. By using the Embassy and its staff as 
its main (if not only) source of information, the NED could not have received a full, 
unbiased understanding of the situation on the ground. Although NED core grantees did 
maintain contact with organisations in Chile and, one assumes, based their decisions 
about project proposals on first-hand information, once proposals reaching the NED 
board they were examined and decided on by people who did not necessarily have a full 
understanding of the situation.  
 Although Freedom House did not have extensive contact with organisations in 
Chile, it engaged with local groups significantly more than the NED did during this 
period. During the Pinochet years, Freedom House did not have a great deal of contact 
with organisations on the ground. For the most part, its contact with Chilean 
organisations during the 1980s consisted of visits by representatives of some of Chile’s 
opposition parties. Between 1985 and 1989, Freedom House developed a relationship 
with the Chilean Christian Democratic Party, a contact which proved productive for it 
when the party’s leader, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, was elected President in 1989. 
Freedom House was visited by representatives of the party (and its associated youth 
movement) in both 1985 and 1986 to discuss the process of transition in the lead up to 
the 1988 plebiscite.534 Freedom House also brought Aylwin to Washington in 1988 and 
gave him a platform to discuss his views of Chilean politics with the Washington 
foreign policy community.535 When it came to Chile Freedom House engaged with a 
broader cross-section of the political spectrum than it did in Central America. For 
example, in the 1980s Freedom House had working relationships with the Chilean 
Commission on Human Rights. Freedom House translated and republished several of 
the Commission’s reports for circulation both in Washington and to the wider public, 
                                                 
534 FH Records, Box 127, Folder 9, Freedom Monitors (December 1985 and April 1986). 
535 FH Records, Box 61, Folder 12, Letter from Patricio Aylwin to Bruce McColm (18th May 1988). 
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including its own donors and members.536 It appeared to have also had a long-standing 
relationship with the head of the Commission, Jaime Castillo Velasco, appealing to 
Pinochet to allow Velasco’s return from exile in 1981 and publishing a number of the 
Commission’s statements concerning the exiling of several of its members.537 Indeed, 
during the 1980s Freedom House engaged quite a bit with the Chilean exile community, 
receiving much of its information concerning the detention of activists in the early 
1980s from Chile Democrático, an organisation of Chilean exiles living in Sweden.538 
Following the election of Aylwin in 1989, Freedom House largely ceased to be 
interested in Chile and what little contact it had with the country was with the Aylwin 
government. In 1992 the Aylwin government asked if Freedom House would translate 
its Human Rights Investigation Report into English and distribute it in the United 
States.539 While Freedom House readily agreed to do this, this was pretty much the only 
engagement the organisation had with Chile between 1990 and 1993.  
 While Freedom House did not have many contacts in Chile, its Chilean contacts 
represented a broader political spectrum than those in other countries in the region. 
During the 1980s, Freedom House developed a largely one-sided relationship with 
Chile’s Vicaría de la Solidaridad which mostly consisted of the Vicaría occasionally 
providing Freedom House with information. Freedom House also maintained a 
relationship with the Chilean Human Rights Commission, which, while more centrist 
than the Vicaría, was a largely apolitical organisation. Freedom House took up the cause 
of Jaime Castillo Velasco, the head of the Commission by writing to Pinochet in 1981 
to demand that he be allowed to return to Chile from exile.540 While the majority of the 
                                                 
536 FH Records, Box 127, Folder 4, Freedom Appeals No 13 (January/February 1982).  
537 FH Records, Box 7, Folder 10, Freedom House Urges Return of Expelled Human Rights 
Commissioner (12th August 1981). 
538 FH Records, Box 127, Folder 4, Freedom Appeals, No. 8 (January – February 1981). 
539 FH Records, Box 148, Freedom House Board of Trustees Meeting (16th January 1992). 
540 FH Records, Box 7, Folder 10, Freedom House Urges Return of Expelled Chilean Human Rights 
Commissioner (1981). 
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Freedom House’s relationships in Chile were with right and centre-right organisations, 
it would seem that here Freedom House was more willing to work across the political 
spectrum. This is reflective of the Reagan administration’s response to the situation in 
Chile in the late 1980s where alliances with the moderate centre left were seen as 
preferable to the continuation of the Pinochet regime. Although Freedom House’s 
relationships in Chile were spread across a broader political spectrum, this does not 
appear to have extended to Central America where it focused its attention almost 
entirely on right and centre-right organisations. This suggests that Freedom House’s 
commitment to the political ideology of its board was stronger than its commitment to 
providing the most accurate and complete information on the region. It is plausible to 
suggest Freedom House’s relationships in Chile were exceptional and brought about by 
the difficult relationship both the US government and Freedom House had with 
Pinochet and many of the pro-Pinochet right-wing organisations in the country.  
 Although Freedom House had significantly more contacts in Chile than the NED 
did, the rather paltry network it had during this period seems particularly sparse for an 
organisation which cited its primary aim as information dissemination. Although 
Freedom House was more inclined to work with organisations outside its political 
comfort zone in Chile, it was still receiving only minimal first-hand information 
concerning the situation on the ground. Aside from the more extensive programme of 
visits and networking which was put in place surrounding the plebiscite, Freedom 
House representatives do not appear to have regularly visited the country either. Given 
that even Freedom House’s briefings concerning the plebiscite were based primarily on 
the findings of a few short delegations, it is plausible to suggest that its interests were 
less in the accurate dissemination of information and more the reinforcing of Freedom 
House’s pre-existing beliefs concerning the state of democracy and human rights in the 
country.  
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 Given that it was founded in response to Chile’s military coup, it is not 
surprising that WOLA had an extensive and broad network of contacts on the ground in 
Chile. For the most part, WOLA’s contacts in Chile were civil society and human rights 
organisations. Throughout the period WOLA regularly met and exchanged information 
with various Chilean human rights, religious and professional groups. In 1983, it 
worked on a project with Chilean exiles during which it worked closely with the legal 
director of the Vicaría and the Chilean Commission on Human Rights.541 Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, WOLA had extensive contact with the Vicaría. It was regularly 
visited by Vicaría lawyers and disseminated Vicaría reports while also using them for 
its own analysis of the human rights situation in Chile.542 WOLA also worked with 
other Chilean human rights organisations, particularly the Chilean Commission on 
Human Rights which it often invited to send members and speakers to WOLA seminars 
and receptions.543 It is worth noting that WOLA’s relationships with both of these 
organisations continued into the 1990s and WOLA wrote to the Chile desk at the State 
Department suggesting that staff meet with these and other human rights organisations 
directly to hear their views.544 In addition to its engagement with human rights 
organisations, it also maintained contact with Chile’s labour movement and several 
professional organisations such as the Chilean Bar Association. In 1988, WOLA hosted 
a seminar on Chile’s labour movement with the president of the National Confederation 
of Federations and Unions of Seafarers, Longshoremen and Fishermen of Chile.545 
Similarly, members of the Chilean Bar Association often visited WOLA and were 
regularly speakers at WOLA’s conferences and seminars, most notably at a large 
                                                 
541 WOLA Records, Box 9, Final Report on J Roderick MacArthur 1983 Grant to the Washington Office 
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542 WOLA Records, Box 29, Washington Office on Latin America 1984 Annual Report (1984). 
543 WOLA Records, Box 303, Advert for a reception concerning the legal and electoral situation in Chile 
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544 WOLA Records, Box 65, Letter from Rachel Neild to Curtis Kamman, Chile Desk State Department 
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conference entitled “The Search for Justice in Chile” in 1987.546 In addition to human 
rights groups and the Bar Association, WOLA also had extensive contacts within the 
Church. These contacts included a large number of US missionaries in Chile as well as 
the Chilean Church’s other two key human rights centres in Temuco and Copiapó and 
the Servicio de Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ).547 Moreover, like Freedom House, WOLA too 
worked closely with the Chilean exile community particularly in the early 1980s. From 
1983 to 1984 WOLA ran a project with a group of Chilean exiles and lawyers seeking 
to regulate Chile’s exile policy.548 
 While the majority of WOLA’s contacts in Chile were civil society 
organisations, it did have some (albeit very few) connections within Chile’s political 
parties. In the course of the 1980s WOLA brought representatives from Chile’s Socialist 
and Radical Parties to Washington and organised seminars where these politicians could 
share their view of Chile’s transition with the Washington foreign policy community.549 
Moreover, when WOLA sent a delegation in 1986 to assess whether continued US 
support for development bank loans for Chile was consistent with US law, it arranged 
meetings with a number of representatives of the Pinochet regime including the finance 
minister and the Vice-President of Chile’s central bank.550 Although it had no 
relationship with the Pinochet regime and no further contact with any of the government 
representatives it encountered on this delegation, the fact that it was able to receive a 
response from the regime when Freedom House was unable to gives an indication of the 
extent of WOLA’s connections and reputation in the country. While WOLA did have a 
                                                 
546 WOLA Records, Box 4, Human Rights and Latin America: A Final Report to the Ford Foundation 
from the Washington Office on Latin America, (30th June 1988). 
547 WOLA Records, Box 66, Conditions for Chile’s Plebiscite on Pinochet: A report based on a joint 
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548 WOLA Records, Box 9, Final Report on J. Roderick MacArthur Grant to the Washington Office on 
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Delegation Report (1986). 
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very wide-reaching network of contacts within Chile, it must be said that it was 
primarily made up of organisations and individuals of the left and centre-left. There is, 
for example, little evidence to suggest that WOLA had much engagement with the 
Christian Democratic Party before or after its election to government. Although 
WOLA’s contacts in the country were primarily within grassroots and civil society 
organisations, it is clear that it had a detailed, albeit not necessarily first-hand, 
knowledge of Chile’s political parties. For example, in a handwritten note concerning 
the 1989 election, a member of WOLA’s staff analysed the country’s reactions to the 
candidates running stating that Hernán Büchi of the Unión Demócrata Independiente 
was thought “weird” and “suspicious” by many Chileans due to his “habit of yoghurt 
eating”.551  
 As can be seen, when it came to Chile, only WOLA could be said to have been a 
truly transnational organisation, incorporating into its work an extensive network of 
contacts and connections on the ground. Where the NED and Freedom House largely 
seem to have based their programming decisions and their views of the country’s needs 
on their own second-hand and strongly US-centric information and attitudes, WOLA 
tried to listen to the desires and needs of organisations on the ground and worked to 
ensure that these groups were heard within Washington either in person or through the 
medium of WOLA reports. Despite their lack of contacts on the ground Freedom House 
and the NED appear to have been significantly more successful in gaining support and 
putting their work to the Washington foreign policy community. Although WOLA 
made more headway with its work on Chile than it did with its work in Central America 
(see Chapter 6), this was largely due to the strong groups of supporters in Congress that 
it had built around its work in Chile since 1973. Moreover, WOLA’s work did not really 
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start to reach the Executive branch until after 1986 when the Reagan administration’s 
attitude towards the Pinochet regime had soured. Before that, its focus on Pinochet’s 
human rights abuses had been unpopular with an administration which saw Pinochet as 
a necessary evil in the fight against communism regardless of how accurate the 
information it presented. By the time of the plebiscite, the interests of all three 
organisations and the US government had largely aligned behind ensuring the vote was 
open and fair and, as a result, WOLA was rehabilitated in the eyes of the US Executive.  
 
Implementation of Principles 
Given the principles these organisations held (see Chapter 1) one would expect that the 
NED and Freedom House would prioritise democracy issues in their work on the 
ground while WOLA would focus more on liberal human rights issues; in the case of 
Chile this largely held true. That said, although the NED very rarely used any human 
rights rhetoric in its work in Chile, focusing instead on the development and promotion 
of pro-US democratic groups, Freedom House did engage with the issue of human 
rights in Chile to an extent, particularly in the earlier 1980s. Moreover, while WOLA’s 
main focus both before and after 1988 was human rights and justice issues, for the 
duration of the plebiscite campaign it too prioritised issues of political rights and 
democracy. From 1983, the NED ran a programme in Chile which was heavily focused 
on shifting the balance of power in the democratic opposition to those organisations 
which were pro-US. Before 1986 the majority of NED grants to Chile were made 
through the FTUI to Chile’s CDT.552 This was, initially at least, a relatively small trade 
union affiliated with the Christian Democratic Party. At first, it seems peculiar that the 
NED would fund this small union over the much larger and more powerful Comando 
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Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) which had been established in 1983 as part of the 
renewed call for democracy. However, the CDT’s strong anti-communist line made 
them a very favourable candidate for NED funding. The CDT had grown out of a small 
group of Christian Democrat union leaders which the AFL-CIO had been funding since 
1976.553 According to the NED annual report of 1984, the CDT (at the time called the 
Union Democrática de Trabajadores or UDT) was “severely curbed by government 
restrictions and threatened by communist-subsidised rivals”.554 In reality, the CNT 
received significantly more state harassment than the CDT, but since it willingly 
worked with organisations and individuals who identified as communist or socialist, it 
never received NED grants. When the CNT and other organisations merged into the 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) in 1989, the NED sought to gain influence in 
this new organisation through small grants and to mould it into a moderate, pro-US 
force within the democratic opposition.555   
In many ways, it would appear that the NED’s primary interest in Chile was to 
ensure that the Chilean opposition was both generally in favour of US goals and also 
politically and economically aligned with the US government of the time. Despite the 
NED’s repeated claims of political impartiality in funding, in Chile it consistently 
funded a small number of organisations which were, almost exclusively, centrist or right 
of centre. The funding of the CDT over the larger and more influential CNT is clear 
evidence of the favour given to those organisations which fell in line politically and of 
the manner in which the NED sought to reshape the opposition. Whilst the CDT 
remained very much a minority organisation between 1983 and 1989 and consistently 
lost members to the CNT throughout the period, funding from the NED helped it to 
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develop, to retain a broad infrastructure and to establish bases in the vast majority of 
urban centres throughout Chile, turning it into a force that had to be acknowledged. 
Moreover, during this period the NED also consistently provided funding to the 
Catholic University of Chile, the Christian Democratic Party’s Centro de Desarrollo 
Juvenil and a number of small conservative think tanks such as the Centro de Estudios 
del Desarrollo. In 1986, Gershman wrote a letter to Henry Kissinger discussing his ideas 
for programming in Chile. In the letter he stated that the NED should only support those 
democrats unwilling to enter into coalition with the Chilean Communist Party and that 
there could be no democracy in Chile without a “centrist coalition that [excluded] 
Communists”.556 This attitude informed most of the NED’s policy making in Chile. 
Until the formation of the Concertación de Partidos por el NO in 1988, the NED went 
so far as to be reluctant to work with any leftist organisations in the country. Once the 
coalition was formed the NED was forced to allow its leftist members to be included in 
some of the broader education projects it funded, but it continued to provide specific 
funding only to the Christian Democrats, their affiliated organisations and other 
conservative private organisations. While the NED clearly sought to shape the Chilean 
opposition into a movement with which the United States felt it could work, it did 
justify its programmes in terms of democracy. Many of the programmes it funded 
sought to help shape Chile’s democratic processes and educate the opposition in 
“democratic values” (as the NED defined them). In 1984 the NED funded a project with 
the US Overseas Cooperative Development Council to examine how cooperatives could 
advance Chile’s democratic process.557 Between 1986 and 1988, the NED funded 
conservative public policy institutes in collecting data about the political behaviour of 
Chileans, the Centro de Desarrollo Juvenil in running “democratic education 
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programmes” for youth and Freedom House to support Editorial Andante, an 
independent Chilean publishing house, to produce books promoting the spread of 
democratic values.558 As the plebiscite approached, the emphasis on democracy and 
democratic processes in NED programming grew. In 1986 the NED funded a 
symposium on the problems of democracy which examined democratic theory and case 
studies of democratic transitions. Alongside this it also funded seminars for the 
opposition parties on how best to strengthen democratic processes in the country.559 The 
NED also began to fund educational programmes around this time which focused on 
teaching the “principles of democracy”.560 In addition to a focus on democratic 
principles and processes, the NED also sought to promote concepts of liberal economics 
in Chile. In 1987 the NED funded a series of seminars promoting the importance of 
private enterprise along with a number of position papers concerning management-
labour relations.561 Unfortunately there is no indication of the detailed contents of these 
position papers, but it would seem that the NED did emphasise the importance of 
certain tenets of liberal economics in practice as well as in its Statement of Principles.  
With the end of the Cold War and the return of Chilean democracy this interest 
in the promotion of free market economics combined with an attempt to strengthen 
democratic infrastructure and legal education in Chile.562 Despite the fact that Chile 
was, after 1989, a functional democracy the NED continued to couch its programmes in 
the language of democracy. The NED’s programme for the 1989 Chilean election 
centred on providing a forum for political debate between parties about reform and 
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transition563. After the election, the NED capitalised on its grantees’ existing relations 
with the Christian Democrats and other centre-right organisations to support the new 
administration by assisting in local government reform and running training 
programmes for municipal leaders for the 1992 municipal elections.564 In 1989, the US 
embassy in Chile sent a cable to the State Department stating that their continuing 
policy goal was to “facilitate Chile’s transition to democracy” and that as part of this the 
NED was working with the embassy on “appropriate” future projects.565 Also in 1992 it 
funded a programme of political education for “Chile’s democratic labor [sic] 
movement” which sought to “consolidate the place of democratic labor [sic]”.566 During 
the 1990s the NED also funded a programme seeking to educate students and staff at the 
Catholic University of Chile in legal and civic issues.567 Moreover, in 1991 the NED 
funded an international conference in Santiago for representatives from free-market 
parties to discuss the “failure of communism and the future of democracy in Latin 
America”.568 The NED also continued to provide funding only to those groups which 
were favourable to the United States. In the post-Cold War world of the early 1990s, the 
NED remained an overwhelmingly anti-communist organisation operating very much 
with a Cold War belief in the primacy of US-style democracy and US values. 
Throughout this period it provided the NRI with funds to organise party-building 
programmes for the leaders of the “democratic centre and centre-right”.569 However, no 
comparable grant was given to the NDI or any other organisation and no programmes 
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involving moderate leftist or centre-left organisations were run. That said, once Chile 
had been transferred into the hands of the Christian Democrats and the country’s 
democratic procedures were deemed to be functional again, the NED’s interest in the 
country significantly decreased. By 1992, its programmes for Chile numbered only 3 
compared to fifteen listed in the NED’s annual report for 1988.570 
Unlike the NED, which took absolutely no interest in any of Chile’s human 
rights issues, until 1986 Freedom House did engage with liberal human rights issues 
such as press freedom and political arrests. Much of its involvement until 1985 involved 
publishing and circulating human rights reports and the Freedom Survey and engaging 
with Pinochet’s press restrictions. In 1981 Freedom House cabled Pinochet concerning 
the exile of Jaime Castillo Velasco, a member of the Chilean Human Rights 
Commission, and requesting the release of four human rights activists arrested by the 
regime.571 It also sent a message Chile’s Minister of the Interior in 1983 requesting 
information about the whereabouts of the trade unionist Jose Luis Baeza Cruces who 
had disappeared in 1974.572 Throughout the 1980s Freedom House took a great deal of 
interest in issues concerning press freedom across the world and Chile was no 
exception. During this period Freedom House wrote a number of cables to Pinochet 
concerning press freedom in Chile. These included requests for the lifting of the ban on 
Radio Cooperativa, the release of Juan Pablo Cardenas and a protest against Decree 320 
which stopped the media from conveying “facts about the private life of any person”.573 
Moreover, before 1986 Freedom House translated and reprinted a number of reports by 
Chilean human rights organisations. While the State Department looked down on the 
sources used in these reports, Abrams does appear to have believed that the reports 
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themselves had a strong influence on Congress and the press.574 Freedom House’s 
involvement with the Vicaría and the Chilean Human Rights Commission suggests that 
it took some interest in more traditional liberal human rights issues although this contact 
was minimal. In the early 1980s Freedom House re-published the Vicaría’s “Report on 
the Status of Human Rights in Chile” and it used information and analysis from Vicaría 
reports throughout the decade.575 Despite sending several cables to Pinochet protesting 
the lack of press freedom and the incarceration of political opponents, in 1982 Freedom 
House had claimed that the human rights situation in Chile had improved because there 
were no more disappearances.576 This engagement in human rights was combined with 
an interest in democratic transition in Chile. In 1981 Freedom House met with the 
Institute of Contemporary Studies in Chile to discuss how to prepare Chile’s youth for 
post-transition leadership roles.577  
By 1985 Freedom House’s interest in liberal human rights issues had faded as it 
began to engage with the transition process more deeply. In 1986 it published an 
advisory, which was circulated to Congress and the State Department, entitled On 
Supporting Democracy in Chile with Consistency. This advisory suggested that Chile 
was in dire need of democratisation to avoid the kind of violent polarisation 
characteristic of Central America. It urged the United States to support the National 
Accord on Transition to Full Democracy and channel its aid to the Chilean unions, 
professional organisations and church groups that signed the agreement.578 Although 
this did focus predominately on the need for democratisation in Chile it also mentioned 
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the threat posed to hemispheric and Chilean stability by human rights abuses in Chile.579 
Freedom House organised a conference in 1987 entitled Democratising the Hemisphere 
which focused on methods and how best to assist with democratisation in Chile and 
Paraguay.580 Aside from these large projects between 1985 and 1988 Freedom House 
expressed minimal interest in the situation in Chile. Although Sussman did visit Chile, 
Brazil and Paraguay on a trip in 1987, very little appears to have come from this visit 
except a suggestion that Freedom House should develop a version of its Education for 
Democracy programme for Latin America.581 Freedom House’s interest in Chile and in 
the consolidation of Chile’s democracy picked up after the plebiscite and continued into 
the 1990s. After 1988 Freedom House began to engage with Civitas, a voter 
participation group affiliated to the Chilean Catholic church, this relationship 
culminated in Freedom House taking a member of Civitas on a delegation to observe El 
Salvador’s municipal elections in 1991.582 In the same year Douglas Payne gave a 
statement to the Subcommittees on Western Hemisphere Affairs and Human Rights and 
International organisations stating that Chile had better prospects for consolidating its 
democracy due to its “historic appreciation for democratic principles”.583 Although 
Freedom House did not appear to have much interest in issues of human rights in Chile 
after the plebiscite, it did publish the Human Rights Investigation Report in English at 
the request of the Aylwin administration.584 Given the general lack of interest in liberal 
human rights issues at this time, this appears to have been more about keeping cordial 
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relations with the Aylwin administration than about the report being reflective of the 
interests of Freedom House itself.  
Until the plebiscite, the majority of WOLA’s work in Chile was concerned with 
human rights issues as it had been since 1973. In 1980, working with several other US 
based advocacy and religious organisations, WOLA compiled a briefing for the State 
Department on what it identified as the five key human rights abuses in Chile: religious 
persecution, prolonged detention without charge, torture, the plebiscite (as mentioned in 
Chile’s 1980 constitution) and the decree law which gave the regime the ability to exile 
internally.585 Indeed, WOLA’s human rights work in Chile largely focused on these five 
issues. Following this statement in 1983 WOLA began to formulate a programme to 
regulate Chilean exile policy.586 This project involved extensive consultation and 
meetings with Chilean human rights groups and Chilean exiles and the end result was 
given to a number of western (primarily European) governments which pressured the 
Pinochet government to accept the suggested reforms. In 1982 WOLA and a number of 
other human rights organisations including Amnesty and Americas Watch wrote to the 
State Department enquiring and raising concerns about the trials of members of 
Izquierda Cristiana, a leftist political party which had been banned with the coup in 
1973; the members arrested included two members of the Chilean Commission on 
Human Rights.587 As the 1980s progressed and the plebiscite approached WOLA 
continued to raise issues of human rights abuses in Chile. In 1986 WOLA contacted the 
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State Department requesting information concerning the alleged torture of twenty-two 
students in a ranch north of Temuco.588 In the same year WOLA organised a delegation 
to assess whether Chile’s human rights situation was good enough to merit the United 
States voting for it to receive multinational development bank loans. The delegation’s 
report concluded that the Pinochet regime was responsible for widespread human rights 
abuses including torture, civil liberty restrictions and threats against the families of 
detainees.589  
In the years following the plebiscite WOLA’s interest in human rights in Chile 
continued. It met with the Chile desk to discuss the human rights situation in the 
country under the Aylwin government and wrote to Aylwin’s Minister for Justice to 
request the release of political prisoners from the Pinochet era.590 Between 1990 and 
1991 WOLA also provided the Aylwin government with information about US 
policymaking processes, highlighting concerns about cooperation with human rights 
investigations.591 It also sought to bring human rights back to the forefront of the State 
Department’s Chile desk through its meetings with staff concerning the situation on the 
ground and suggesting local human rights groups the Department should contact.592 
Throughout the period, WOLA had worked with the Letelier-Moffitt Memorial Fund 
and a number of advocacy groups seeking justice for the murders of Orlando Letelier 
and Ronni Moffitt and, after easing the pressure for this issue during the plebiscite and 
election years, they continued to work on a resolution into the 1990s, while 
acknowledging that the Aylwin government was attempting to resolve the murders. 
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WOLA also voiced its concern for ensuring justice for Chile’s victims of torture, 
hosting a discussion in Washington entitled Torture in Chile: Judicial Investigation and 
Official Impunity with Judge René García Villegas.593 Furthermore, at this time, WOLA 
was particularly concerned with civil-military relations in the country. In 1990, WOLA 
sent several memos to the offices of members of Congress advising against the repeal of 
the Kennedy-Harkin Amendment stating that a repeal would undermine Aylwin’s 
attempts to re-establish civilian control over the military.594 These Congressional 
memoranda were hugely successful and the amendment to repeal the Kennedy-Harkin 
Amendment was withdrawn.595  
Although WOLA’s primary interest in its work in Chile was human rights, it did 
take an interest in the course of transition and the fairness of the democracy created by 
the transition process. In addition to the work it did concerning the plebiscite, in 1989, 
WOLA published a report and a series of briefing papers on democratic transition in 
Chile. The report outlined the various obstacles to complete transition, making specific 
mention of the inherently anti-democratic institutions enforced by the 1980 constitution 
and calling for the United States to support the Chilean democrats in their efforts to re-
establish and consolidate democracy.596 Even here, WOLA was still concerned about 
human rights issues stating that democracy required that the “truth about past human 
rights abuse be acknowledged” at the very least.597 The second paper in WOLA’s 1989 
series of briefings was primarily concerned with the upcoming election, focusing on the 
candidates, campaigns and regulations involved.598 WOLA was also concerned with the 
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role played by international interference in Chilean democracy, particularly that of the 
NED and USAID. In 1990 WOLA organised a conference examining and critiquing the 
place of US electoral assistance in Chile, Nicaragua and Panama. This conference and 
the related report, were the result of a series of investigations carried out by WOLA 
since 1988 involving interviews with NED and USAID personnel. The conference itself 
involved participants and delegates from a number of religious and secular NGOS, 
Congressional staff, NED and USAID personnel and NDI and NRI staff who all 
assessed the shortcomings of the NED and USAID and their electoral assistance 
programmes. Aside from some exceptions WOLA took to the basic structure of the 
NED, it found little fault with the idea of NED electoral assistance to Chile and even 
went so far as to praise it for its focus on those aspects of the No campaign which had 
proved vital to its success.599 However, it did state that this type of assistance was only 
acceptable in the case of the plebiscite and was far too interventionist for a multi-party 
election.600  
In Chile neither the NED nor Freedom House regularly used the rhetoric of 
human rights. Unlike in Central America the situation in Chile was such that, by 1985, 
the desire to see democracy restored and Pinochet removed in Chile no longer had much 
controversy attached to it in the United States and, since the source of the human rights 
abuses was primarily the Pinochet regime, there was no need for these organisations to 
nod to more traditional human rights issues in conjunction with calls for democracy. 
The NED took no interest in Chile’s human rights issues, making no effort even to 
engage with Chile’s human rights groups, which many observers saw as integral to the 
successful consolidation of democracy post-transition. Instead, its programmes were 
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designed around ensuring that the pro-US, centre-right organisations held the balance of 
power in the democratic opposition and, later in the 1980s, helping the opposition to 
electoral victory. While Freedom House did engage with issues of human rights in the 
early 1980s, its involvement was minimal, mostly concerned with press freedoms (a 
consistent priority for Freedom House globally) and combined with an interest in 
transition. As the decade progressed, Freedom House’s engagement with human rights 
issues in Chile waned and its focus turned entirely towards securing democratic 
transition in the country.  
WOLA too created its programme in Chile very much in line with its internal 
principles. Although founded in reaction to the removal of Chilean democracy, 
WOLA’s focus rapidly became trying to uphold international human rights law within 
Chile. This focus continued through the 1980s and, even throughout and after transition, 
WOLA put liberal human rights issues and reconciliation at the top of its agenda. 
Unlike Nicaragua which had a highly factionalised internal political situation and had 
divided opinions in the United States, the nature of the Pinochet dictatorship and Chile’s 
transition process meant that there was space in the Washington debate surrounding 
Chile for both the liberal human rights focused position and the neo-conservative, 
democracy focused position. While the NED and Freedom House’s work on Chile did, 
broadly, fall in line with the US government’s policy towards the country and, as a 
result, they both had more success in their work in Chile during this time, post-1985 
WOLA’s strong human rights stance does not appear to have hindered its work as much 
as it did in Nicaragua. Even before the Reagan administration’s attitude to the Pinochet 
regime changed, WOLA’s human rights stance concerning Chile was well established 
enough within Congress that it was still able to make some headway in its work on the 
country. 
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The 1988 Plebiscite 
Although a defining moment in the country’s move to democracy, the Chilean plebiscite 
was unique among Latin American political transitions. Despite being a referendum on 
the continuation of Pinochet’s government, the plebiscite was not a multi-party election 
and, as a result electoral aid was less contentious than it was in Nicaragua. The 
opposition consisted of parties from across the political spectrum along with civil 
society groups, unions and other professional organisations. The plebiscite received a 
great deal of international attention both media and political in the form of electoral aid 
and election monitoring by non-state and inter-governmental organisations. Indeed, the 
plebiscite garnered more international interest, particularly from the United States and 
Western European governments, than the actual election did the following year. All 
three of the organisations in question organised special programmes surrounding the 
plebiscite. For Freedom House and WOLA these primarily consisted of sending 
delegations to Chile to assess the situation on the ground, while Congress granted the 
NED a special appropriation to provide assistance to the No Campaign. For both the 
NED and Freedom House the plebiscite represented the peak of their involvement and 
interest in Chile.  
All in all, the NED spent around $1.6 million on its programme for the 
plebiscite, $1 million came from the special appropriation and the NED added around 
$600,000 from its normal budget. The special appropriation was part of a concentrated 
effort on the part of the US government to distance itself from the Pinochet regime. 
Unlike the NED’s regular annual budget, the special appropriation came from the 
budget of the USAID and was the first time Congress had sought to control how the 
NED spent their budget. Despite the non-partisan nature of the plebiscite, the 
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appropriation for electoral assistance caused a great deal of controversy in both the 
United States and Chile. Like most of the NED’s projects in Chile, the grant programme 
for the plebiscite was clearly designed to promote an outcome favourable to US 
interests in the country. The appropriation was required to go to organisations affiliated 
with the No campaign and most of the projects funded involved voter registration and 
education campaigns, technical assistance and activities to increase turnouts on the day. 
601 For example, the NED funded the Centro de Desarrollo Juvenil to provide ID card 
photos required for voter registration to low income households.602 It also assisted the 
independent newspaper La Epoca in purchasing printing equipment and supplies and 
provided technical assistance to the No Campaign in designing effective publicity.603 
The NED provided the NDI with funds to help opposition groups purchase radio spots 
and newspaper adverts and produce pamphlets, banners and publicity 
photos.604Moreover, the NED funded education projects and seminars discussing the 
process of democratic transition in Chile.605 These projects were designed to counteract 
the restrictions placed on the opposition by the Pinochet government and help 
opposition organisations to get their message out to a greater proportion of the Chilean 
population. For the most part, these projects made use of the same local organisations 
the NED had funded since the early 1980s, democratic education seminars were 
provided to CDT members in an attempt to strengthen their political power while 
Editorial Andante was given funding to produce “citizenship manuals” for the 
population.606 In addition to the funding that was given directly to those involved in the 
                                                 
601 National Endowment for Democracy, (Non-U.S. Classification), Memorandum for Record, Annotated 
Copy, January 27, 1988, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CL/02587/all.pdf> 
602 LoC, NED, Annual Report 1988, JC421.N37a (1988) p. 34. 
603 National Endowment for Democracy, (Non-U.S. Classification), Memorandum for Record, Annotated 
Copy, January 27, 1988, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CL/02587/all.pdf>. 
604 NED Records, Series 2, Box 1, Folder 2, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
Biannual Report, (19th January 1989). 
605 NED, Annual Report 1988, JC421.N37a (1988) p. 35. 
606 NED, Annual Report, JC421.N37a (1988) p. 33. 
Mara Sankey 
 
226 
 
No Campaign, the NED did fund a cross-party delegation of electoral observers who 
were in Chile on election day, but this was the only genuinely non-partisan project the 
NED funded in Chile in 1988. Predictably, the NED’s programme for the plebiscite 
brought it into direct conflict with the Pinochet regime.  
In June 1988, the pro-Pinochet Chilean newspaper El Mercurio published an 
editorial criticising the NED’s democracy promotion programme. This was followed 
about 10 days later by a letter to the House of Representatives from the Chilean 
Ambassador Felipe Errázuriz Hernán doing the same. The El Mercurio article accused 
the NED of interfering in Chilean domestic politics by funding the No Campaign, 
stating that the assistance was “not a neutral and impartial option to promote 
democracy”.607 Similarly, Hernán’s letter questioned why the NED was attempting to 
promote democratic values in Chile when the plebiscite process was designed to achieve 
democratic transition.608 Moreover, the fact that the majority of the funding for the 
plebiscite programme came from the special appropriation raised questions among 
regular recipients of NED funding about the independence of the NED as an 
organisation. The sudden involvement of Congress in NED programming, gave the 
impression of, if not a loss of independence, than at least a strengthening of the 
relationship between the NED and the US government. In Chile, this translated into 
reluctance on the part of beneficiaries to take money from the NED or its core 
grantees.609 For example, a member of the Christian Democratic Party suggested that 
the NED funding contained “moral dilemmas” but was, in the long run, the “lesser 
evil”.610As this quotation suggests the image of the NED as a US-government 
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influenced organisation did not stop organisations in the Chilean opposition from 
accepting NED funds but it did make it more difficult for the NED to find new 
democratic organisations willing to accept aid and may go some way to account for the 
reduction in programming from the plebiscite to the 1989 election.611 Although it raised 
very few questions in the United States, the one-sided nature of NED programming 
during the plebiscite sparked a debate in Chile concerning the US’s intentions towards 
Chilean democracy. The funding of the No Campaign not only opened up the NED to 
accusations of interference in domestic political processes, but also came very close to 
violating the NED’s own regulation regarding the funding of individuals running for 
office. Although the NED did not fund political parties during the plebiscite and it was 
not influencing a representative election, the fact that the NED so openly chose sides in 
the plebiscite let many to question its impartial credentials and set a precedent for the 
partisan funding which occurred during the Nicaraguan election the following year. 
 While it is impossible to say whether or not the NED funding had a meaningful 
effect on the outcome of the plebiscite, it can be said that its funding programme went 
some way to altering the structures of influence and power within the democratic 
opposition. Given Chilean public opinion leading up to the plebiscite, it is highly likely 
the regime would have lost regardless of NED involvement and it is likely the NED 
were aware of this. As a result, the programmes funded were primarily designed to help 
the NED’s grantees (and by extension the United States) to develop stronger 
relationships with the moderate centre and centre-right elements of Chile’s opposition 
while helping to tip the balance of the plebiscite in favour of the No Campaign. Within 
the opposition, the NED used its funding to keep the balance of power in the hands of 
the moderate Christian Democrats and away from the leftist parties. However, NED aid 
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proved to be something of a double-edged sword for the opposition movement as a 
whole. Although still at a campaigning disadvantage, through NED-funded voter 
registration campaigns, education programmes and the provision of technical assistance, 
the No Campaign was able to reach a wider cross-section of Chilean society and to 
campaign more effectively. Moreover, NED aid strengthened the infrastructure of many 
of the moderate opposition organisations and parties. Accepting aid from the NED also 
opened the opposition up to accusations and criticism from the Pinochet government 
and its supporters who painted them as dependent on foreign aid and co-opted by 
foreign governments.  
Freedom House’s programme concerning the plebiscite primarily consisted of 
providing information concerning the situation on the ground in Chile to the 
Washington foreign policy community. The only project Freedom House was involved 
with which attempted to influence the situation in Chile was administering the NED 
grant to work with Editorial Andante producing a series of pamphlets to assist citizens 
in understanding their political rights.612 These pamphlets included a breakdown of the 
histories and philosophies of the 19 parties involved in the plebiscite and a pamphlet 
called “Instructions to Poll Watchers”, which was used as a training manual by both the 
Sí and No Campaigns.613 Aside from this, before and during the plebiscite, Freedom 
House wrote a collection of briefing reports and organised a delegation of observers to 
monitor the vote. It compiled a briefing booklet for delegations observing the plebiscite 
entitled “What to Watch for and What to Ask: Plebiscite in Chile”, in which they 
suggested the biggest threats to the fairness of the plebiscite would be from intimidation 
both at polling stations and during campaigning.614 They also suggested that observers 
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check whether press coverage was equal for both sides and whether the voting 
procedures were made clear to voters in advance. The Freedom House also provided 
information concerning public opinion in Chile through its exchange programme. It 
published poll results carried out by the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Reality 
in Santiago which suggested that the majority of Chileans questions had a “centrist 
attitude” towards democracy in Chile.615 A major characteristic of Freedom House’s 
programme in Chile during the plebiscite was the promotion of the centrist elements of 
Chilean politics and the idea that only these groups could ensure democracy in Chile.   
 Although it wrote and released a number of briefing papers in the lead-up to the 
plebiscite, Freedom House only sent one delegation to Chile. This delegation, which 
observed the plebiscite itself, spent several days in Chile during which it attended a 
briefing by the Chilean Teachers’ Association as well as a conference of the families of 
11 desaparecidos.616 Like most of the delegations that observed the plebiscite, Freedom 
House found the vote to have no serious fraud and only a few isolated irregularities.617 
The briefing Freedom House put forward based on this delegation’s findings ahead of 
the plebiscite made a point of making it seem that the only viable option for Chile’s 
future was the centre. It made a direct link between the Communist Party and the 
Pinochet regime claiming that “both draw strength from mutual antagonism and 
violence”. Moreover, it claimed that “violent activities of the extreme left” marred 
peaceful protests in Chile and warned of the dangers of the “radical” influence of 
Clodomiro Almeyda, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, on the No 
Campaign.618 Alongside attempts to discredit the Chilean left came some reasonable 
                                                 
615 FH Records, Box 51, Folder 2, Grant Proposal for Exchange (1988). 
616 FH Records, Box 164, Leonard Sussman report on the Chile Elections (1988). 
617 FH Records, Box 61, Folder 16, Approaching the October 5 Plebiscite in Chile: A Freedom House 
Briefing (1988). 
618 FH Records, Box 61, Folder 16, Approaching the October 5 Plebiscite in Chile: A Freedom House 
Briefing (1988).  
Mara Sankey 
 
230 
 
concerns about Chile’s democratic prospects following the plebiscite. For example, 
Freedom House put forward the idea that the biggest obstacle to Chilean democracy was 
the 1980 Constitution which it said “[undermined] the concept of representative civilian 
rule” by allowing the military control of the political environment.619 The delegation’s 
report on the plebiscite also suggested that Chile needed to reform its campaigning 
regulations (which restricted the rights and liberties of the opposition) before the 
election the following year. 
Despite Freedom House’s lack of institutional contacts on the ground and the 
fact that its reports were based on one short trip to the country, it would seem that the 
Freedom House reports and delegation were seen as particularly important by the 
Santiago embassy. It features frequently in the embassy’s reports concerning the 
plebiscite and was invited to the embassy debriefing after the vote along with other 
organisations which had sent delegations including the NDI, the AFL-CIO and the Latin 
American Studies Association (WOLA was not invited to these debriefings). The 
reports of these organisations were heard by Ambassador Barnes and added to the final 
briefing sent to the State Department.620 Freedom House also participated in an NDI 
press conference in which Governor Bruce Babbitt stated his appreciation for the work 
Freedom House did during the plebiscite.621 Overall, it would appear that the Freedom 
House programme for the plebiscite in Chile was designed to serve two purposes. The 
first was to assess the fairness of the vote and the prospects for Chile’s future 
democracy and the second to discredit the Chilean left and reinforce the idea, already 
prevalent in Washington at the time, that the Chilean centre was the only hope for 
consolidated democracy in the country. It appears to have been successful in both of 
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these aims; despite its lack of a significant or broad network on the ground and limited 
local research it did for its briefings, these papers were taken on as one of the major 
sources of non-state information for the State Department. Moreover, given this level of 
influence and the fact that the ideas it was stating were shared by the US government at 
the time, Freedom House’s work on the plebiscite provided a clear justification for the 
continuation of US policy towards Chile.  
Like Freedom House, WOLA’s work concerning the plebiscite mostly consisted 
of briefing papers, delegations and seminars concerning the situation on the ground. In 
September 1988, WOLA and the CI-IR sent a delegation, which included several 
members of Congress, to Chile to analyse the conditions for the plebiscite. The 
delegation concluded that the No Campaign was at a significant disadvantage and that 
harassment of campaigners and voters was rife. Moreover, the report outlined details of 
the parties involved in the opposition, media access available to both sides and the level 
of military involvement in the Sí Campaign.622 The report also contained the results of 
public opinion polls suggesting that Chileans felt the involvement of the military in the 
plebiscite was inappropriate and that there was widespread scepticism about whether 
Pinochet would step down regardless of the result.623 In conjunction with the delegation 
report, WOLA organised a number of seminars and lunch discussions for Members of 
Congress and other Washington personnel. These seminars and discussions included 
individuals from Chile’s political opposition and human rights and legal communities as 
well as US-based commentators and experts such as Pamela Constable of the Boston 
Globe and Arturo Valenzuela, a Chilean-American academic.624 These seminars were in 
part designed to expose the Washington foreign policy community to Chilean voices 
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they were unlikely to have heard before because they were not popular with the Reagan 
administration. For example, Dr Germán Correa Díaz of the Chilean Socialist Party 
(later Aylwin’s Minister for Transport and Telecommunications) was invited to give a 
seminar entitled “Government and Opposition in Chile: A Transition to Democracy”. 
The Reagan administration was, for the most part, unwilling to engage with Chile’s 
Socialist Party, although it was a key organisation within the No Campaign, as a result, 
WOLA’s seminars were one of the few chances such organisations had to reach the 
Washington community. WOLA also organised seminars with the Vice-President of the 
Chilean Radical Party, union representatives and representatives from human rights 
organisations.625 These seminars discussed opposition strategies towards the plebiscite, 
the role of human rights and the position of the labour movement in the plebiscite and 
the opposition. Moreover, in the run up to the plebiscite WOLA engaged in a campaign 
of media outreach in which it briefed representatives from NPR, The Nation, the 
Washington Post and other newspapers in an attempt to provide a broader picture to the 
US public.626 
Aside from the delegation to assess the conditions for the plebiscite, most of 
WOLA’s work surrounding the plebiscite was concerned with opening the Washington 
conversation on Chile to include issues and organisations which were ignored by the 
Reagan administration. The delegation report included a discussion of the human rights 
abuses and intimidation that were ignored by Freedom House’s delegation. It pointed 
out that many teachers were pressured by local authorities and fired for not supporting 
the regime and that there were 1780 political arrests in the first six months of 1988.627 
While this report was circulated around Washington’s foreign policy community, it 
                                                 
625 Ibid. 
626 WOLA Records, Box 4, Human Rights and Latin America: A Final Report to the Ford Foundation 
from the Washington Office on Latin America, (30th June 1988). 
627 WOLA Records, Box 66, Conditions for Chile’s Plebiscite… (1988). 
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received very little attention outside of those circles usually associated with WOLA. 
Those members of Congress who usually supported WOLA or were involved in the 
delegation did cite the report in their congressional work; although the delegation had 
met with Ambassador Barnes for briefings while in Chile, neither the State Department 
nor the majority of Congress appears to have taken the report particularly seriously. 
WOLA had more success with its seminars. Although there are not many indicators of 
how many people attended specific seminars or seminar series, overall WOLA’s 
seminars tended to draw quite large audiences, many of them congressional staff.628  
 For the NED and Freedom House, alongside their interest in ensuring and 
promoting a No victory in the plebiscite, the priority for their plebiscite programmes 
was laying the groundwork for a victory for Chile’s political centre in the election the 
following year. While both organisations portrayed their work as attempting to analyse 
or ensure the fairness of the vote itself, this was in many ways a mask for the promotion 
of US interests in the country. The NED’s funding programme sought to ensure that the 
centrist organisations within the opposition retained the balance of power and had the 
resources to fight the election the following year. Similarly, through its reporting 
Freedom House sought to provide the evidence to reinforce the perceived position of 
Chile’s centre as the only force able to provide stable, long-term democracy to the 
country. While Freedom House’s work was mostly either welcomed or ignored within 
Chile, the fact that most NED funding came from the special appropriation caused some 
problems both for the NED as an institution and for the opposition organisations it 
funded. By contrast, WOLA’s programme for the plebiscite sought to open a space in 
Washington for a broader conversation concerning the plebiscite. Moreover, while it did 
comment on the fairness and freedom of the electoral process, its primary interest was 
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in highlighting political and human rights abuses associated with the plebiscite process. 
That said, while Freedom House’s work on the plebiscite was widely circulated and 
respected throughout the Washington foreign policy community, WOLA’s attempts to 
expand the debate had mixed results. Despite the fact that, at a basic level, all three of 
these organisations shared the main aims of the US government, a victory for the No 
Campaign and a vote that could not be questioned by the Pinochet regime, WOLA was 
still denied access to key policymaking circles in favour of Freedom House and other 
organisations which shared Reagan administration views.  
Chile makes an interesting case study both for the role these organisations 
played within inter-American policy and for what they represent within the broader 
history of human rights and democracy promotion. Unlike in Nicaragua where, 
throughout the period, the US government was actively seeking regime change, in the 
early part of the 1980s the Reagan administration was, if not actively friendly with then 
tacitly supportive of the Pinochet regime. As a result, the rhetoric of human rights was 
not only unhelpful to the Reagan administration but also counter-productive to its 
policy. Moreover, the fact that a programme for democratic transition had been laid 
down and voted for in the 1980 constitution meant that when Pinochet fell out of the 
administration’s favour, the United States was able to call for transition without 
appearing to have significantly reversed its policy towards the country. Both the NED 
and Freedom House broadly followed the trends of US policy towards Chile at the time. 
The NED’s programme for the country focused entirely on shaping the democratic 
opposition into the form most favourable to US interests. It made no use of the rhetoric 
of human rights, instead focusing on the rhetoric of building and (later in the period) 
consolidating democracy and providing democratic education in advance of the 
plebiscite and the election. Although Freedom House did engage with some human 
rights issues, republishing the Commission’s reports and lobbying for press freedom, 
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they were, for the most part, those issues which, in its view, had the potential to affect 
the country’s democratic prospects. However, behind this rhetoric of concern for the 
country’s democracy was an intent on the part of both organisations to further US 
interests in the country. The NED sought to ensure those centre and centre-right 
organisations the United States felt it could work with gained and held the balance of 
power within the opposition, while Freedom House worked to provide evidence 
supporting US positions through its reporting. After Chile’s return to democracy, both 
of these organisations largely lost interest in the country beyond some projects which 
sought to maintain cordial relations with the new government. By contrast, as it had 
been since the 1970s, WOLA’s primary interest in Chile was in human rights issues 
which brought them into direct conflict with the Reagan administration particularly in 
the early 1980s. While this interest in human rights continued through and beyond the 
plebiscite, WOLA’s plebiscite programme also sought to open Washington foreign 
policy circles to voices which had been largely ignored by the US government in this 
period.  
 Despite the convergence of basic interests between these three organisations and 
the US government surrounding the plebiscite, for much of the 1980s the NED and 
Freedom House enjoyed extensive influence in and assistance from the US executive 
concerning Chile, while WOLA was largely closed off from the executive branch. 
Although neither the NED nor Freedom House had the connections and networks on the 
ground that Keck and Sikkink claim is essential for the effective functioning of 
transnational advocacy, they were nevertheless respected and their work used by the 
Reagan administration. WOLA, on the other hand, was limited to working with the 
small network of supporters it had within Congress and relying on them to get its work 
out to a wider Washington audience. This suggests that, even in a country where the 
evidence for human rights abuses on the part of the government was overwhelming, the 
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neo-conservative interest in democracy overshadowed liberal human rights issues. 
Moreover, the work of the NED and Freedom House in Chile showcases the way in 
which this rhetoric of democracy promotion was used to justify the promotion of US 
interests abroad. Indeed, in the case of the NED, the rhetoric of democracy promotion 
was used to justify direct intervention in the political landscape of Chile. Even though 
the NED did not influence the 1989 Chilean election in the way it did in Nicaragua, the 
fact that it spent most of the 1980s shaping the Chilean political opposition into a pro-
US force without criticism gives an indication of the extent to which democracy 
promotion had been normalised in the 1980s.  
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Chapter 6 – Nicaragua: Democracy Promotion as a Form of Aggression? 
 
Nicaragua had long been of interest to US foreign policy-makers. Under the Somoza 
dynasty Nicaragua was one of the largest recipients of US military aid in Latin America 
and, by the 1960s, a multi-tiered relationship had developed between the US 
Department of Defence and the Somoza National Guard.629 During the 1970s, as the 
Sandinista movement grew in strength and began a campaign of anti-Somoza 
kidnappings, the Somoza regime engaged in a brutal clamp-down characterised by 
widespread human rights violations, extra-judicial killings, intimidation and censorship. 
This eventually led to the Carter administration withdrawing aid in 1977, followed 
closely by a revolution which ousted the Somoza family and replaced it with the 
Sandinista regime in 1979. Although the Carter administration originally sought to work 
with the Sandinistas, once Reagan took office all willingness to engage vanished. In 
1981 he terminated all economic assistance to the country before declaring a full trade 
embargo in 1985. Reagan’s first Secretary of State Alexander Haig developed a theory 
concerning Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in training and arming El 
Salvador’s guerrilla movements and, as a result, Nicaragua became a key part of the 
Reagan administration’s fight for ideological victory in Central America.630 This theory 
was the stated reason for the initial sanctions placed on Nicaragua and continued to be 
used as a justification for US aggression towards the country until the late 1980s.  
 The question of Nicaragua was hugely contentious within Washington and US 
policy towards the country under Reagan became embroiled in scandal. Until 1982, the 
White House largely led the way in Nicaraguan policy, and the result of which was the 
                                                 
629 Morley, Morris H., Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in US Policy Toward 
Nicaragua 1969 – 1981 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 37 – 38.  
630 Hager, Jr., Robert P. ‘Soviet Bloc Involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War: The US State 
Department’s 1981 “White Paper” Reconsidered,’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28, 4 (1995), 
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direct funding of the Contra forces in Honduras by the US government. From 1983 a 
series of amendments were passed in Congress, starting with one attached to the 1983 
Defense Appropriations Act, authored by Rep. Edward Boland (MA-D). This 
amendment sought to limit the Reagan administration’s ability to fund the Contra forces 
by prohibiting the federal government from providing military assistance for the 
purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.631 However, the administration 
continued funding Contra forces until 1987 using money raised through a secret 
agreement (which had presidential approval) to sell weaponry to Iran. When the details 
of this deal were published by a newspaper in 1986, the ensuing scandal (the Iran-
Contra scandal) resulted in the indictment of fourteen administration officials including 
the Secretary of Defense and Elliott Abrams (at the time Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs) who pleaded guilty to two counts of misleading Congress.632 
After 1987, with the Contra funding finally stopped, the policy of democracy promotion 
became the new method by which the Reagan administration sought to remove the 
Sandinistas from power.  
 There are differing opinions concerning US policy towards Nicaragua in the 
1980s. According to James Scott, the administration was divided on what to do 
concerning the country which led to an inconsistent policy consisting of three phases: 
1981-1982 saw a White House-led policy of Contra aid, 1982-1987 was characterised 
by an internal struggle between government branches to shape policy and 1987-1989 
saw the ascendance of congressional priorities.633 Whether or not efforts to force the 
Sandinistas out of office through the policy of democracy promotion could really be 
seen to represent “congressional priorities” is debatable, but it is clear that US policy 
                                                 
631 House of Representatives, 98th Congress, “Passed House Amendment Summary H.R. 2968” 
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/2968/summary/36> (1983). 
632 Rabe, The Killing Zone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 163. 
633 Scott, Deciding to Intervene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) pp. 156 – 157.  
Mara Sankey 
 
239 
 
towards the Sandinista government did become significantly less militaristic following 
the Iran-Contra scandal. By contrast, Laurence Whitehead suggests that, despite the 
continued aid to the Contra forces, the democratisation of Nicaragua had become an 
explicit policy tactic by 1984.634 It is certainly clear that the democratising of Nicaragua 
had, in rhetoric at least, became an important policy tactic by the mid-1980s. As an 
examination of the involvement of the NED and Freedom House in the country will 
suggest, this rhetoric, and the practical work of the NED, was part of the same greater 
push to reinforce US ideological hegemony in the region. As was the case with its 
policy towards the USSR, the Reagan administration regularly used the rhetoric of 
human rights as a means of discrediting the Sandinista government and justifying the 
push for democratisation. It is worth noting that the Sandinistas had held and won 
elections in 1984 which had been declared free and fair by many international 
observers, including WOLA. The Reagan administration had refused to recognise these 
elections, making it very clear that their priority was less democracy in Nicaragua, and 
more that the “right” side came out on top.  
 The importance placed on Nicaragua by the Reagan administration and its status 
in the 1980s as a functionally democratic country, makes it a rather interesting case for 
the study of democracy-promoting non-state actors.635 In theory, these organisations 
should have had very little to do in Nicaragua by 1984. Despite the ongoing Contra war, 
the 1984 election had been internationally monitored and declared free and, aside from 
the State of Emergency which had been declared in 1982 and curtailed some civil 
liberties (mostly press freedoms), the Sandinista government’s human rights record was 
not particularly poor. That said, although the Sandinistas were not serious human rights 
                                                 
634 Whitehead, Laurence, “The Imposition of Democracy” in Lowenthal, Abraham, Exporting 
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abusers, there were extensive human rights abuses being carried out by the Contras as 
part of the war at this time. While both Freedom House and the NED were heavily 
involved with Nicaraguan issues in the early 1980s, neither ever made mention of the 
Contra war or the abuses associated with it. By contrast, although WOLA’s interest in 
Nicaragua was fairly minimal before 1989 its primary concern was more US policy 
towards the country and the problems and abuses which resulted from it than the affairs 
of the Sandinista government. As will be shown, Nicaragua proved to be a test for the 
new human rights rhetoric espoused by the neo-conservative non-state actors. The 
combining of democratic values with human rights rhetoric could be expected to be less 
effective when faced with a country that was already internationally recognised as 
democratic; but, aided by their US-centric definitions and heavy emphasis on procedural 
democracy, both the NED and Freedom House were fairly successful in using this 
rhetoric even in Nicaragua. Despite the efforts of organisations like WOLA, which did 
acknowledge the country as democratic, the NED and Freedom House contributed 
significantly to the domestic US perception that Nicaragua was undemocratic.  
 As in Chile, neither the NED nor Freedom House had particularly extensive 
contacts on the ground in Nicaragua; that said, both organisations had a greater network 
of relationships in Nicaragua than they did in the Southern Cone. The NED’s 
connections in Nicaragua were as thin as they were in Chile. Unlike in Chile, some of 
the NED’s key personnel had personal connections in Nicaragua. Freedom House had a 
similar dearth of connections on the ground, relying heavily US journalists and 
observers for information. The connections these groups did have were primarily with 
the political opposition to the Sandinistas. This opened them up to criticism and 
accusations of bias both in and outside Nicaragua. Indeed, both organisations directly 
antagonised the Sandinista government and suffered harassment and denunciation as a 
result.  
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 Perhaps the most difficult of the NED’s relationship was Gershman’s personal 
relationship with the Chamorro family. The Chamorros had been a prominent family in 
Nicaraguan history since the 18th century. By the late 20th century, the family had 
extensive political power and after 1980 members of the family were in control of every 
independent national Nicaraguan newspaper.636 Since the early 1980s, Gershman had 
been in extensive contact with members of the Chamorro family, in particular Violeta 
Chamorro who became the head of the UNO.637 The UNO was the coalition of 
opposition parties which formed to contest the 1990 general election against the 
Sandinistas. Gershman had a close personal relationship with Violeta Chamorro and a 
number of other members of the Chamorro family regularly writing letters to Violeta 
Chamorro explaining the state and nature of the grants being given to Nicaraguan 
groups and giving updates on grant progress and administration.638 Gershman was 
openly supportive of Violeta Chamorro’s nomination for the UNO leadership and, as 
the election approached, he travelled to Nicaragua to meet her and two other members 
of the family to assess the situation.639 Although no NED funds went directly to Violeta 
Chamorro, or any of the Chamorro family, a sizable sum of money was given yearly to 
La Prensa which was firmly in the hands of the Chamorro family. As Violeta Chamorro 
assumed leadership of the UNO coalition, this relationship had the potential to take on a 
sinister appearance to outside observers. Regardless of the potential for criticism, this 
relationship between Gershman and the Chamorros constitutes the NED’s only 
significant connection to Nicaragua. While, as in Chile, the NED’s US grantees did 
have some connections on the ground (for example the CIPE had regular meetings with 
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the Nicaraguan business association), the NED never made use of these for information, 
relying instead on staff trips and State Department cables.640 When it came to knowing 
exactly what the situation was on the ground, the NED was therefore at a significant 
disadvantage; with low levels of information and a high dependence on opposition 
sources, the allocation of grants was likely to be distorted. 
 While the NED had a strong relationship with the main opposition leader in 
Nicaragua, it had a consistently antagonistic one with the Sandinista regime. This came 
to a head during the 1989 election, but the Sandinistas had long been attacking the NED 
as an instrument used by the CIA to destabilise the country.641 The Sandinistas claimed 
that the NED had been provoking acts of civil disobedience by the opposition in the 
hope of generating a repressive response that would justify a US invasion of the 
country.642 While there is no evidence the NED was doing this, the relationship it had 
with the upper echelons of the political opposition and the volume of money channelled 
to pro-opposition organisations made this claim believable. As the 1989 election 
approached, the NED undertook a vast pro-opposition funding campaign using a special 
appropriation from USAID, and the Sandinistas’ claim that the NED was part of the 
broader policy of US aggression towards the country seemed ever more plausible.643 In 
this respect, the evidence certainly suggests that the NED’s work in Nicaragua was a 
key part of the broader US policy to destabilise the democracy of the Sandinistas and 
replace it with a version that looked much more like their own. In light of this, the 
complete lack of contacts on the ground was perhaps less damaging to the organisation 
than it first appears. Since, as in Chile, its primary aim was not really to promote a 
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functioning democracy, in depth knowledge of the situation on the ground and what 
Nicaraguan citizens felt they required was less relevant. Provided the NED could assess 
which organisations were more likely to be favourable to the United States and its ideals 
extensive intelligence was, while potentially useful, not essential for it to achieve its 
aims.  
 Like the NED, Freedom House lacked a network of contacts on the ground in 
Nicaragua. While the NED could, as a grant-making organisation regardless of its aims, 
theoretically perform its work effectively without a strong local network, the 
information-disseminating Freedom House should have struggled without a good 
network of first-hand informants. Freedom House, lacking relationships with local 
individuals or organisations on the ground, relied instead primarily on its own 
delegations and the US embassy for information. In fact, also like the NED, the primary 
contact Freedom House had in Nicaragua was a personal relationship between Leonard 
Sussman and the Chamorro family. Sussman maintained regular contact with Violeta 
Chamorro, particularly towards the end of the 1980s when she often sent him updates 
on La Prensa.644 Freedom House had been involved with and had appealed on behalf of 
La Prensa on numerous occasions during the 1980s and, through this, Sussman had 
developed a personal relationship with Violeta Chamorro going so far as to write her a 
personal congratulations after the election saying “my warmest congratulations to you 
personally, and to your people for having acted so wisely”.645 Freedom House also 
worked closely with Maria Esther Chamorro, who it employed to act as the Panama 
distributor for publications by the NED-funded Libro Libre project. Freedom House 
also hosted a tour for Jaime Chamorro after the election during which he was taken to 
meet many US political leaders.646   
                                                 
644 FH Records, Box 156, Letter from Violeta Chamorro to Sussman, (14th November 1988). 
645 FH Records, Box 156, Letter from Sussman to Violeta Chamorro (8th March 1990). 
646 FH Records, Box 59, Folder 15, Freedom House Activities 1990 – 1991 (1991). 
Mara Sankey 
 
244 
 
Freedom House brought a number of visitors from Nicaragua to the United 
States to give testimony and speak in Freedom House sponsored seminars. For the most 
part, they came from the Nicaraguan opposition; during the 1980s Freedom House 
hosted five UNO leaders and organised a reception for Violeta Chamorro with the 
mayor of New York.647 The two exceptions to this programme of opposition leaders 
came in the form of a reception Freedom House organised for Senator Bill Bradley (D, 
NJ) to host the head of the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission and the occasional 
visit from the leader of MISURA (the organisation of the Miskito Indians).648  With this 
primary focus on opposition contacts, the information it was receiving from Nicaragua 
and channelling to the United States, as in the case of the NED, presented Freedom 
House with a one-sided view. Indeed, perhaps the only Freedom House contact that 
would have given a different perspective was Edén Pastora who was, perhaps, even 
more radically anti-Sandinista than the Reagan administration. A long-time opponent of 
Somoza, he had originally supported them. However, by 1982 Pastora had become 
disillusioned with the Sandinistas and had begun to work with the CIA as part of the 
Contra project. Despite working with the United States, Pastora was reviled by many in 
the Reagan administration for his unpredictability and his unwillingness to subordinate 
his forces to the main CIA-backed Contra force.649 After bringing him to the United 
States in 1983, Freedom House attempted to bring Pastora to the United States again in 
1987 and was prevented from doing so by a furious White House which demanded to 
know “who put them up to it”.650  
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 Although Freedom House lacked significant long term contacts in Nicaragua, it 
did conduct research in the country for its reports. It sent members of its staff on fact-
finding missions and sponsored missions and delegations to Nicaragua which included 
various experts and members of Congress. Between 1987 and 1991, Freedom House 
sponsored four delegations to Nicaragua, including an election-monitoring delegation, 
and sent Douglas Payne along with Morton Kondracke on a fact-finding mission for an 
article concerning the Central American peace process.651 With the exception of 
Antonio Ybarra Rojas, a member of the Freedom House election monitoring team, very 
few Latin American (or indeed non-US) delegates were included in these trips. 
Although this was not inherently negative, it did have the potential to bias further the 
information Freedom House received towards the US viewpoint. Perhaps the clearest 
evidence of this came when Freedom House sent a delegation in 1989 to analyse and 
“make a contribution to the debate” about Nicaraguan democracy and electoral law 
ahead of the election; this delegation consisted entirely of experts in US electoral law, 
five from the Democratic Party and three Republicans.652 Given that Nicaraguan 
democracy bore little resemblance to the US system, it seems peculiar to send a 
delegation composed solely of experts in US electoral law unless the aim was either to 
ensure Nicaragua’s democracy wouldn’t measure up or to try and persuade the 
Nicaraguan government to remake its electoral law in the US’ image.  
 Freedom House, like the NED, also had a difficult relationship with the 
Sandinista government. Many Freedom House reports and statements were disparaging 
of the Sandinistas and, in 1986, the organisation issued a statement in support of US 
military assistance to the Contras.653 Even after the Sandinista government had begun 
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actively participating in the Central American Peace Agreements, Freedom House 
questioned their commitment and accused them of only agreeing to peace measures 
because the economic situation in Nicaragua was so bad.654 In the same document, 
Freedom House stated that the “Sandinista deception of [sic] the 1984 elections” should 
“raise suspicion of current Sandinista intentions”.655 Although initially not invited, 
Douglas Payne had observed the 1984 election in Nicaragua and had concluded “if we 
mean by a free election one in which people freely express their political will, the 
Nicaraguan elections were not free”.656 Given the antagonistic way in which Freedom 
House portrayed and dealt with the Sandinista government the lack of response from the 
Sandinistas is notable; the most harassment Freedom House suffered at the hands of the 
Sandinistas was the expulsion of one of their election monitoring team for visa 
violations in 1989.657  
 As can be seen, neither of these organisations could be said to be particularly 
transnational when it came to their involvement with Nicaragua. While better connected 
than in Chile, neither the NED nor Freedom House maintained a strong network in 
Nicaragua. Those relationships that did exist were mostly personal relationships 
between staff and members of the Nicaraguan opposition. While for the NED, which 
sought throughout the 1980s to ensure the eventual removal of the Sandinista 
government, this lack of first-hand, unbiased information was not detrimental to its 
aims, for Freedom House, which portrayed itself as an impartial purveyor of 
information, this lack of first-hand contacts should have cast doubt on its ability to carry 
out this function. When it came to Nicaragua, Freedom House had little interest in 
presenting unbiased information, seeking instead to provide “impartial” support for US 
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government policies on the international stage. Even when members of the organisation 
and sponsored delegations were sent to the country to carry out research, the 
composition of delegations and the fact that they rarely made much contact with locals 
while they were there made it almost impossible for Freedom House to receive a clear 
and even-handed picture of the situation. Furthermore, given the complexity of the civil 
war that was going on in Nicaragua at the time, a full understanding of the situation 
would have been impossible without extensive contact with those directly involved.  
 In contrast to Freedom House and the NED, WOLA did maintain a network of 
connections to local actors. Although its Nicaragua network was much smaller than the 
one in Chile, it contained individuals and groups from across Nicaragua’s political 
spectrum. Also unlike the other organisations in question, WOLA’s network primarily 
consisted of other non-state actors, particularly human rights groups and academics. It 
maintained close relationships with a number of staff from the Central American 
Historical Institute, Mateo Guerrero (director of the Nicaraguan Association for Human 
Rights) and various campesino leaders and unionists.658 WOLA also hosted several 
Nicaraguan lawyers and academics and often sought out individual Nicaraguan citizens 
to give testimony before Congress or give seminars and meet with members of 
Congress and tell their stories; for example, WOLA brought Danilo Aguirre of El 
Nuevo Diario to discuss the way the Nicaraguan peace talks were represented in the 
media. 659 WOLA also brought a family who had been injured by Contra landmines to 
Congress, along with Richard Boren of Witness for Peace, who had been captured by 
the Contras and held for 10 days, to the United States to meet with journalists, members 
of Congress and State Department staff.660 Almost all of WOLA’s reports, while written 
                                                 
658 WOLA Records, Box 8, Meeting the Changing Challenges of Latin American Human Rights: A 
Report to the Scherman Foundation 1991 – 1992, (1992). 
659 WOLA Records, Box 14, Washington Office on Latin America Report to the Philadelphia Foundation 
Grant No. 44790 (1990) and WOLA Records, Box 303, List of seminars held by WOLA, (undated). 
660 Ibid. 
Mara Sankey 
 
248 
 
by staffers or US experts who had gone on fact-finding missions, were informed by 
first-hand testimony, often given under oath. This use of witness and personal testimony 
given by ordinary citizens, while obviously open to criticism, offered a more informed 
picture of the situation on the ground than that presented by Freedom House.  
 Unlike the NED or Freedom House, WOLA also had contacts within the 
Sandinista government and the UNO coalition. In 1986, WOLA hosted a forum in 
Washington for Nicaraguan political leaders. This included Sandinistas as well as 
members of the Independent Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, the Popular Social 
Christian Party and the Democratic Conservatives.661 WOLA also hosted Mariano 
Fiallos, the President of Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council, who spoke to members 
of Congress and State Department staff concerning the role of the Council in the 
election.662 Moreover, WOLA maintained regular contact with Victor Hugo Tinoco of 
the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and Carlos Tunnermann, the former Nicaraguan 
ambassador to the United States.663 As in its human rights reporting, many of WOLA’s 
briefings and political reports were based on first-hand information from Nicaraguan 
politicians. In 1989 WOLA sent a delegation to Nicaragua to meet with political actors 
from across the political spectrum to discuss the upcoming election.664 This research, 
based not merely on observation, but testimony and meetings with the actors involved 
allowed WOLA to present more detailed information to members of Congress and State 
Department staff. These strong connections gave WOLA’s work an authority and a 
legitimacy which Freedom House retained perhaps only as a result of its long-standing 
reputation.  
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 Neither the NED nor Freedom House appears to have suffered in terms of its 
reputation in the United States or the ability to deliver its programmes as a result of its 
lack of contacts on the ground. In fact, during the 1980s, Freedom House’s work 
concerning Nicaragua was used not only in the United States by the State Department 
and in Congress, but also by the international community, with the United Nations, for 
instance, reviewing its report on the abuse of Nicaragua’s Miskito Indians.665 Similarly, 
despite its lack of knowledge of Nicaraguan society, highly personal contact with the 
Nicaraguan opposition and its funding programme for the same, there was no significant 
challenge to the NED’s work in Nicaragua. Indeed, the only major international 
challenge came about after the 1989 special appropriation had been granted. By 
contrast, while WOLA maintained an extensive network and formed part of an intricate 
information network in Nicaragua, for much of the 1980s, its reports were either 
ignored or reached only those members of Congress who were already part of WOLA’s 
broader network of support in the United States. Even after Bush’s election, which 
loosened the restraints on WOLA’s access to the executive, its influence remained 
limited to altering the language of Congressional acts. The level of its influence is 
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that a petition it circulated within Congress in 1991 
demanding the release of suspended aid to Nicaragua’s newly elected government 
received only 60 signatures.666 The consistent success of the two neo-conservative 
organisations suggests that the conversation concerning Nicaragua, at least in the United 
States, was not concerned with an open and frank discussion of the situation on the 
ground. Instead the debate had been hijacked and, with the help of organisations like 
Freedom House, had become an extension of Reagan’s Cold War.  
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Implementation of Principles 
Having examined the networks (or lack thereof) these three organisations created and 
maintained within Nicaragua, it is important to understand how these organisations 
applied their own principles to their work in the country. One would expect that the 
NED and Freedom House would focus their attention on the issue of democracy within 
the country while WOLA would prioritise issues of human rights abuses; but as will be 
shown, this was not always the case. Aside from an APF document in 1982 and a 
mention in the NED’s 1985 annual report, the NED did not put Nicaraguan democracy 
front-and-centre until 1987. As the election approached, its rhetoric and priorities 
became more and more focused on issues of democracy; but before that the NED 
combined the rhetoric of “exposing” the human rights situation in Nicaragua with that 
of democracy promotion.667 In its 1985 report the NED claimed that it could help 
resolve “the absence of a democratic alternative to authoritarianism”, citing Nicaragua 
as an example of a country that needed this help.668 While democracy and democratic 
and civil rights were clearly present in the NED’s writing and thinking, they are not 
prominent in the rhetoric. Also in its 1985 annual report, the NED wrote that it was 
funding Nicaragua’s Confederación de Unificación Sindical (CUS), an anti-Sandinista 
trade union, because it had been experiencing “the suspension of such human rights as 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and the right to 
strike”.669 This statement was almost immediately followed by the claim that the CUS 
were critical to “organising the democratic force committed to peaceful change” in 
Nicaragua.670 These kinds of statements are not uncommon within NED reports, 
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particularly in the early 1980s. The organisations funded were almost always described 
as “democratic” but the language of rights was a key part of the conversation. In 1986 
the NED funded a programme called “Labor Watch” which reported on violations of 
trade union rights in a number of countries including Nicaragua.671 By 1987, the 
language had almost completely moved away from any discussion of rights and, in its 
1987 annual report the NED announced its aim in Nicaragua to be assistance for “those 
groups working for a stable and successful transition to democracy”.672  
 Between 1987 and 1991, the NED focused both its programmes and its rhetoric 
on the prospect of “democratic transition”. It organised a workshop in 1987 entitled 
“Democratic Alternatives for Nicaragua” and began to refer to Nicaragua’s opposition 
as the “democratic opposition”.673 This was perhaps the most telling shift in language. 
Prior to 1987 although the epithet “democratic” was often applied to grantees on the 
ground, they were never discussed in direct opposition to the Sandinista government. 
While the suggestion was always there that the NED did not perceive the Sandinistas as 
democratic, it did not openly indicate this until the language changed in 1987. The 
combination of rhetoric concerning democracy and human rights suggests that the NED 
was acutely aware of, and actively participating in, the shift from a universalist focus on 
human rights left over from the 1970s and the more pragmatic and politicised interest in 
democracy promotion which arose in the 1980s. This use of rhetoric also reflects the 
shift in US government rhetoric and policy. By the late 1980s, democracy promotion in 
Nicaragua had become a stated aim of US policy which had, publicly at least, moved 
away from the aggressive militaristic stance of the early 1980s and as the language of 
the state changed, so did that of the NED.  
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 When it came to adopting the rhetoric of the US government, it was Freedom 
House that really made use of the Reagan administration’s language. Like the NED, 
Freedom House combined the rhetoric of rights and democracy in their work on 
Nicaragua; but, unlike the NED it did so for the majority of the 1980s. In its response to 
El Salvador’s presidential elections in 1984, Freedom House referred to Nicaragua 
openly as “undemocratic”.674 This portrayal of the country as undemocratic continued 
throughout the 1980s; in 1987 Freedom House concluded, in a document concerning the 
Central American Peace Agreements that it should spotlight the democratisation process 
in Nicaragua and seek to frame this as the central issue of the agreement.675 As the 1989 
election drew nearer, the issue of democracy became ever more prevalent in Freedom 
House documents. Although there were still reference to rights issues, particularly press 
freedom, these were drowned out by discussion of the “democratic environment” (or 
lack thereof) in the country.676 Having declared the 1984 election undemocratic, 
Freedom House reports in the lead-up to the 1990 election were able to be particularly 
damning of the situation on the ground, regardless of whether or not any progress had 
actually been made. For example, the report from the delegation of legal experts stated 
that Nicaragua “[lacked] democratic infrastructure” (which it defines as “institutions 
and traditions which…assist in the neutral enforcement of election laws”) despite this 
being a highly questionable claim.677 The fact that Freedom House’s key piece of 
evidence for this lack of infrastructure was the fact that Nicaragua had not held a census 
since 1971 would suggest that what was really meant by this claim was that Nicaragua 
lacked democratic infrastructure the delegates recognised.  
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 Alongside this ongoing discussion about Nicaraguan democracy was some 
engagement with more traditional liberal human rights issues in the early 1980s. The 
fact that, in this discussion, Freedom House completely ignored all abuses perpetrated 
by the Contra forces, suggests that this engagement was less about interest in targeting 
abuse and more about discrediting the Sandinista regime. Through its relationship with 
the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission, particularly in the early 1980s, Freedom 
House took on a number of human rights issues in Nicaragua, most notably the abuses 
committed against the Miskito Indians. Between 1982 and 1984, Freedom House wrote 
a series of reports and lobbied the State Department, the UN and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights concerning the mistreatment of Miskito people which, it 
stated, included forced migration and murder.678 Moreover, in 1984 Freedom House 
reported on the alleged murder of thirteen dissidents in Nicaragua (although it must be 
said, nothing came of this report and it is unverified).679 Aside from these two cases, the 
majority of Freedom House’s concern for human rights focused on political and civil 
rights, especially press freedom. It took up the cause of La Prensa as early as 1981, 
sending a cable to the Sandinista government concerning its closure after the declaration 
of the state of emergency.680 This sort of activity continued throughout the 1980s. 
Various Freedom House staff members wrote letters to President Daniel Ortega 
demanding the “freeing” of the newspaper and condemning the harassment of its 
staff.681 It is worth noting that although, like the NED, in the early 1980s Freedom 
House appeared to take an interest in more traditional human rights issues (mistreatment 
of minorities and dissidents), by 1985 this interest had disappeared and democracy once 
again took priority. While in the case of the Miskitos, the improved relationship 
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between the Sandinistas and the Miskitos after the regime granted them autonomy in 
1987 may have been part of the reason for this, there is no obvious explanation for why 
Freedom House ceased to be interested in political incarceration. Again, Freedom 
House’s rhetoric and focus on human rights would appear to have been one essentially 
of convenience. The lack of interest in the abuses of the Contras and the fact that after 
1985 liberal human rights issues are almost never discussed would suggest that 
Freedom House’s interest was less in seeing the upholding of international human rights 
law and more a desire to discredit the Sandinistas. Freedom House used the 1970s 
language of human rights in conjunction with the new focus on democracy in order to 
phase this original language out gradually and change the debate concerning Central 
America. 
  Where the rhetoric of Freedom House differed most significantly from the NED 
was in its open and strong adherence to the beliefs and language of the early Reagan 
State Department. It regularly emphasised the “internationalism” of the situation in 
Nicaragua and attributed the problems in El Salvador directly to the Sandinista 
government. In its proposal for the creation of the Centre for Caribbean and Central 
American Studies it stated that the “internationalisation” of Nicaragua’s regional 
conflict had been driven by “armed radical movements… through aid given by the 
Eastern Bloc, Cuba and radical Third World countries”.682 In a 1984 document on El 
Salvador, Freedom House stated that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Naciona (FMLN) was a “guerrilla army of trained soldiers and civilian support teams 
supplied and assisted by Cuba and Nicaragua”.683 Elsewhere, Sussman talked about the 
urgent need for a public campaign to support El Salvador in resisting “terrorism from 
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Cuba and Nicaragua”.684 In 1988 Freedom House went so far as to state that US aid to 
the Contras was not in violation of the spirit of the Arias Peace Plan because “resistance 
forces [were] outside of Nicaragua, and [were] not equipped for fighting”.685 Perhaps 
the most explicit statement of Freedom House’s real priority in Nicaragua came in a 
summary of its hemispheric programme in 1988. In this document, Freedom House 
stated that Cuba and Nicaragua played an “integrated role in the Latin American 
community in developing policy initiatives that are against US interests”.686 It also 
accused the Sandinista government of trying to “wait out” the Reagan administration so 
that they would “face the prospect of a weaker United States”.687 In Nicaragua at least, 
Freedom House went beyond even the NED in tying human rights not only to issues of 
democracy but also directly to US security interests. 
 Nicaragua provides perhaps the clearest example of the neo-conservative 
alternative to traditional human rights rhetoric. At the beginning of the decade, when the 
rhetoric of universalist human rights was still quite powerful, particularly among the 
international community, both Freedom House and the NED made use of it in order to 
portray the Sandinista government as authoritarian or, at the very least, repressive. Both 
organisations always combined these human rights issues with an emphasis on 
democracy and democratic rights. The NED particularly focused its human rights 
interest on civil liberties and both organisations took on the mantle of defender of the 
US-friendly La Prensa. As the decade wore on, the references to human rights (with the 
exception of La Prensa) became fewer and were replaced with a greater focus on issues 
of democracy. This shift in the rhetoric of these organisations away from universalist 
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human rights towards democracy (and, by extension, pro-US ideology) both provoked 
and represented a shift in the broader language of human rights within the United States. 
While the NED, perhaps due to its legally closer relationship with the US government, 
never went so far as to state its aims to be the furthering of the cause of US security 
interests in the region, Freedom House was very open about tying these issues to the 
preservation of US interests in Central America.  
 As has been mentioned, WOLA had very little involvement in Nicaragua before 
the late 1980s. What interest it took was primarily concerned with human rights abuses 
and violations of the rules of war during the Contra War. WOLA published two reports, 
one in 1985 written by a US lawyer using sworn testimony from locals and missionaries 
concerning the contraventions of the rules of war, and one in 1986 concerning the 
human costs of the war.688 In 1983, WOLA worked on a number of extensive human 
rights reports seeking to “sort through the claims and counterclaims about the 
Sandinista government”.689 While the majority of its human rights work in Nicaragua 
was concerned with abuses committed by the Contras, it did include the Sandinista 
government in its discussion of violations of the rules of war. It did also engage with the 
Sandinistas on the issue of the government’s treatment of indigenous communities.690 
WOLA’s only substantial work concerning democracy in the country in the early 1980s 
came during the 1984 election. WOLA sent two delegations to Nicaragua in 1984, one 
in collaboration with the IHRLG to observe the election itself and one prior to the 
election to “assess the quality of the democratic experience”.691 Given that WOLA 
found the election in 1984 to be free, fair and democratic, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
they took little interest in the broader issues of democracy in the early and mid-1980s. 
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As the 1990 election drew closer, WOLA returned to the question of democracy, albeit 
in a less prescriptive form than the other organisations. In 1989 WOLA collaborated 
with three other non-state actors to compile an information booklet entitled Nicaragua’s 
Elections: A Step Towards Democracy? and provided extensive analysis of the political 
environment in Nicaragua before and during the election.692 In 1990, WOLA sought to 
promote the institutionalisation of political pluralism in Nicaragua and ensure the “free 
practice of civil rights”.693 After the election, WOLA continued to be concerned with 
both human rights issues and the democratic situation in Nicaragua, but it also added an 
economic dimension to its interest in the country. It pressured the US government to 
work with actors from across the political spectrum to address problems of human and 
property rights.694 In addition, it pushed the US government to continue its economic 
aid package to Nicaragua, claiming that cutting it would “endanger the significant 
advances in… the institution of democracy in the country”.695 Indeed, WOLA became 
focused on the role of the United States in Nicaragua during this time; in 1991 it 
published a report analysing the post-election dynamic in the country and the US role in 
supporting reconciliation and reconstruction.696  
 Although WOLA’s language and focus in Nicaragua did shift, it did not follow 
the same trajectory as that of Freedom House or the NED. At first, WOLA continued 
along much the same path that it had taken in the 1970s, with a strong rhetorical and 
practical commitment to traditional human rights, using first-hand testimony to produce 
human rights reports for international and US consumption in the manner of the human 
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rights advocacy networks described by Keck and Sikkink.697 As it became clear that this 
approach was not producing the results it had during the 1970s, WOLA did begin to 
mix democracy and civil rights into its ongoing human rights interests. This came to a 
head during the 1990 election when WOLA spoke almost exclusively of the democratic 
situation in Nicaragua. Once the election had passed WOLA did appear to lose interest 
in issues of democracy again, but it did not return to its pre-1990 discussion of human 
rights either. Instead, it switched its focus to the role the United States played in the 
country’s domestic situation and to problems of economic development and civil rights 
under the UNO government. This suggests that WOLA was aware that its more 
traditional language and approach was ceasing to be effective and, as a result, changed 
to one that, while not reflecting the heavily politicised stance of the NED and Freedom 
House, was more in line with the language and international interests of the time.  
 Nicaragua provides a clear picture of exactly how the relationship between 
democracy and human rights shifted between 1980 and 1993 and also illustrates the 
tensions between the two within the organisations in question. Unlike in Chile, where 
neither the NED nor Freedom House expressed particular interest in more traditional 
liberal human rights issues, in Nicaragua they saw the utility of using human rights as a 
means to discredit the Sandinistas. In the early part of the 1980s they regularly 
discussed questions of procedural democracy and Sandinista human rights abuses, 
although neither organisation acknowledged nor reported the human rights abuses of the 
Contras. This suggests that their primary interest was not in extending the universalist 
human rights of the 1970s, but rather in promoting a politicised conception of human 
rights to attack those on the other side of the Cold War. As the decade progressed, the 
language of human rights favoured by the US establishment concerning Nicaragua 
shifted from the liberal human rights of the 1970s to the politically driven language of 
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the late 1980s, with its strong focus on democracy being the precursor to human rights. 
The prevalence of this new dialogue is shown in the fact that even WOLA was forced to 
alter its language in order to maintain salience. Although it did not completely buy into 
the neo-conservative interpretation of human rights, the focus on socio-economic issues 
after the end of the Cold War suggests that not only had its traditional human rights 
advocacy lost its effectiveness but also that the whole topic of human rights within the 
country was of declining interest in Washington. Defending the socio-economic rights 
of the Nicaraguan population was, it would seem, one of the few ways WOLA felt it 
could still be an effective advocate for rights in Nicaragua.  
 
The 1990 Election 
The 1990 election in Nicaragua provides a vivid snapshot of the work of these three 
organisations in Nicaragua. Like the 1988 plebiscite in Chile, the election garnered a 
great deal of international attention both from governments and non-state actors. As 
they had done in 1984, the Sandinistas invited many non-state actors and 
intergovernmental organisations (including the OAS) to observe the election on the day. 
A number of non-state actors sent delegations and fact-finding missions to the country 
earlier in the year as well. As had been the case in Chile, the NED was granted a special 
USAID appropriation by Congress to support the democratic opposition in Nicaragua; 
Freedom House and WOLA both ran special programmes and published a number of 
briefings and reports on the election and the political situation in the country. Given the 
nature of the work in which these organisations were engaged, it is very difficult to 
assess the success (or lack thereof) of their programmes. As a result, this investigation 
will not try to assess the success these organisations had with their projects. Instead it 
will focus primarily on assessing exactly what these organisations sought to achieve.  
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 In a reflection of the US government’s priorities in the region, the special 
appropriation granted to the NED for Nicaragua was significantly larger than that given 
for Chile. After some debate within Congress, the appropriation was eventually set at $5 
million to aid the Nicaraguan opposition. The size of this appropriation in comparison 
to that granted for Chile ($1 million) very much reflects the priorities of US foreign 
policy in the region. Unlike the appropriation for Chile, which was mostly met either 
with enthusiasm or indifference in Congress and among other non-state actors, the 
Nicaragua appropriation proved very controversial in Washington. Unlike previous 
appropriations the request for the 1990 appropriation was put to Congress by the Bush 
administration and there was extensive debate in both the House and the Senate. 
Statements in opposition ranged from procedural objections to ideological opposition to 
the policy of continued intervention in the country.698 By 1990, following years of civil 
war and US economic sanctions, the domestic situation in Nicaragua was becoming 
desperate and it was this fact that formed the backbone of the opposition argument 
within Congress. Many members of Congress believed that US government had no duty 
to provide the Nicaraguan opposition with further assistance since its economic and 
military assault had already destabilised the country enough to ensure an opposition 
electoral victory.699 Even the NED had concerns about the appropriation, Gershman 
wrote a memo to the Board of Directors stating his fear that these appropriations were 
undermining the NED’s independence.700 The appropriation also brought criticism from 
other non-state actors, including WOLA which ran a conference analysing USAID and 
NED electoral assistance programmes. 
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 Despite the criticism, the appropriation went ahead and the NED sent $8.5 
million to Nicaragua to support the opposition.701 The fact that the NED added $3.5 
million of its standard budget to this project compared to the $600,000 it added to the 
Chile appropriation suggests that, like the US government, it too prioritised the 
problems in Central America over those of the Southern Cone. The majority of this 
money went directly to the opposition with some going to opposition affiliated and 
other pro-US organisations. Between 1989 and 1990 the NED funded training and 
education programmes for opposition parties, covered currency costs for supplies and 
staff training at La Prensa and assisted in improving communication between the 
parties of the UNO coalition.702 While many of the organisations funded by the NED 
were not directly connected to the UNO coalition, a sizable proportion was given, in 
one form or another, to the UNO. Given that the NED was forbidden from directly 
funding opposition parties, grants tended to support training or education. Funds were 
also given for vehicle maintenance, salaries and office equipment. These grants were 
justified with the claim that they were not funding the UNO’s campaign but helping to 
“build party infrastructure”.703 Understandably, this claim was considered spurious by 
the appropriation’s opponents and by NED critics in Washington and Nicaragua. 
Indeed, in the House debate on the appropriation Representative Dave Obey (D-WI) 
stated that it was “money which [was] going to parties” and that a “dollar which goes to 
a party computer or a dollar which goes to a get-out-the-vote-campaign helps the 
candidate every bit as much as it helps the party”.704 It is clear that NED funding for 
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“free and fair elections” was designed, in the words of Rep. George Crockett (D-MI) to 
“buy an opposition victory”.705  
 Since neither Freedom House nor WOLA were grant-making organisations, for 
the most part, neither of their programmes was designed to have a strong impact within 
Nicaragua. Freedom House’s Nicaraguan Election Task Force monitored the election 
and provided briefings for Washington and reports for the international community, 
based on a series of delegations sent to the country in 1989 and 1990. The first of these 
was the delegation of US legal experts which went seeking to “make a contribution to 
the debate about democracy in Nicaragua”.706 The delegation’s report reinforced the 
need for US electoral assistance and criticised the Sandinistas for failing to meet certain 
standards. The report laid out four things that it deemed to be requirements of a 
democratic system: neutral enforcement of electoral law, equal access to resources for 
all parties, freedom to campaign and, perhaps most cryptically, a “democratic 
environment”.707 While some of the report’s findings were fair others were simply not 
true. The delegation reported that the Sandinistas had an advantage because they had 
access to foreign funding that opposition parties did not; in truth, as Freedom House 
was well aware, the NED had been channelling money to the opposition and pro-
opposition groups since the mid-1980s.708 The report concluded that “moral and 
economic assistance should be provided by friends of democracy abroad”.709 
 Freedom House’s report on the first stage of the election process was similarly 
supportive of external involvement in the election and sceptical of the reforms the 
Sandinistas had put in place. It demanded the Sandinistas allow OAS and UN teams to 
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conduct a second vote count at the same time as the Supreme Electoral Council’s (CSE) 
count and stated that international observers should be wary of decisions made by the 
CSE because its administrative appointments had been made by the Sandinistas.710 
Although it was not unreasonable to draw attention to the question of the CSE’s 
independence, to state publicly that observers should actively distrust Nicaragua’s major 
election authority only served to undermine the electoral process. The report also 
suggested that polling officials should be trained by an “impartial” international body, 
such as the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. As the election drew closer, 
Freedom House appeared to be more willing to concede that the environment in the 
country was more democratic; it congratulated the CSE on its voter registration 
campaign, although criticising the same campaign for being confusing and 
underestimating the number of registrants (leading to long queues).711  
 As had been the case prior to the election, Freedom House’s work in 1989 and 
1990 primarily sought to reinforce the ideas and actions of the United States through 
“accurate” reporting of conditions in Nicaragua. In this it was fairly successful. 
Freedom House was accepted and respected within the international community and 
their reports were often used in the UN, the OAS and by the State Department itself. 
The fact that, particularly in the international community, US involvement in the 
Nicaraguan election was so readily accepted by many would suggest that Freedom 
House (and those like it) were successful in promoting the merits of US policy 
regarding Nicaragua. Similarly, when it came to affecting the mood in Washington 
Freedom House’s reports did appear to persuade many that US policy was justified. 
What does become clear from this investigation is exactly how carefully tailored, and at 
times completely inaccurate, these reports were. Reports were careful to acknowledge 
                                                 
710 FH Records, Box 69, Folder 14, Nicaragua: The First Stage of the Electoral Process (14th November 
1989). 
711 Ibid. 
Mara Sankey 
 
264 
 
changes they supported so as not to risk the validity of a potential UNO victory, while 
simultaneously continuing to criticise the Sandinistas for incompetence or heavy-
handedness and to call into question those institutions involved in the electoral process 
in order to undermine the Sandinista government in the eyes of the international 
community.  
 WOLA’s work on the Nicaraguan election mostly took the form of damage 
control against the work of Freedom House and organisations like it. WOLA provided 
briefings on US Nicaraguan policy to religious and other grassroots groups that were 
sending delegations to the elections, and channelled information for use in debates to 
members of Congress who had been long-standing opponents of Contra aid, as well as 
the staff of the foreign affairs and appropriations committees.712 In April 1989, it sent a 
memo to the staff of the Foreign Affairs committees explaining that Nicaragua’s 
political parties had agreed on democratic rules and had agreed to participate in the 
1990 election. This memo also stated that the opposition and the National 
Reconciliation Committee were very active in the political life of the country.713 WOLA 
was also in regular contact with those members of Congress opposed to US electoral aid 
and wrote a number of memos questioning NED practices and highlighting potential 
violations of the Central American Peace Accords that could result from US aid to the 
UNO.714 One of WOLA’s larger projects was a conference on NED and USAID 
funding practices for electoral aid. Although this conference was not solely concerned 
with Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan appropriation did make up a sizable part of the 
discussion in which academics and other non-state actors argued that not only did they 
believe US electoral aid in Nicaragua represented an effort to influence domestic 
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politics, but also that it served to discredit the UNO campaign since it was used as an 
election issue against them and hindered their ability to raise money domestically.715 
 In addition to its work in Washington, WOLA also sent a delegation to 
Nicaragua to observe the election. Unlike Freedom House, which held the Nicaraguan 
government to its own standard of rules, WOLA focused on whether the Sandinistas 
had complied with their commitments under the Central American Peace Accords. 
WOLA showed that the Sandinistas had released political prisoners, lifted sanctions on 
media outlets and liberalised electoral laws after taking the suggestions of opposition 
parties into account.716 This report also provided extensive information on the 
composition of the CSE and the opposition parties, stressing the factionalised nature of 
political organisations in Nicaragua. The report also provided details of accusations 
made against the Sandinistas relating to intimidation, land expropriation and media 
censoring as well as summarising US media and congressional reactions to the 
election.717 Unlike the Freedom House reports of the election, which were heavily 
balanced in favour of the opposition, WOLA tended to offer a straight reporting of the 
events and reactions with very little editorialising. Following the election, in 1991, 
WOLA published a report on the post-election dynamic in the country which included 
analysis of the continued US role in Nicaragua and the socio-economic conditions after 
a year of UNO rule.718  
 WOLA’s goal for its work on the Nicaraguan election was primarily to counter 
the misinformation disseminated by the Reagan administration and helping those 
members of Congress who sought to block further US involvement in the country. It is 
clear that WOLA did not see international interference in the election as productive or 
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particularly useful and, as a result, aside from sending its own delegation to monitor the 
elections, it focused its attention on levelling the playing field in Washington rather than 
in Nicaragua. Since WOLA had previously declared Nicaragua a democratic country 
and, while more favourable to their ideology than its neo-conservative counterparts, was 
not blindly supportive of the Sandinistas, its work concerning the election was minimal 
and, for the most part, not particularly analytical. WOLA appeared to believe that 
simple factual narratives, information and data would do more to shift the debate in 
Washington. However, the large base of support for the US electoral aid packages and 
the widespread belief within Congress that Nicaragua under the Sandinistas was a 
dictatorship with no prior democratic infrastructure or experience, suggests that WOLA 
and its allies lost the war for a reasoned discussion of Nicaragua’s political situation in 
Washington.  
 Indeed, the case of the Nicaraguan election showcased the powerful hold that 
neo-conservative human rights groups had gained over the conversation in Washington. 
Although neither the NED nor Freedom House had the network of local actors 
supposedly necessary for the pursuit of advocacy and grant-making, both were key 
players in US policy debates and in the representation of these issues to a national and 
international audience. Throughout the 1980s Freedom House worked to shape the 
debate both in the United States and abroad, combining the traditional language of 
human rights and civil liberties with a new focus on democracy promotion, gradually 
phasing out the former as the decade wore on. Its work in shaping the dialogue and 
shifting it away from human rights towards the importance of (US-style) democracy 
helped to smooth the way for the NED’s democracy promoting work within Nicaragua. 
In the early 1980s, the NED also spoke in the language of human rights as well as 
democracy promotion and focused most of its work towards the funding of civil society 
organisations such as La Prensa and the CUS. As the dialogue shifted, the NED began 
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its more direct funding of Nicaragua’s political opposition culminating in the special 
appropriation which was justified using the language of the importance of “free and 
fair” democracy. While US interference in Latin America had rarely sparked 
international or domestic outrage in the 20th century, the success of Freedom House and 
others like it is evident in the fact that the NED’s blatant attempt to influence the 
Nicaraguan elections in the name of “democracy promotion” passed through the 
international community with almost no protest. Although there was always some 
opposition to the NED within Congress, until the special appropriation there was almost 
no complaint concerning the NED’s programme in Nicaragua. Even when it came to the 
appropriation, much of the argument was less about the interference in a foreign 
election (although there was opposition of this kind) and more to do with the amount of 
money, procedural issues and the belief that the United States had “done enough” in 
Nicaragua to secure its aims anyway. This strongly suggests that the neo-conservative 
movement had been successful in redefining human rights and democracy in line with 
US security interests.   
 This is not to say that there was no interest in traditional human rights or that 
that side of the conversation had wholly abandoned; but, as can be seen in the work of 
WOLA, when it came to Nicaragua the work of the more traditional universalist human 
rights organisations became closer to damage control than prevention. Moreover, some 
of them did begin either to adopt this new language of democracy or, as WOLA did, to 
try and find a new niche for themselves. Indeed, for much of the 1980s WOLA did very 
little work on Nicaragua aside from producing human rights reports on the Contra war 
and monitoring the 1984 election. As the 1990 election drew closer and the international 
interest in Nicaragua grew, WOLA’s workload concerning the country did increase, but 
it mostly consisted of countering the information being produced by organisations such 
as Freedom House and the US government. However, for all the information it provided 
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to the foreign policy community, the international community and other non-state 
actors, it was not successful at breaking the hold of the new democracy-focused 
dialogue. As a result, once the election in Nicaragua was over, WOLA sought new 
rights issues to work on away from the universalist human rights of the 1970s. A focus 
on economic and social issues allowed it to retain as much of the traditional rights-
based language as possible while still allowing it to fit into the new dialogue of the 
Bush administration.  
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Conclusion 
 
The 1980s was the decade in which the convergence of human rights and democracy 
promotion, which began in the 1970s, developed within the non-state sector and came to 
prominence in US foreign policy. There has been a trend to cast the policy of 
democracy promotion as little more than a pretext for US intervention abroad.719 While 
the policy certainly has a capacity to fulfil a neo-imperialist function and has been used 
for that purpose since, this was not its primary aim in the 1980s. Democracy promotion 
offered, instead, a new form of morality for US foreign policy. Unlike liberal human 
rights policies, which required both the US’s allies as well as its enemies to be rebuked, 
democracy promotion gave the United States a chance to maintain the moral high 
ground and advance an anti-Communist agenda while retaining its more authoritarian 
allies. Furthermore, democracy promotion remained a powerful moral justification for 
US policy as terrorism replaced Communism as the main perceived existential threat. 
The Reagan administration made democracy promotion a key priority of its inter-
American policy, raising it in tandem with the coming to prominence of the neo-
conservative human rights movement in Washington and the international community. 
While the subsequent Bush administration did begin to bring the liberal human rights 
network back into a position of influence in the executive branch, the rhetoric and 
conception of human rights had irrevocably changed, a fact attested by the need of 
traditionally liberal human rights organisations such as WOLA to materially reshape 
their rhetoric in order to be taken seriously by the US government.  
 Although the issue of democratic rights was of interest to both the neo-
conservative and liberal human rights movements, the liberal human rights movement 
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had sought to ensure all those political rights written into international law were upheld. 
These rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration, did not lay down a 
specific vision of democracy or democratic rights; the Universal Declaration merely 
states that citizens should have the right to take part in the government of their country 
and the will of the people, expressed through periodic elections, should be the basis of 
government. By contrast, the neo-conservative human rights movement, typified by the 
NED and Freedom House, redefined political rights as democratic rights, specifically 
those democratic rights afforded by a US-style polyarchic democracy, and made them 
the focus of the human rights movement. This led to the politicisation of human rights, 
forging a partisan tool from an originally universalist concept. Under the neo-
conservative interpretation, political systems such as those introduced by the 
Sandinistas could never meet these standards since they rejected the representative 
polyarchic democracy of the United States in favour of participatory democratic 
experiments. Moreover, this interpretation allowed the United States (and non-state 
actors) to seek regime change in allied nations with authoritarian regimes without 
actively withdrawing support from the regime in question (as seen in Chile). WOLA 
and the liberal human rights movement, although interested in ensuring populations 
could participate in government on the terms enshrined in the Universal Declaration, 
were less concerned with the exact form this participation took. As a result, the liberal 
human rights movement was able and willing to apply the standards enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration to governments across the world, including those of the United 
States and its allies.  
While the liberal human rights movement had developed from the grass-roots 
and, in the 1970s, had been adopted and institutionalised by the Carter administration, 
the neo-conservative conception of human rights was more top-down in its formation. 
WOLA’s founding story, of being an organisation grown from the bottom up and 
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outside the social network of the state, was common among liberal human rights groups, 
(although its religious background was less so). WOLA built up its network of 
Washington contacts from scratch through the work it undertook throughout the 1970s. 
Although it was successful in building a group of supporters, once the Reagan 
administration assumed power and many of those executive staffers who had valued its 
work in the 1970s were replaced, WOLA found itself isolated from foreign policy 
circles outside of Congress. By contrast, Freedom House and the NED were embedded 
within the Reaganite foreign policy network. Both organisations were run and staffed by 
members of the burgeoning neo-conservative movement, which had grown out of the 
SDUSA, and both were engaging with human rights, democracy promotion and foreign 
policy on the Reagan administration’s terms. Indeed, the redefinition of human rights to 
include democracy promotion was the result of the work of both members of the US 
government, starting with Elliott Abrams and groups such as Freedom House (which 
moved away from its centrist roots in the 1980s). The outcome was the creation of the 
NED to be the leading non-state face of the new movement.  
The organisations which focused on human rights and democracy promotion did 
not behave in the manner of other types of non-state actor. Most of the theories and 
scholarship concerning the “third sector” focus on either NGOs (service-providing 
organisations including humanitarian and development groups) or CSOs (political 
agents such as think tanks and private aid agencies). The organisations under 
investigation here fit neither of these definitions but fall somewhere between the two. 
Due to their nature as independent political actors, they did not encounter the same 
problems with legitimacy and independence as NGOs, particularly in respect of 
funding. Although the NED was entirely government funded, its legitimacy as an 
independent organisation was only questioned when it accepted conditional 
appropriations from USAID. Regardless of the level of influence the NED’s basic 
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funding arrangement actually gave the US government over its programming, its 
independence was only publicly questioned when Congress visibly dictated where the 
NED deployed funds. Similarly, foundation funding was seen merely as a necessary 
part of international human rights work and neither Freedom House nor WOLA felt 
their legitimacy compromised as a result of their foundation funding, despite the Ford 
Foundation actually requiring a number of internal changes of WOLA as a condition of 
its funding. Since foundations were largely perceived as apolitical, questions concerning 
these financial relationships were rarely asked by the peers or critics of these 
organisations. That said, as closer examination of the foundations in question suggests, 
the foundations that funded Freedom House and WOLA were far from apolitical and 
did, in fact, form a key part of the international political networks in which these 
organisations were situated.  
The question of the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of non-state actors 
and the problems this can pose for the effectiveness of these organisations is raised 
regularly by scholars. However, again, these three organisations did not fit existing 
theoretical models. Neither the NED nor Freedom House needed to undergo a 
professionalisation process because both organisations began life operating in a rather 
more business-like manner than traditional NGOs. Both of these organisations were 
mostly staffed with “professionals” and both were bureaucratic from the start (although 
in the case of the NED this was a consequence of the reporting requirements placed 
upon it by the General Accounting Office and Congress). Only WOLA underwent a 
professionalisation process in the 1980s and, while this visited significant changes upon 
the organisation’s personnel, operations and funding, it did not create the accountability 
crisis so often observed in service-providing non-state actors. Indeed, these 
organisations did not face the same issues of accountability as their service-providing 
counterparts because they lacked traditional “beneficiaries”. As a grant-making 
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organisation, the NED came closest to having “beneficiaries”; but, since the groups and 
individuals who received NED funding on the ground in Latin America were kept at a 
remove from the NED itself by the use of intermediary US organisations to channel 
funding, the NED was never immediately accountable to Latin American groups. 
Moreover, as information disseminators, neither Freedom House nor WOLA was 
answerable to groups on the ground. In both cases, their only accountability was to 
those using the information they provided and even then, this only extended to 
questions of accuracy and detail. Indeed, of the three only WOLA saw itself as having 
any kind of accountability to Latin American actors and this relationship was not 
significantly affected by its professionalisation process since it retained its network of 
local informants and continued to listen carefully to their interests. Since none of the 
three organisations provided on the ground services or emergency relief, they did not 
require the same levels of flexibility and quick decision-making that humanitarian and 
development organisations needed. As a result, an increase in bureaucracy did very little 
to influence the effectiveness or efficiency of their work.  
What did impact the work of the three organisations was their relationships with 
the Washington foreign policy community, other international non-state actors and local 
actors on the ground. The Reagan administration ushered in a new relationship between 
Washington foreign policy-makers and the third sector. The Reagan administration had 
a great hostility to the liberal human rights movement, which had been taken into 
confidence under Carter. Particularly during the early 1980s, WOLA was largely cut off 
from both the White House and the State Department, which curtailed its ability to 
reach a key part of the Washington foreign policy-making community. Although it 
maintained a small but active network of contacts and supporters within Congress, 
without access to the State Department its ability to influence policy decisions was 
minimal. Organisations such as WOLA had, traditionally, sought to act as a check on 
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the morality of US government policy and under Reagan they continued to do so, often 
putting themselves at odds with the US government.720 By contrast, the NED and 
Freedom House positioned themselves as implementers and justifiers of US government 
policy in the 1980s. They were well connected and supported within the State 
Department and Congress during the 1980s and early 1990s and, through their work, 
sought to provide members of these branches of government with the tools to rationalise 
Reagan administration policy. While all three organisations struggled to draw much 
attention to Latin American issues under Bush, during the Reagan administration both 
the NED and Freedom House enjoyed consistent access to the State Department and, in 
the case of Freedom House, was regularly consulted about region. Despite its public and 
vocal support for and involvement in the founding of the NED, the White House took 
very little meaningful interest in any of the three organisations during this period. Only 
Freedom House, as the oldest and most established of the three, had any consistently 
direct contact with the White House during this time and this came in the form of 
requests for briefings from Freedom House staff. An explanation for the growth in 
power of the neo-conservative human rights movement can be found in the fact that the 
NED and Freedom House publicly enjoyed the confidence of the Executive during this 
time, while WOLA and other liberal human rights groups were dismissed as biased and 
looked upon with suspicion. The alignment of political views and anti-communist 
definitions of human rights between the US government and the neo-conservative 
movement goes some way to explaining its successes despite its lacking the legitimacy 
traditionally provided by collaboration with other international non-state actors and 
engagement with local actors in the region.  
Lack of collaboration and engagement with local actors did, in fact, seem to 
characterise the neo-conservative movement. While the liberal human rights movement 
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of the 1970s was built around mass mobilisation through strong transnational networks, 
requiring extensive pooling of resources through collaboration between international 
non-state actors and cordial working relationships with local actors, the neo-
conservative movement was constructed from the top down. Organisations involved in 
the neo-conservative movement tended to be more insular and rarely had extensive 
grassroots networks. This is not to say that such organisations lacked involvement with 
their peers; as a grant-making organisation, the NED had long-standing working 
relationships with its grantees, even those not set as core grantees by Congress. Indeed, 
its relationships with its grantees were often on a more equal basis than those of many 
grant-making organisations and their grantees, possibly because the NED’s grantees 
were also international Western actors. Similarly, Freedom House did engage 
periodically with other organisations for information exchange, but only in one or two 
cases did this extend to longer-term collaborative relationships. Moreover, the 
relationships it did establish with other international non-state actors were largely one-
sided, with information passing to Freedom House but very little going the other way. 
By contrast, WOLA worked consistently and extensively with other liberal international 
non-state actors, pooling funding and resources, exchanging information and 
maintaining reciprocal relationships. This difference in methodology represented a 
fundamental difference in the attitudes of the two human rights movements. The liberal 
human rights movement believed that legitimacy derived from mass movements, 
collaboration and strong reciprocal relationships. Collaboration and reciprocal 
relationships enabled them to take on bigger and more ambitious projects while 
simultaneously lending weight and credibility to their work. The neo-conservative 
movement, on the other hand, believed its credibility and legitimacy was derived from 
its contacts within formal foreign policy channels. Overall, these organisations were 
also usually better and more consistently funded than their liberal counterparts and, as a 
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result, did not require the same level of resource pooling in order to function on a larger 
scale.  
Similarly, when it came to relations with local actors, the neo-conservative 
human rights movement was not a truly transnational movement. Neither the NED nor 
Freedom House made much effort to engage with Latin American actors, and when they 
did it was usually limited to personal relationships between organisational staff and 
members of Latin American governments. The ultimate beneficiaries of NED funding in 
Latin America were, by design, kept at arm’s length with very little contact ever 
occurring between the two groups. Indeed, the NED’s primary relationship in Latin 
America consisted of a personal relationship between Gershman and the Chamorro 
family, which had a distinctly negative effect on the public perception of the NED. 
Similarly, Freedom House lacked connections in Latin America, particularly among 
grassroots organisations. It maintained some contact with organisations such as the 
Chilean Commission on Human Rights, but they were used primarily as an occasional 
information resource and very little information or assistance passed the other way. This 
lack of local contacts calls into question the level of understanding these organisations 
had about the situation on the ground and their ability to obtain detailed and impartial 
information or make informed choices about where to send funding. It suggests that, in 
fact, these organisations were designed not to be transnational advocates and providers 
of aid, but rather to act as implementers or justifiers of US policy towards the world. By 
contrast, extensive contact and collaboration with local actors were key aspects of the 
workings of liberal human rights organisations such as WOLA. Indeed, a great deal of 
WOLA’s legitimacy in both Washington and Latin America derived from the fact that it 
was seen as well connected in the region and to be acting on the information and 
interests of these connections.  
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These differences in working methods are indicative of the differences in 
approach and in scope of the two human rights movements. The neo-conservative 
human rights movement was characterised by top-down structures, highly insular 
working methods and a strong focus on promoting US interests in the region, with little 
first-hand information concerning the situation on the ground. Its interest in human 
rights and democracy promotion was primarily political. Amalgamating the 
internationally powerful idea of human rights with what amounted to a less incendiary 
form of anti-Communism lent a moral argument, if not a moral imperative, to US anti-
Communist policy in the region and the NED and Freedom House were instrumental in 
the implementation and justification of these policies. This is exemplified by the work 
of these organisations in Chile and Nicaragua. The interest these two organisations took 
in the two countries directly correlated to US policy in the region and, in both cases 
these organisations sought to promote whatever they saw as being in the US’ best 
interests. In Chile, this took the form of reshaping the democratic opposition into a 
moderate and pro-US force and providing information to discredit the more radical left 
and create the impression that the centre and centre-right groups were the only hope for 
Chile’s future. In the significantly more contentious case of Nicaragua, the work of 
these organisations involved promoting and funding the Nicaraguan opposition in 
preparation for the 1989 election and directing the foreign policy-making community 
towards the idea that the Sandinista government was inherently undemocratic and US 
policy was serving as a positive democratising force.  
This was a far remove from the liberal human rights movement that built itself 
around the power of grassroots mass movements and transnational relationships 
between non-state groups and actors. The liberal human rights movement sought to see 
that international law was upheld, but also that the interests and needs of local actors 
were heard and taken into account. Its greatest strength and legitimacy came from its 
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extensive relationships with local actors on the ground and the collaborative, reciprocal 
relationships it developed between international human rights groups. In this WOLA 
was no exception and, as a result of its devotion to the upholding of international law 
regardless of nations’ political and ideological affiliation, it often found itself at 
loggerheads with the Reagan administration. In Chile, it essentially continued the 
Carter-era policy of focusing public and government attention on the human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the Pinochet regime, an issue that the Reagan administration had 
played down in its relationship with the junta. Meanwhile, its work in Nicaragua sought 
to provide an alternative to the Reagan administration’s narrative about the Sandinistas’ 
communist sympathies and the country’s involvement with the Soviet Union. WOLA 
highlighted the Sandinistas’ abuse of Miskito Indians and the curtailment of civil 
liberties brought about by the state of emergency. However, its primary aim was to 
persuade Washington and the US public that, far from the undemocratic, communist 
police state envisioned by the Reagan administration, Nicaragua was functionally 
democratic and the majority of its shortcomings in human rights stemmed from 
destructive US policy towards it.  
So why, given the extent of WOLA’s on the ground contacts and knowledge in 
the region, did it (and the broader liberal human rights movement) struggle to influence 
US policy towards Latin America during this time? On the one hand, the answer is 
simply that the liberal movement did not have the ear of the US government at the time. 
The suspicion with which Reagan regarded these organisations limited their access to 
those branches of government most concerned with foreign policy-making. By contrast, 
the NED and Freedom House enjoyed unparalleled access to the State Department, 
Congress and, in the case of Freedom House, even occasionally the White House. 
However, the answer is more complicated than a mere lack of access, as evidenced by 
fact that the strong network of supporters WOLA maintained within Congress was still 
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unable to influence policy much during this time. Instead, the answer lies in the 
confluence of a number of factors, including access to the government, the somewhat 
“imperial” nature of the Reagan presidency and the timely redefinition of human rights.  
The inauguration of Reagan brought with it a distinct change in the Bureau of 
Human Rights as well as the international cause of human rights. Abrams had been a 
proponent of the concept of democracy as a human right for some time and brought this 
belief to the role of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. This opened the door 
for organisations such as Freedom House and the NED, with similar conceptions of 
human rights, to enjoy the level of influence the liberal human rights movement had 
enjoyed under Carter. Moreover, the strongly anti-Communist policies operated by the 
Reagan administration clashed with the liberal human rights movement’s commitment 
to universalism in its work, which led to such organisations regularly criticising the 
authoritarian regimes with which the Reagan administration aligned in the region. This 
gradual exclusion of the liberal human rights movement meant that, as the decade 
progressed, the new definition which included the uniquely US form of democratic 
rights, gained traction not only in the United States but also internationally. Even once 
the liberal human rights movement regained some of its lost ground in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the new definition was entrenched as an international norm. Indeed, the 
United States used elements of this amalgamation of democracy and human rights as 
part of the justification for both the 1990 Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
The prominence of this new conception of human rights did not necessarily force the 
liberal human rights movement to change its own definitions and, certainly, 
organisation such as Amnesty International have continued their work largely 
unchanged. However, in the 1990s some, such as WOLA, did adopt socio-economic 
and other issues typically outside the remit of traditional human rights work in order to 
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try to rehabilitate themselves in the new human rights discourse and to align with 
Bush’s post-Cold War policy interests.  
A great deal of the scholarship concerning inter-American relations of the 1980s 
chooses to focus on the flashpoints of US aggression and the abandonment of 
containment policies, as noted in the Introduction. However, this approach ignores the 
key legacy of the Reagan administration in inter-American policy.721 Democracy 
promotion continued to shape the manner in which the United States engaged with the 
region (and indeed the rest of the world) in the aftermath of the Cold War and into the 
21st century. Dismissal of the policy of democracy promotion due to its uneven 
application or the fact that it did little to nurture true democracy is short-sighted.722 
There is little doubt that this policy did not necessarily seek to help local actors in 
creating home-grown democratic systems, but this was never its intended purpose. Nor 
was its designed merely to act as a justification for intervention (although it was 
certainly used this way on occasions). Instead, democracy promotion was designed to 
provide a new moral policy around which the United States could rally and exert its 
influence internationally. During the Cold War, it had a secondary aim of shaping Latin 
American democratic transitions to produce systems which resembled the US. Indeed, 
the strict adherence of the NED and Freedom House to polyarchic, US-style democracy 
in their work is indicative of this. Furthermore, the continued influence of democracy 
promoting organisations into the 1990s, combined with the fact that groups such as 
WOLA were forced to alter their principles to fit the new international rhetoric, is 
illustrative of the fact that democracy promotion had become a key part of inter-
American policy.  
                                                 
721 Scott, Deciding to Intervene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) pp. 2-5 and Lowenthal, “The 
United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History” in Exporting Democracy 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991) pp. 268-270.  
722 Lowenthal, “The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History” in Exporting 
Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991) p. 270. 
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This thesis has shown that the rise of democracy promotion policies also brought 
with it a change in the way non-state actors interacted with traditional foreign policy-
making channels. While in the 1970s, non-state actors usually positioned themselves as 
providing a moral check on the actions of states, the 1980s saw the rise of non-state 
actors which sought to provide not only justification but also implementation assistance 
for state foreign policy.723 Non-state actors did provide support for the Carter 
administration’s human rights policy, but, for the most part the relationship between the 
administration and non-state actors was one of information exchange. Liberal human 
rights groups provided information concerning abuses throughout the world along with 
suggestions for action and the Carter administration made policy decisions with the help 
of that information; but the administration was not above criticism from human rights 
groups when it failed to live up to their expectations.724 By contrast, under Reagan the 
liberal human rights movement was completely blocked from influencing policy for 
much of the decade and, instead of providing information and policy suggestions, the 
neo-conservative movement sought either to assist in the implementation or provide 
information to justify policies already in place. This is not to say that these 
organisations completely eschewed policy suggestions: Freedom House did make some 
suggestions based on its own analysis (and these were often taken seriously), but this 
was not the norm for the relationship between the Reagan administration and non-state 
actors.   
Moyn has argued that liberal human rights did “far more to transform the terrain 
of idealism than they [did] the world itself”.725 This investigation of non-state actors has 
shown that the re-definition of human rights to include democracy promotion brought 
about a significant change to both idealism and the world. Instigated by members of the 
                                                 
723 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) pp. 23-24.  
724 Sikkink, Mixed Signals (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) pp. 122-123. 
725 Moyn, The Last Utopia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) p. 9.  
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US government and supported by non-state actors, this new movement took the moral 
foreign policy of the Carter era and redefined it for use in the war against Communism. 
As a result of the fact that, initially, third sector actors had acted as moral checks on 
government policy, there is a widespread public perception that increased numbers of 
third sector actors ensures greater governmental accountability to citizens and the 
international community. However, as in the case of the neo-conservative non-state 
actors discussed here, after the 1980s this did not necessarily hold true. In little more 
than a decade, not only had the new definition of human rights taken hold as a tenet of 
US foreign policy, but it had gained a non-state following which had worked to 
establish it as an international norm and lend the moral legitimacy of the third sector to 
the policy of democracy promotion abroad. This thesis goes some way to proving and 
developing the comment made by Moyn in the epilogue to The Last Utopia that the 
Reagan era brought the assimilation of human rights into democracy promotion.726 
However, Moyn places the “human rights community” firmly in opposition to this 
redefinition of human rights. In reality, as this thesis has shown, the policy of 
democracy promotion fractured the human rights community, developing a new 
movement which operated in opposition to the liberal movement and in full support of 
democracy promotion.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
726 Ibid, p. 217. 
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